GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

 

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AMERICA DIVIDED AND DOLLAR DEPRECIATION © Leo Haviland September 7, 2021

Pogo, created by the cartoonist Walt Kelly, is a possum living in Georgia’s Okefenokee Swamp. About 50 years ago, Pogo proclaimed: “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

For many decades, the United States dollar has led the foreign exchange field as the key currency for global trade as well as financial reserves. Over that time span, the greenback’s predominance to a significant extent encouraged, sustained, and reflected widespread (although not unlimited) American and global faith in the wisdom and goodness of American cultural values and the persuasive and practical ability of the nation to be a (and sometimes the) critical guiding force in international affairs. Although the dollar obviously has had numerous extended periods of appreciation and depreciation since the free market currency dealing regime began in the early 1970s, the dollar’s crucial role in the increasingly intertwined global economic system has seldom been significantly questioned or challenged for over an extended period of time.

Using the Federal Reserve’s real “Broad Dollar Index” (which is a monthly average) as a signpost, the US dollar “in general”, for almost ten years, from its major bottom in July 2011 until April 2020, the overall trend of the dollar in general was bullish. The US dollar “in general” depreciated until “around” January 2021. It rallied for several months thereafter, with August 2021 being the high since then. From a long run historical perspective, August 2021’s real Broad Dollar Index level is rather strong.

However, when interpreted alongside phenomena such as America’s government debt level and trend, ascending United States inflation, and the nation’s ongoing cultural divisions and the recent increase in net dissatisfaction among the US public regarding the country’s direction, a review of various important currency cross rate trends against the dollar suggest that “overall” weakness in the US dollar has resumed (beginning around late August 2021) or will do so in the near future.

Take a related vantage point. Given the Federal Reserve’s determined effort to repress (pin at a very low level) the Federal Funds rate and US Treasury yields despite numerous inflationary signs, a probable outcome (consequence; outlet) for that central bank scheme in the context of these assorted variables is a depreciating dollar.

In this context, if the real Broad Dollar Index (“BDI”) moved toward or underneath its March 2009 international economic disaster peak at 101.5, that probably will help to precipitate a “weak United States dollar equals weak US stocks” scenario.

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An underlying factor promoting a dollar tumble is the gradually declining share of America as a percentage of worldwide GDP. Also, both political parties, not just the current US Administration, and especially in the coronavirus era, likely want the real Broad Dollar Index to stay beneath its April 2020 summit at 113.6. They also probably prefer a renewed fall in the BDI from August 2021’s 107.3 elevation. The great majority of the country’s politicians preach their allegiance to a strong dollar, but they also endorse economic growth.

Several additional phenomena make the dollar particularly vulnerable nowadays. First, although many major nations have increased their government debt burdens in recent years, America’s public debt situation has worsened significantly more than most others since 2019. Moreover, America already faced widening federal budget deficits encouraged by the tax “reform” enacted at end 2017. Plus don’t overlook the ongoing ominous long run debt burden, looming from factors such as an aging population. How easily will America service its debt situation? In addition, the current Administration’s infrastructure proposals, if a significant proportion of them become law, probably will boost America’s debt as a percentage of GDP. Will there be a political fight over raising the nation’s debt ceiling? And America’s corporate and individual indebtedness also is substantial.

Second, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U, all items) as a benchmark, American “inflation” in recent months has exceeded that of other leading nations. The Fed continues to maintain a highly accommodative monetary policy. This beloved guardian has merely murmured about tapering its massive quantitative easing (money printing) scheme, and it remains reluctant to raise policy rates significantly anytime soon. Due to the Fed’s yield repression, nowadays US Treasury yields across the yield curve relative to the current US CPI level offer a negative real return. This negative return situation of course (all else equal) tends to make UST ownership rather unattractive for many marketplace participants.

Whether because of ascending US interest rates, a descending dollar or both, suppose foreigners become smaller buyers, or even net sellers, of US Treasury securities. Such overseas action would not be an endorsement of America.

