GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

 

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MARKETPLACE TRENDS AND ENTANGLEMENTS © Leo Haviland April 4, 2022

Bob Dylan says in “The Times They Are A-Changin’”:
“There’s a battle outside and it is ragin’
It’ll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin’”

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CONCLUSION

Marketplace history of course is not marketplace destiny, whether for one financial realm or the relationships between assorted domains. Although traditions and the analytical time horizon and the scope of allegedly relevant variables remain critical, the cultural past in its major fields such as economics and politics need not repeat itself, either completely or even partly. Yet sometimes current and potential economic and other cultural situations apparently manifest sufficient important similarities to “the past” so that many observers can perceive patterns helping to explain “the present” and to forecast future probabilities. Thus from the standpoint of many subjective perspectives, marketplace history (like other history) often does recur to a substantial extent. Such alleged historical similarity, as it is not objective (scientific), also consequently permits a great variety of competitive storytelling about it.

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The 2022 landscape for the United States dollar, the US Treasury 10 year note, commodities “in general”, and the S+P 500 resembles that of around early 2020. The United States dollar currently hints that it may have established an important peak or that it will soon do so. The real Broad Dollar Index’s height (see the Federal Reserve Board, H.10) borders its March/April 2020 highs. Arguably commodities in general began a notable decline in early 2022. Using the broad S&P GSCI as a benchmark, the spot/physical/cash (as well as the nearest futures continuation) commodities complex (including the key petroleum arena) peaked in early January 2020 alongside a strengthening US dollar. A pattern of increasing US Treasury yields (take the 10 year note as the signpost) preceded the early 2020 stock pinnacles (S+P 500 on 2/19/20; emerging marketplaces in general on 1/13/20) as well as the commodities one. Marketplace chronicles unveil a significant yield increase in the UST 10 year note (and other important debt security benchmarks) prior to (and following) the S+P 500’s very significant high (perhaps a major top) 1/4/22 at 4819. As in 2020, the 2022 highs in stocks and commodities entangled with both rising yields and a strong dollar.

In summary, although their future levels and trends admittedly are cloudy and uncertain, what are probable trends for these marketplaces? The United States real Broad Dollar Index probably has attained its pinnacle or will do so in the near future. Commodities in general (spot; nearest futures basis) probably made a major high in early March 2022 and will continue to retreat. Although it is a difficult call, the S+P 500 likely peaked in January 2022, and it probably will venture beneath late February 2022’s 4115 low. Over the long run, given the American (and global) inflation and debt situation, the yield for the US Treasury 10 year note will ascend above its recent high around 2.55 percent, although occasional “flights to quality” and thus interim yield declines may emerge.

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Arguments in marketplaces and elsewhere in cultural life that “this time is different” are inescapable and often persuasive. Of course the coronavirus pandemic played a major role in the first quarter 2020 collapse in global stocks and commodities. However, the rising interest rates and strong dollar variables still played an important part in those 2020 marketplace declines. And the American and international inflation and debt troubles of 2022 (“nowadays”) far exceed those existing around January 2020. The Russian invasion of Ukraine obviously makes aspects of the recent commodities situation different from 2020; global petroleum prices, for example, though “high” prior to the Russia/Ukraine conflict, probably would not have skyrocketed in its absence. And in regard to historic and potential future marketplace relationships and related risk assessments, we should not forget 2007-09, the ending of the Goldilocks Era and its dismal aftermath, the global economic disaster. The S+P 500’s summit (October 2007) diverged for several months from the peak in commodities in general (July 2008), although the trends of those two financial sectors thereafter converged. Also, as US and other stocks began their terrifying descent in spring 2008 until March 2009, the dollar rallied.

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Marketplace Trends and Entanglements (4-4-22)

RINGING IN THE NEW YEAR: US AND OTHER GOVERNMENT NOTE TRENDS © Leo Haviland January 6, 2020

“Time present and time past

Are both perhaps present in time future,

And time future contained in time past.” T.S. Eliot’s poem, “Burnt Norton”

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CONCLUSION

Since summer 2016, the marketplace yield trends for government 10 year notes of the United States and many of its key trading partners generally have resembled each other. Given today’s interconnected global economy, the crucial role of the United States within it, and the roughly similar central bank policy strategies for these nations, this pattern probably will continue.

