GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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GIMME SHELTER (AND FOOD AND FUEL) © Leo Haviland June 5, 2022

In “Gimme Shelter”, The Rolling Stones sing:
“Ooh, a storm is threatening
My very life today
If I don’t get some shelter
Ooh yeah I’m gonna fade away”

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CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

Not long after the end of the 2007-09 global economic disaster, American home prices embarked upon a sustained and substantial bull move. Economic growth, population increases, the American Dream’s ideology praising home ownership, widespread faith that a home represents a long run store of value, and tax incentives for home acquisition encouraged that rally. In recent years, the Federal Reserve’s sustained interest rate yield repression and extravagant money printing policies also boosted the consumer’s ability (reduced the cost) and inclination to buy homes. Homes, like stocks and corporate bonds and even many commodities, became part of the “search for yield” universe. The dramatic home price rally has not been confined to America.

The international coronavirus epidemic which emerged around first quarter 2020, made working in the office (or learning at school) appear dangerous. This inspired a ravenous appetite to acquire homes (or more space or quality at home) to escape health risks, encouraging the latest stages of the bullish house trend. Both central bankers and governments acted frantically to restore and ensure economic recovery and growth. Thus housing prices, benefited not only by the beloved Fed’s easy money policies, but also from monumental federal deficit spending.

Moreover, given the acceleration and substantial levels of American and international consumer price inflation over the past year or so, the general public increasingly has seen home ownership as an “inflation hedge”, not just as an indication of American Dream success and “the good life”.

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Over the next several months, the intersection of the current major trend of increasing American and other interest rates alongside a gradually weakening United States (and worldwide) economy probably will significantly reduce the rate of American home price increases. Fears that a notable slowdown (or stagflation), and maybe even a recession, have developed. Even the ivory-towered Federal Reserve finally espied widespread and sustained inflation. So central bankers nowadays are engaging in monetary tightening. Further rounds of mammoth government deficit spending currently are unlikely. Public debt in the US and elsewhere rose immensely due to the huge government expenditures related to the coronavirus pandemic and the related quest to create and sustain economic recovery. As the US November 2022 election approaches, that country is unlikely to agree anytime soon on another similar deficit spending spree to spark economic growth. Some signs of moderation in housing statistics hint that home price increases probably will slow and that prices will level off. Thus the peak in American home prices will lag that in the S+P 500.

In regard to the present robust bull price pattern for US homes, there is a greater probability than most audiences believe that US home price increases will slow substantially. Nominal house prices eventually may even fall some. It surely is unpopular (and arguably heretical) nowadays to suggest that American and other national house prices eventually may decline. Yet history, including the passage from the Goldilocks Era to the global economic crisis period, demonstrates that home values, like other asset prices, can fall significantly.

“Runs for cover” increasingly are replacing “searches for yield” in the global securities playground by “investors” and other owners. Price declines in American and other stock marketplaces have interrelated with higher yields for (price slumps in) corporate debt securities and emerging marketplace US dollar-denominated sovereign notes and bonds.

Further declines in US consumer confidence probably will take place. Sustained lofty consumer price inflation (encouraged not only by core CPI components such as shelter, but also by high levels in food and fuel prices) distress consumers. At some point, generalized inflation accompanied by higher US Treasury and mortgage yields can slash home buying enthusiasm, especially if home-owning affordability tumbles. Although history shows that price and time relationships for the S+P 500 and US home prices are not precise, and though equities and houses have different supply/demand situations, stocks and home prices roughly “trade together” over the misty long run. In addition, substantial declines (and increases) in American consumer confidence intertwine with (confirm) major trends in the S+P 500. Consumer confidence has been slipping for several months; the S+P 500 probably established a major peak in early January 2022, and its decline of around twenty percent fits the conventional definition of a bear market.

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Gimme Shelter (and Food and Fuel) (6-5-22)

FINANCIAL MARKETPLACES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE STORIES © Leo Haviland April 6, 2021

“Honest to goodness, the tears have been falling
All over this country’s face
It was better before, before they voted for What’s-His-Name
This was supposed to be the new world…
All we need is money
Just give us what you can spare”. X the Band’s 1983 song, “The New World”

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Financial observers often seek to ascertain a relationship between apparent trends involving stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces. This involves subjective historical reviews as to the extent to which the price and time trends (patterns) of two or more marketplaces tend to converge or diverge. Some viewpoints may indicate that trends for a given marketplace tend to lead (or lag) those of another. For example, people investigate linkages between two United States technology stocks. Or, traders and analysts seek to establish the relationship (extent of convergence or divergence) between emerging marketplace stocks “in general” and the S+P 500.