Another bearish indicator for the US dollar exists: the intensity and breadth of America’s cultural divisions has increased in recent times. Though the Trump era reflected and enhanced these splits, they remain very significant across various fields. America’s ongoing substantial cultural battles in economic, political, and social arenas reflect reduced national unity and tend to undermine domestic confidence. American confidence in the nation’s overall direction has slumped in recent months. As US citizen faith in the country’s situation declines, so probably likewise will (or has) that of foreigners in regard to America. To some extent, faith in America and its institutions is reflected by a willingness to own substantial amounts of dollar-denominated assets.

An additional feature can intertwine with these variables to undermine the dollar, especially over the long run. In recent years, the strong international belief in the reliability (and leading role) of America as a trading and military partner probably has eroded somewhat. Some of this may reflect the declining US share of worldwide GDP. Former President Trump’s often erratic behavior, bold wordplay, and frequent disregard for the truth assisted this fall in confidence process. Also, ongoing America First (Make America Great Again) movements and an apparently diminished American enthusiasm for multilateralism and globalization probably reduce confidence in other players that America will be “as committed” a partner. For example, trade conflicts, even if they now are less strident than during the Trump presidency, have not evaporated. The dismal American withdrawal process from Afghanistan troubles many overseas observers. In addition, the persistence of America’s fervent and substantial cultural divides to some extent risk injuring foreign faith in the reliability and effectiveness of America on the international scene.

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Declining faith in American assets (and its cultural institutions and its economic and political leadership) can inspire shifts away from such assets. American marketplaces will not be completely avoided given their importance, but players can diversify away from them to some extent. Not only Americans but also foreigners own massive sums of dollar-denominated assets (debt instruments, stock in public and private companies, real estate; dollar deposits). Such portfolio changes (especially given America’s slowly declining importance in the global economy) will tend to make the dollar feeble.

Suppose nations and corporations increasingly elect, whether for commercial or political reasons, to avoid using the dollar as the currency via which they transact business. That will injure the dollar.

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America Divided and Dollar Depreciation (9-7-21)

GAMESTOP AND GAME SPOTS: MARKETPLACE AND OTHER CULTURAL PLAYGROUNDS © Leo Haviland February 13, 2021

In “The Biggest Game in Town”, A. Alvarez writes: “Mickey Appleman remarked to me that a lot of people don’t fit in where they are, but Las Vegas takes anybody.”

James McManus declares in “Positively Fifth Street”: “Las Vegas…attracts more annual pilgrims than any destination but Mecca.”

OVERVIEW

Wall Street inhabitants and other observers often label Wall Street as a game. Stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces likewise are games with assorted players.

GameStop Corporation’s stock trades publicly on the New York Stock Exchange, a respected venue. GameStop’s website, advertisements, and Annual Report include a catchy slogan, “power to the players”. The firm says: “we are a family of preferred destinations for gaming, collectibles and consumer electronics”.

Though GameStop is a significant business enterprise, over the years it generally has not won substantial Main Street attention beyond those following the industry sector to which it belongs. However, GameStop’s recent explosive flight and bloody fall in recent weeks captured front page headlines around the globe. Recall its spring 2020 bottom at less than five dollars per share (2.57 on 4/3/20). From a much higher interim trough at 20.03 on 1/13/21, GameStop marched quickly upward in its bull campaign, more than doubling by its close at 43.03 on 1/21/21. The stock thereafter skyrocketed to 1/28/21’s 483 pinnacle (about 24 times 1/13/21’s depth). On this wild upward ride, a couple of big hedge funds with short positions in GameStop (betting that the GameStop price would slump) apparently got squeezed by a wave of (primarily) Main Street buyers (longs) and had to pay stratospheric prices to escape their short position. Despite the enthusiastic buying spearheaded by the retail (Main Street) crew, not long thereafter GameStop cratered over ninety percent to its subsequent low, at 46.52 on 2/9/21. The pattern of trading in the S+P 500, which reached a new high at 3937 on 2/12/21 in its massive bull charge since 3/23/20’s major bottom at 2192 (though that depressing key trough was close in time to GameStop’s 4/3/20 one), has not closely resembled that of GameStop.

Remarkable (unusual) moves in relatively unknown stocks often attract a modest amount of Wall Street and Main Street (retail) attention. However, the excitement around GameStop’s recent dramatic price action, and especially the related widespread blizzard of wordplay involving GameStop from numerous leading Wall Street stock marketplace wizards, investment and other trading gurus, venerable financial regulators, and sage financial and mainstream media commentators, indicate the relevance of the GameStop phenomenon to other more important cultural matters in economic, finance, and elsewhere.