Over the past three and one-half years, at times some moderate divergence appeared within that group. For example, yield highs for China’s 10 year government note (11/27/17’s 4.04 percent) and the German Bund (2/8/18’s .81 percent) preceded America’s critical yield top on 10/9/18 at 3.26 percent. But even when yield highs (lows) occurred at different times for some sovereigns relative to others, directional shifts in yield for the entire group tended to happen around the same time. Thus China’s 9/21/18 interim high at 3.71 percent and Germany’s on 10/10/18 at .58pc align with the UST yield pinnacle on 10/9/18.

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The United States Treasury 10 year note yield completed a triple bottom during this era. Recall 7/5/12’s 1.38 percent trough. Then see 7/6/16’s 1.32 percent major low and 9/3/19’s 1.43pc. September 2019’s UST depth probably commenced an extended period of rising government (as well as other) interest rates for America and its important trading partners “in general”. Widespread and determined devotion by leading central banks to a gospel of sufficient inflation (the Federal Reserve’s two percent target is a key benchmark) and adequate GDP growth (and low unemployment) encourages this. Given America’s great importance within the world economy, its large current national debt and looming massive future fiscal deficits tend to propel UST interest rates (and thus American corporate yields) upward, and thereby help to raise government yields of many of its global trading partners.

Current central bank caution (including maintaining some yield repression and quantitative easing/money printing) may inhibit a rapid and large yield ascent for the US Treasury 10 year and its companions. In addition, rate climbs for the assorted 10 year government notes will not all necessarily be the same in distance or speed terms. And fearful “flights to quality” at times can depress government debt yields of “safe haven” nations such as America and Germany. For America’s 10 year Treasury note, significant resistance exists around two percent.

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Ringing in the New Year- US and Other Government Note Trends (1-6-20)

SEASONS COME, SEASONS GO: US NATURAL GAS © Leo Haviland February 5, 2019

“The Times They Are A-Changin’”, a Bob Dylan song

CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

The vicious bear slump in NYMEX natural gas (nearest futures continuation) that started after 11/14/18’s 4.929 peak probably will end between mid-February and early March 2019. Assuming normal weather for the balance of winter 2019, major support around 2.40/2.50 probably will hold. Above-average temperatures for the rest of this winter increase the risk of a  moderate breach of the 2.40/2.50 floor.

Looking forward over the next several months, NYMEX natural gas (nearest futures) probably will remain in a sideways trend between 2.40/2.50 and 3.20/3.45. However, higher than anticipated United States natural gas production, reduced demand due to milder than expected summer weather, or American economic feebleness may inspire an assault on the lower end of that range. Many important lows in nearest futures continuation have occurred in late August/calendar September.

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What is a “low”, “high”, or “normal” (average, reasonable) inventory is a matter of opinion. In any case, over the past two years, the United States natural gas industry probably has shifted toward a lower level of desired (appropriate, reasonable, normal, prudent, sufficient) stock holding relative to long run historical averages. Structural changes in the US natural gas marketplace have encouraged more widespread (and more aggressive) adoption of a “just-in-time” (lower inventories in days coverage terms) inventory management approach instead of a “just-in-case” (relatively higher stockpiles) method.

Why? One likely factor has been faith that gas production (in 2018, 2019, and thereafter) would remain far greater than that of calendar 2017. Many players therefore probably believe there “always (or almost always) will be enough gas around” to satisfy demand, even during peak consumption periods. Another variable likely encouraging lower inventory in days coverage terms is the substantial expansion of America’s pipeline infrastructure. Thus it has (will) become easier to move sufficient gas to many locations where it is needed. In addition, the growing share of renewables in total US electricity generation arguably to some extent reduces the amount of necessary natural gas inventories.

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Assume an entrenched change in natural gas inventory management practices to the just-in-time orientation. Assume also that from the days coverage perspective (stocks relative to consumption), the “reasonable” level of industry holdings has tumbled by several days relative to historical days coverage benchmarks. Nevertheless, anticipated October 2019 (and October 2020) United States natural gas inventories from the days coverage perspective are substantially lower than the historical average. The natural gas inventory situation therefore is somewhat bullish, particularly from the perspective regarding the close of build seasons at end October 2019 and end October 2020.

Suppose US natural gas output does not surpass current expectations, economic growth remains moderate, weather remains normal, and commodity prices in general (especially in the petroleum complex) do not collapse. This natural gas inventory situation, assuming it persists, makes it probable that the marketplace eventually will attack and surpass 3.20/3.45.

Although prospects for US natural gas days coverage at end October 2019 and October 2020 at present currently are fairly bullish, end March 2020 inventories appear sufficient. It consequently may be difficult to sustain moves over 3.45/3.70.