The marketplace arenas studied are not necessarily the same. To what extent do significant increases in United States Treasury interest rates precede (lead to) eventual noteworthy declines in the S+P 500?

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Since cultural (subjective) perspectives, arguments, predictions, and actions regarding marketplace and other phenomena and their interrelations diverge (and converge) to various extents over time, emerging stock marketplaces “as a whole” and the S+P 500 do not necessarily trade identically or even very closely in price direction and timing terms. Of course marketplace history is not marketplace destiny, either completely or partially. Relationships within and between financial fields can shift or transform, sometimes dramatically. And these stock theaters have their own supply/demand situations and intertwine with other financial realms and assorted variables in diverse ways. However, over the past couple of decades, important price highs (and lows) and related trend shifts for the overall emerging stock marketplace and the S+P 500 have tended to occur at around the same time, sometimes within a few days, generally within a couple of months.

In first quarter 2020, prices for emerging stock marketplaces began to fall shortly before the S+P 500. They thereafter collapsed and reached a major bottom “together” in late March 2020. Over subsequent months, ferocious bull moves emerged in both districts.

However, since around early March 2021, prices for emerging stock marketplaces have diverged somewhat from the S+P 500. The emerging stock theater stands around seven percent beneath its mid-February 2021 top, whereas the S+P 500 has marched relentlessly to record heights. Will this divergence persist for an extended period?

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Financial Marketplaces- Convergence and Divergence Stories (4-6-21)

GAMESTOP AND GAME SPOTS: MARKETPLACE AND OTHER CULTURAL PLAYGROUNDS © Leo Haviland February 13, 2021

In “The Biggest Game in Town”, A. Alvarez writes: “Mickey Appleman remarked to me that a lot of people don’t fit in where they are, but Las Vegas takes anybody.”

James McManus declares in “Positively Fifth Street”: “Las Vegas…attracts more annual pilgrims than any destination but Mecca.”

OVERVIEW

Wall Street inhabitants and other observers often label Wall Street as a game. Stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces likewise are games with assorted players.

GameStop Corporation’s stock trades publicly on the New York Stock Exchange, a respected venue. GameStop’s website, advertisements, and Annual Report include a catchy slogan, “power to the players”. The firm says: “we are a family of preferred destinations for gaming, collectibles and consumer electronics”.

Though GameStop is a significant business enterprise, over the years it generally has not won substantial Main Street attention beyond those following the industry sector to which it belongs. However, GameStop’s recent explosive flight and bloody fall in recent weeks captured front page headlines around the globe. Recall its spring 2020 bottom at less than five dollars per share (2.57 on 4/3/20). From a much higher interim trough at 20.03 on 1/13/21, GameStop marched quickly upward in its bull campaign, more than doubling by its close at 43.03 on 1/21/21. The stock thereafter skyrocketed to 1/28/21’s 483 pinnacle (about 24 times 1/13/21’s depth). On this wild upward ride, a couple of big hedge funds with short positions in GameStop (betting that the GameStop price would slump) apparently got squeezed by a wave of (primarily) Main Street buyers (longs) and had to pay stratospheric prices to escape their short position. Despite the enthusiastic buying spearheaded by the retail (Main Street) crew, not long thereafter GameStop cratered over ninety percent to its subsequent low, at 46.52 on 2/9/21. The pattern of trading in the S+P 500, which reached a new high at 3937 on 2/12/21 in its massive bull charge since 3/23/20’s major bottom at 2192 (though that depressing key trough was close in time to GameStop’s 4/3/20 one), has not closely resembled that of GameStop.

Remarkable (unusual) moves in relatively unknown stocks often attract a modest amount of Wall Street and Main Street (retail) attention. However, the excitement around GameStop’s recent dramatic price action, and especially the related widespread blizzard of wordplay involving GameStop from numerous leading Wall Street stock marketplace wizards, investment and other trading gurus, venerable financial regulators, and sage financial and mainstream media commentators, indicate the relevance of the GameStop phenomenon to other more important cultural matters in economic, finance, and elsewhere.

The extensive passionate interest around GameStop points out that variable’s importance as a factor to consider in connection with overall American (and global) stock marketplace trends and the growing democratization of financial playgrounds. Taking a look at GameStop also offers insight into America’s economic and other cultural divisions and conflicts, the American Dream, and financial rhetoric (including metaphors).