The extensive passionate interest around GameStop points out that variable’s importance as a factor to consider in connection with overall American (and global) stock marketplace trends and the growing democratization of financial playgrounds. Taking a look at GameStop also offers insight into America’s economic and other cultural divisions and conflicts, the American Dream, and financial rhetoric (including metaphors).

CONCLUSION

Many orations about GameStop’s meteoric stock price rise and its subsequent collapse have involved talk of Main Street (retail; “the little guys”) “versus” Wall Street (typically including institutional “professionals”, “big guns” such as banks, investment banks, and larger money managers and financial (wealth management) advisors.

However, although the large GameStop shorts who got killed were Wall Street pros (insiders), the majority of Wall Street money in stocks (including hedge funds and other money managers) is on the buy (ownership) side. Most institutions (regardless of whether one labels them as an “investor” or some breed of investor, speculator or trader) are net owners of stock who, all else equal and as a guideline, want prices in the S+P 500 (and other stock signposts and individual equities around the world) to rise. So do their banking, investment banking, and financial media allies. Likewise, most of the various communities of Main Street stock owners (typically Wall Street and the media honors these financial pilgrims as “investors”) want stock prices to climb.

Consequently, from the standpoint of stock price action, assuming the existence of a Wall Street versus Main Street battle is erroneous, or at least highly misleading. If retail (investors, traders, speculators) sticks a knife into a few hedge funds (or other institutions) short a stock (or stock sector; index) via encouraging a stock price rise in the given supply/demand situation, that almost surely is not damaging Wall Street institutions as a whole. Despite retail enthusiasm and pride in such a victory, neither Wall Street, capitalism, nor “The Man” suffer much if at all.

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In the stock game, Wall Street loves retail players. Why? Main Street buys and holds stocks. Even when it does not own them for a long time, the majority of Main Street initiates its marketplace position by buying, not selling. Sometimes Main Street is a net seller, but as a rule of thumb it owns equities. It is a truism that all else equal, incremental net buying of equities by Main Street inhabitants will tend to move stock prices upward. That helps Wall Street institutional stock owners to make money from such rising prices. Plus significant retail participation in equity playgrounds provides Wall Street and the corporations they serve with an audience to whom it can sell new issues of stock.

Consider most Wall Street stock recommendations. Doesn’t Wall Street usually advise both professional and Main Street audiences to buy, or at least to hold? How many stock research analysts and advisers (brokers) advise their clients to go short? Of all recommendations, in the array of buy, hold, or sell, what percentage are sell ones? Generally speaking, most Wall Street and Main Street participants in the cultural world of marketplaces, in regard to stocks, applaud upward (bullish) stock price moves and “high” prices as “good”. Conversely, all else equal, most assert that it is “bad” if stocks fall (enter a bear trend) or are “low”.

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In marketplaces, notions of probability and causation reflect opinions. But nevertheless ask a question about Main Street’s role in Wall Street during the past several years, especially since the coronavirus pandemic emerged about a year ago. To what extent has the growing ability of Main Street fortune (financial security, wealth)-seekers to readily access stock marketplaces tended to elevate equity prices? Probably by a great deal. Overall US corporate earnings realities in recent months were feeble; their probable future prospects have not rocketed up to the extent of the S+P 500’s leap. So by propelling stock prices higher, Main Street thereby probably has played a critical role in stretching valuation measures upward significantly relative to what they otherwise would be.

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Wall Street has sold itself to America and the rest of the world as a good (reasonable) place for institutional and Main Street players seeking to make money (receive an acceptable/adequate/good financial return) to put and keep their money. Investment wordplay is a critical aspect of Wall Street sales pitches. Especially in the securities landscape, in stocks and interest rate instruments, Wall Street seeks owners (buyers), and especially it hunts for, honors, and praises “investors” and “investment”. The basic definition of the investment label in Wall Street (and on Main Street) means buying (owning) something. In general Many on Main Street (and Wall Street) have devoted faith that prices for US stocks (“in general”; at least those of investment grade) will continue to rise over the misty long run.