Despite the explosive price leap to nearly 5.000 in mid-November 2018, the shattering collapse from mid-December (12/10/18 high at 4.666), signals that many natural gas marketplace participants probably remain complacent regarding the availability of supplies, even in regard to periods of expected or actual high demand. The current sideways trends and relatively modest price heights for the summer 2019 and winter 2019-2020 calendar strips likewise reflect little worry regarding prospective supply availability 

However, picture a significantly colder than usual winter (or widespread belief this will occur). A colder than normal winter 2019/20 (or winter 2020/21), assuming low end-October days coverage, boosts the risks of very low inventories at the end of winter and thus substantial (even if brief in duration) bull charges. US natural gas inventories were very low in days coverage terms at end-October 2018. Fears that available supplies (whether in days coverage or arithmetical terms) are or may become tight can prompt feverish scrambles to procure them. Recall the spike from 9/10/18’s 2.752 and 10/29/18’s 3.100 up to November 2018’s summit. In any case, the most probable time for any flight toward or above 4.00/4.10 is close to or during winter.

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Seasons Come, Seasons Go- US Natural Gas (2-5-19)

TICKING CLOCKS: US FINANCIAL MARKETPLACES (c) Leo Haviland August 8, 2016

“Isn’t it a pity…the wrong people always have money.” From “The Big Clock”, a 1948 American film noir (John Farrow, director)

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CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

Ongoing yield repression by the Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank, and their allies plays a crucial role in keeping the US Treasury 10 year note well beneath 6/11/15’s 2.50 percent interim yield top, as well as later and lower heights of 2.38pc (11/9/15) and 2.00pc (3/16/16). For the next few months, running up at least through America’s 2016 election period, it will be difficult for the UST 10 year to break above the resistance range of 2.00/2.50pc or much under its 7/6/16 low at 1.32pc.

The Fed leadership promotes caution regarding Fed Funds rate boosts. The NY Fed President recently argued “at the moment, for caution in raising U.S. short-term interest rates” (“The U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy”; 7/31/16). A Fed Governor is “not in a hurry to lift rates”; he argues “for a ‘very gradual’ path for any rises” (Interview with Financial Times, 8/8/16, p2).

Economic growth in America, Europe, and Japan generally remains subdued. China, though it retains a comparatively strong real GDP rate, has slowed down. Despite massive money printing (quantitative easing) by assorted leading central banks at various times over the past seven to eight years, inflation yardsticks generally remain beneath the two percent target beloved by the Fed and its loyal allies. Ongoing government deficit spending, though less than during the global economic disaster era and the following few years, in recent times likewise has not sparked sustained substantial growth or sufficient inflation.

The broad real trade-weighted US dollar (“TWD”, monthly average; Fed H.10 statistics), though still lofty relative to its July 2011 major bottom around 80.5, remains beneath first quarter 2016’s 101.2 pinnacle. Central banks and finance ministers have been determined to keep the TWD beneath (or at least not much over) its January 2016 summit. For the next few months, they probably will continue to succeed in accomplishing this goal. The TWD also for the near term probably will not plummet more than 10 percent from its first quarter 2016 pinnacle.

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Establishment icons such as the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan probably will retain their highly accommodative policies for the next several months (at least). They will persist in their path not merely because of failure to achieve inflation goals, relatively sluggish growth, fears about global economic troubles (such as the United Kingdom’s Brexit Leave vote fallout) or worries about assorted “headwinds”/”volatility”. So why else?

The economic and political “establishment” (elites) in America and overseas fervently battles to subdue both left-wing and right-wing “populist” advances. See “‘Populism’ and Central Banks” (7/12/16). These guiding lights do not want populist leaders, whether America’s Donald Trump or European (or other) left or right wing firebrands, to achieve power.

The S+P 500 and other global stock marketplace benchmarks have rallied sharply from their 1Q16 depths. The S+P 500 has edged above its 5/20/15 peak at 2135. But a sharp downturn in worldwide equities probably would help populist advocates of “Change” to claim that “the establishment” had inadequate or failing economic (and political and social) policies. So the US establishment and its overseas comrades do not want the S+P 500 and related equity marketplaces to collapse, especially during the countdown up to US Election Day (11/8/16). Keeping US government (and other) yields low and avoiding big moves in the US dollar intertwine with central bank (and other establishment) stock marketplace support and anti-populist strategies.

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Ticking Clocks- US Financial Marketplaces (8-8-16)