CONCLUSION

Many orations about GameStop’s meteoric stock price rise and its subsequent collapse have involved talk of Main Street (retail; “the little guys”) “versus” Wall Street (typically including institutional “professionals”, “big guns” such as banks, investment banks, and larger money managers and financial (wealth management) advisors.

However, although the large GameStop shorts who got killed were Wall Street pros (insiders), the majority of Wall Street money in stocks (including hedge funds and other money managers) is on the buy (ownership) side. Most institutions (regardless of whether one labels them as an “investor” or some breed of investor, speculator or trader) are net owners of stock who, all else equal and as a guideline, want prices in the S+P 500 (and other stock signposts and individual equities around the world) to rise. So do their banking, investment banking, and financial media allies. Likewise, most of the various communities of Main Street stock owners (typically Wall Street and the media honors these financial pilgrims as “investors”) want stock prices to climb.

Consequently, from the standpoint of stock price action, assuming the existence of a Wall Street versus Main Street battle is erroneous, or at least highly misleading. If retail (investors, traders, speculators) sticks a knife into a few hedge funds (or other institutions) short a stock (or stock sector; index) via encouraging a stock price rise in the given supply/demand situation, that almost surely is not damaging Wall Street institutions as a whole. Despite retail enthusiasm and pride in such a victory, neither Wall Street, capitalism, nor “The Man” suffer much if at all.

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In the stock game, Wall Street loves retail players. Why? Main Street buys and holds stocks. Even when it does not own them for a long time, the majority of Main Street initiates its marketplace position by buying, not selling. Sometimes Main Street is a net seller, but as a rule of thumb it owns equities. It is a truism that all else equal, incremental net buying of equities by Main Street inhabitants will tend to move stock prices upward. That helps Wall Street institutional stock owners to make money from such rising prices. Plus significant retail participation in equity playgrounds provides Wall Street and the corporations they serve with an audience to whom it can sell new issues of stock.

Consider most Wall Street stock recommendations. Doesn’t Wall Street usually advise both professional and Main Street audiences to buy, or at least to hold? How many stock research analysts and advisers (brokers) advise their clients to go short? Of all recommendations, in the array of buy, hold, or sell, what percentage are sell ones? Generally speaking, most Wall Street and Main Street participants in the cultural world of marketplaces, in regard to stocks, applaud upward (bullish) stock price moves and “high” prices as “good”. Conversely, all else equal, most assert that it is “bad” if stocks fall (enter a bear trend) or are “low”.

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In marketplaces, notions of probability and causation reflect opinions. But nevertheless ask a question about Main Street’s role in Wall Street during the past several years, especially since the coronavirus pandemic emerged about a year ago. To what extent has the growing ability of Main Street fortune (financial security, wealth)-seekers to readily access stock marketplaces tended to elevate equity prices? Probably by a great deal. Overall US corporate earnings realities in recent months were feeble; their probable future prospects have not rocketed up to the extent of the S+P 500’s leap. So by propelling stock prices higher, Main Street thereby probably has played a critical role in stretching valuation measures upward significantly relative to what they otherwise would be.

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Wall Street has sold itself to America and the rest of the world as a good (reasonable) place for institutional and Main Street players seeking to make money (receive an acceptable/adequate/good financial return) to put and keep their money. Investment wordplay is a critical aspect of Wall Street sales pitches. Especially in the securities landscape, in stocks and interest rate instruments, Wall Street seeks owners (buyers), and especially it hunts for, honors, and praises “investors” and “investment”. The basic definition of the investment label in Wall Street (and on Main Street) means buying (owning) something. In general Many on Main Street (and Wall Street) have devoted faith that prices for US stocks (“in general”; at least those of investment grade) will continue to rise over the misty long run.

What is one of Wall Street’s greatest fears in regard to Main Street? It is the departure of retail owners of securities (especially stock investors, and particularly stock investors buying and holding for the so-called long run. Hence Wall Street gospels diligently and cleverly promote and solicit stock buying. From Wall Street’s view (not only banks, investment banks and big money managers and financial advisors, but also publicly-held corporations in general), a dramatic reduction of net buying by Main Street of stocks in general (particularly American ones) would be ominous, but an actual sustained substantial run for the exits by retail sects (Main Street becoming a net stock seller) would be dreadful (bad).

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GameStop and Game Spots- Marketplace and Other Cultural Playgrounds (2-13-21)