What is one of Wall Street’s greatest fears in regard to Main Street? It is the departure of retail owners of securities (especially stock investors, and particularly stock investors buying and holding for the so-called long run. Hence Wall Street gospels diligently and cleverly promote and solicit stock buying. From Wall Street’s view (not only banks, investment banks and big money managers and financial advisors, but also publicly-held corporations in general), a dramatic reduction of net buying by Main Street of stocks in general (particularly American ones) would be ominous, but an actual sustained substantial run for the exits by retail sects (Main Street becoming a net stock seller) would be dreadful (bad).

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GameStop and Game Spots- Marketplace and Other Cultural Playgrounds (2-13-21)

THE FEAR FACTOR: FINANCIAL BATTLEFIELDS © Leo Haviland January 5, 2021

“But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions such as they have in Japan over the past decade?” Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board, Speech to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society” (12/5/96)

Voltaire’s 18th century novel, “Candide, or Optimism”, depicts a character who believes that all is for the best in the allegedly best of all possible worlds.

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In recent times, prices in the S+P 500 and other benchmark United States and global stock indices, lower-grade interest rate instruments within corporate fields (and low-quality foreign dollar-denominated sovereign debt), and commodities “in general” often have risen (or fallen) at roughly the same time. They generally have climbed in significant bull ascents (and fallen in noteworthy bear retreats) “together”. These entangled domains therefore have alternatively reflected joyous bullish enthusiasm as “investors” and other traders avidly hunted for adequate return (“yield”), and terrifying bearish scenes as they raced fearfully for safety. Whether the existing bull trend for American stocks in general (use the S+P 500 as a benchmark) persists is especially important for realms connected with the S+P 500.

Actions by and rhetoric from the Federal Reserve Board and its central banking allies around the globe since the calamitous price crashes during first quarter 2020 restored investor (buying) confidence and generated price rallies in the S+P 500 and related marketplace playgrounds. In response to the economic (and political) challenges of the ravaging coronavirus era, gargantuan deficit spending by the United States and its foreign comrades also assisted these bullish price moves. Based on this as well as past experience (especially in regard to the merciful Fed), marketplace captains and their troops dealing in the S+P 500 and intertwined provinces once again have great faith that these marketplaces will not fall “too far”, or for “very long”. Bullish financial media fight especially hard to promote, justify, and sustain stock marketplace investment and price rallies in particular. In regard to equities in particular, propaganda speaking of “buy and hold for the long run” and “buy the dip” inspired entrenched investors and often sparked new buying. Thus, and despite occasional worries, significant complacency gradually has developed over the past several months in assorted stock marketplaces and “asset classes” tied to them.

Complacency regarding US Treasury yield trends has bolstered the relative calm and bullish optimism in the S+P 500. Strenuous yield repression (and money printing/quantitative easing) by the Federal Reserve Board and its central bank teammates not only assisted the S+P 500 rally, but also boosted belief that US Treasury yields will not shift much higher (and definitely will not rise “too high”) over the next couple of years.

Moreover, (for many months) easygoing stock bulls have had happy visions of recovering corporate earnings for calendar 2021 and rather robust ones thereafter. Numerous S+P 500 bull advocates do not worry much about or downplay risks of historically “high” valuations. “This time is different”, right? Most of these sunny forecasters generally see possibilities for further significant economic stimulus plans (deficit spending) during the upcoming Biden Administration. Encouraged by the development of coronavirus vaccines, they are optimistic regarding the eventual emergence of a V-shaped recovery, or at least an adequate one.

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This relative complacency through end-year 2020 in the S+P 500 and many other Wall Street marketplace territories (as the upward price trends evidence) contrasts with the ongoing economic agitation in the wider (“real”; Main Street) arena. Picture, for example, issues of economic inequality and the sharp divide between the “haves” and “have-nots”. Also, underline in America and elsewhere assorted and widespread political splits and heated wordplay. This rhetoric is not merely in regard to establishment/elites versus an array of left (liberal; progressive; keep in mind accusatory weapons such as the labels “socialist”, “communist”, and “Marxist”) and right wing (conservative; reactionary) populist (or “radical” or “fringe”) movements. In the United States, concepts of “identity politics” link to cultural wars involving assorted factors such as race/ethnicity, sex/gender/sexuality, age, religion, and geographic region/urban/suburban/rural. Diverse patriots brawl over the relative merits of nationalism and globalization, capitalism and socialism, and so forth. Though in stock and other fields bulls and bears always battle to some extent, the relative peace and tranquility in many Wall Street marketplaces contrasts with the turmoil and hostility permeating the wider cultural vista.

The dangers of weaker than forecast corporate earnings and lofty valuations for American stocks “in general” probably are significantly greater than the “consensus” wisdom promulgated by stock marketplace bulls. Figuratively speaking, US stock prices around current levels probably have “built in” a substantial amount of predicted earnings growth for calendar 2021 and 2022. Many corporations and small businesses remain under pressure. Year-end 2020 buying of stocks to have further equities on the books by definition is finished. The relatively slow implementation of the coronavirus vaccine is one consideration weighing on the recovery, corporate earnings, and valuation. It likely will take at least several months to vaccinate a substantial share of the global population, including within the United States and other advance nations. Besides, the coronavirus problem is bad and may be worsening. So its burden on economic output and employment levels probably will continue for the next several months

Moreover, despite the complacency regarding United States Treasury yield levels and trends, using the UST 10 year note as a signpost, UST yields probably have commenced a long run increase. Despite widespread global desires for a sufficiently feeble home currency to promote economic recovery and growth, and the related willingness to engage in competitive depreciation to accomplish this, spring 2020 unveiled the onset of substantial US dollar weakness. Although the US dollar (using the Fed’s “Broad Dollar Index” as the yardstick) has withered about ten percent from its peak, its long run pattern probably will remain down.

As “Games People Play: Financial Arenas” (12/1/20) emphasized, these interest rate and currency considerations also warn of a notable decline in the S+P 500. The probable eventual notable climb in US interest rate yields likely will connect with a weaker US dollar. The Fed and the incoming Democratic Administration (and debtors in general) probably want higher American inflation (including higher wages). Massive and rising US (and global) government debt is an important warning sign in this context. American household debt is huge in arithmetic terms, and this will put pressure on much of the nation if the economic recovery is not robust.

Marketplaces, marketplace relationships, and the relative importance (and interrelations) of their variables obviously can and do change over time. However, cultural history can influence “current” marketplace perceptions and decisions, especially when cultural (economic, political, social) conditions are at least significantly similar. Though numerous phenomena were involved in the stock marketplace crashes of 1929 and 2007-09, both occurred in an era of significant debt and leverage. That debt and leverage situation arguably fits the global situation nowadays as well.

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Significant fear likely soon will return to the S+P 500, other stock signposts (including those in emerging marketplaces), US corporate bonds, lower-grade foreign dollar-denominated sovereign debt, and many commodities.

What’s the bottom line for the S+P 500’s future trend? Although it is a difficult call, the S+P 500 probably will start a significant correction, and perhaps even a bear trend, in the near future. A five percent move in the S+P 500 over 3588, the important 9/2/20 interim high at 3588, gives 3767, and it probably will be difficult to breach that level by much on a sustained basis. The S+P 500’s high to date, 1/4/21’s 3770, exceeded the 9/2/20 top by 5.1 percent.

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The Fear Factor- Financial Battlefields (1-5-21)

MARKETPLACE MANEUVERS: SEARCHING FOR YIELD, RUNNING FOR COVER © Leo Haviland September 7, 2020

In the novel “The Gilded Age” (chapter 7), by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, Colonel Sellers exclaims: “Si Hawkins has been a good friend to me, and I believe I can say that whenever I’ve had a chance to put him into a good thing I’ve done it, and done it pretty cheerfully too. I put him into that sugar speculation—what a grand thing that was, if we hadn’t held on too long.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Diverse, changing, and interrelated marketplace variables of course encourage price rallies and declines in assorted financial domains. Central bank monetary policies, national deficit spending and debt levels, currency trends, and the recent coronavirus pandemic of course are on the list.

Yet focus on United States Treasury rates only slightly above or beneath benchmark inflation indicators such as consumer price or personal consumption expenditure indices. In other leading government rate realms, such as German ones, note negative nominal interest rates. During the era of global central bank policy yield repression by America’s beloved Federal Reserve Board and the friendly central banks of other major advanced nations, “investors” and other traders generally have engaged in ravenous searches for adequate return (“yield”) in assorted financial marketplaces. These playgrounds include United States and other stocks, lower-grade foreign dollar-denominated sovereign debt, corporate notes and bonds, and commodities.

During this repressive policy yield environment, and often encouraged by massive money printing (quantitative easing) and other accommodative monetary programs, price trends in the S+P 500 and these other marketplaces frequently have been similar. They have risen in bull markets (and fallen in bear markets) “together”. Convergence and divergence (lead/lag) relationships between fields such as the S+P 500, US corporate bonds, and crude oil are a matter of subjective perspective. The connections and patterns are complex and not necessarily precise; they can modify or even transform. But in recent years, prices in these benchmark stock indices, lower-grade interest rate instruments, and commodities often have risen (or fallen) at roughly the same time. For example, prices for US stocks and other financial domains enjoyed glorious rallies which peaked in early to mid-first quarter 2020. Their murderous bear crashes commence at around the same time; numerous investors and other buyers (owners) frantically ran for cover and pleaded for help. The ensuing price rallies in these assorted key generally embarked around late March 2020, and their subsequent bullish patterns thereafter have intertwined.

However, various phenomena indicate that these marketplaces are at or near important price highs and probably have started to or soon will decline together. These bearish factors include the probability of a feeble global recovery (the recovery will not be V-shaped), the persistence of the coronavirus problem for at least the next several months, and lofty American stock marketplace valuations (and the substantial risk of disappointing late 2020 and calendar 2021 corporate earnings). Also, the Democrats probably will triumph in the 11/3/20 American national election, which portends a reversal of the corporate tax “reform” legislation as well as the enactment of increased taxes on high-earning individuals and the passage of capital gains taxes. Also on the US national political scene, fears are growing of a political crisis if President Trump disputes the November voting outcome.

Other warning signs of notable price falls in the S+P 500 and various related marketplaces include vulnerable US (and other) households (reduced consumer spending) and endangered small businesses, massive and rising government debt, a greater risk of rising US interest rates (at least in the corporate and low-quality sovereign landscapes, and even with ongoing Fed yield repression) than many believe, and the recent weakness in the US dollar. The likelihood of a substantial new US Congressional stimulus package has ebbed.

The S+P 500 (and especially “technology” stocks; see the Nasdaq Composite Index) probably has been the bull leader for the various asset classes “as a whole” since its 3/23/20 bottom at 2192. For US equities, laments of “where do I put my money?” enthusiastic comments that “there’s a lot of cash around looking for a home”, and venerable rhetoric regarding the reasonableness of buying and holding United States stocks for the “long run” persist. Gurus as well as media cheerleaders still say: “buy the dip” and “don’t miss the train.” Yet such aphorisms and even massive money printing do not inevitably keep asset prices rising.

Despite the Federal Reserve’s late August 2020 promulgation of a revised and even more accommodative policy doctrine, it essentially codified rather than changed the practice of its easing policy of the preceding months. See the Fed’s 8/27/20 “Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Strategy” and the Fed Chairman’s speech, “New Economic Challenges and the Fed’s Monetary Policy Review” (8/27/20). In any case, the Fed guardian is unlikely to race to the rescue of the US stock marketplace with the S+P 500 hovering around its all-time high.

For detailed further discussion of stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces and the political scene, see other essays such as “Dollar Depreciation and the American Dream” (8/11/20); “Divergence and Convergence: US Stocks and American Politics (7/11/20); “US Election 2020: Politics, Pandemic, and Marketplaces” (6/3/20); “American Consumers: the Shape We’re In” (5/4/20); “Crawling from the Wreckage: US Stocks” (4/13/20); “Global Economic Troubles and Marketplace Turns: Being There” (3/2/20); “Critical Conditions and Economic Turning Points” (2/5/20); “Ringing in the New Year: US and Other Government Note Trends” (1/6/20).

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Marketplace Maneuvers- Searching for Yield, Running for Cover (9-7-20)(1)