GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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GAMES PEOPLE PLAY: AMERICAN REAL ESTATE © Leo Haviland August 28, 2016

“Home is the nicest word there is.” Laura Ingalls Wilder, author of the “Little House” books, which inspired the famed television show, “Little House on the Prairie”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

The United States real estate marketplace played a significant role in the worldwide economic disaster that erupted in mid-2007 and accelerated in 2008. That dreadful time and its consequences probably are not a distant memory within the perspectives of key central bankers and at least some politicians. Otherwise, the Federal Reserve Board, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and other monetary gatekeepers would not have sustained various highly accommodative schemes for over seven years. Though international growth resumed around mid-2009, it generally has been erratic and modest. Despite unwavering devotion to their mandates, these sheriffs thus far have not delivered sufficient inflation relative to benchmarks such as the consumer price index. Although headline unemployment measures have plummeted in the United States, they remain fairly high in some nations.

The United States of course is not the whole world and American consumers do not represent the country’s entire economy. Yet because the US is a crucial player in the interconnected global economic (and political) theater, and because US consumer spending represents a majority of US GDP, the state of affairs for the US consumer has international consequences. Consumers represent about 68.3 percent of America’s GDP (2015 personal consumption expenditures relative to GDP; Federal Reserve Board, “Flow of Funds”, Z.1; 6/9/16). The household balance sheet level and trend (net worth) is an important variable in this scene. Although stock marketplace and real estate values matter a great deal to others (such as corporations and governments) beyond the “person on the street”, they are quite important to US household net worth and thus behavior (including spending patterns) and expectations (hopes) regarding the future.

Thus although US household net worth is not an explicit part of the Federal Reserve’s interpretation of its mandate (promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates) and related policy actions, it is very relevant to them. So therefore are stock marketplace and real estate values and trends. Home ownership is an important dimension of the ideology of the American Dream. Rising home and increasing stock marketplace prices to some extent bolster faith that the American Dream “in general” (as a whole) is succeeding. And what happens to American real estate still matters a great deal for the global economy.

Sustained yield repression and quantitative easing (money printing) by the Fed and its playmates not only have helped the S+P 500 and many other stock signposts to soar through the roof. These programs (assisted to some extent by deficit spending programs) also repaired much of the damage to America’s real estate landscape. Let’s survey the US real estate marketplace in this context, concentrating primarily on the consumer housing sector.

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The dutiful Fed reviews assorted factors related to personal consumption expenditure (consumer price) inflation and other aspects of its mandate. Consumer price or personal consumption expenditure inflation targets of around two percent matter to the Fed and other central bank sheriffs. Yet sufficient (too low; too high) inflation (as well as deflation) can occur in other realms, including stocks and real estate.

Combine the monumental recovery in US real estate values with the towering rise in the value of stock marketplace assets. Although these are not the only parts of or phenomena influencing the US household balance sheet, current real estate and stock marketplace (particularly note the S+P 500) levels and trends appear more than adequate to justify a less accommodative Fed monetary policy. And US housing trends (including the rental situation) probably are placing substantial upward pressure on key consumer price benchmarks.

Recall the glorious American real estate spectacle before the mournful crash of the worldwide economic disaster. Although that Goldilocks Era for US real estate belongs to the past, the current housing situation recalls it.

The dovish Fed nevertheless will be cautious regarding boosts in the Federal Funds rate. Like other members of the global establishment (elites), it does not want populists (whether left wing or right wing; such as Donald Trump) to win power. To some extent, sustained substantial slumps in stocks and real estate prices tend to encourage populist enthusiasm. The Fed and its allies battle to avoid a sharp downturn in the S+P 500 or housing prices. The Fed meets 9/20-21, 11/1-2, and 12/13-14/16. The US Election Day is November 8. See “‘Populism’ and Central Banks” (7/12/16) and “Ticking Clocks: US Financial Marketplaces” (8/8/16).

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Games People Play- American Real Estate (8-28-16)

TICKING CLOCKS: US FINANCIAL MARKETPLACES (c) Leo Haviland August 8, 2016

“Isn’t it a pity…the wrong people always have money.” From “The Big Clock”, a 1948 American film noir (John Farrow, director)

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CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

Ongoing yield repression by the Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central Bank, and their allies plays a crucial role in keeping the US Treasury 10 year note well beneath 6/11/15’s 2.50 percent interim yield top, as well as later and lower heights of 2.38pc (11/9/15) and 2.00pc (3/16/16). For the next few months, running up at least through America’s 2016 election period, it will be difficult for the UST 10 year to break above the resistance range of 2.00/2.50pc or much under its 7/6/16 low at 1.32pc.

The Fed leadership promotes caution regarding Fed Funds rate boosts. The NY Fed President recently argued “at the moment, for caution in raising U.S. short-term interest rates” (“The U.S. Economic Outlook and the Implications for Monetary Policy”; 7/31/16). A Fed Governor is “not in a hurry to lift rates”; he argues “for a ‘very gradual’ path for any rises” (Interview with Financial Times, 8/8/16, p2).

Economic growth in America, Europe, and Japan generally remains subdued. China, though it retains a comparatively strong real GDP rate, has slowed down. Despite massive money printing (quantitative easing) by assorted leading central banks at various times over the past seven to eight years, inflation yardsticks generally remain beneath the two percent target beloved by the Fed and its loyal allies. Ongoing government deficit spending, though less than during the global economic disaster era and the following few years, in recent times likewise has not sparked sustained substantial growth or sufficient inflation.

The broad real trade-weighted US dollar (“TWD”, monthly average; Fed H.10 statistics), though still lofty relative to its July 2011 major bottom around 80.5, remains beneath first quarter 2016’s 101.2 pinnacle. Central banks and finance ministers have been determined to keep the TWD beneath (or at least not much over) its January 2016 summit. For the next few months, they probably will continue to succeed in accomplishing this goal. The TWD also for the near term probably will not plummet more than 10 percent from its first quarter 2016 pinnacle.

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Establishment icons such as the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan probably will retain their highly accommodative policies for the next several months (at least). They will persist in their path not merely because of failure to achieve inflation goals, relatively sluggish growth, fears about global economic troubles (such as the United Kingdom’s Brexit Leave vote fallout) or worries about assorted “headwinds”/”volatility”. So why else?

The economic and political “establishment” (elites) in America and overseas fervently battles to subdue both left-wing and right-wing “populist” advances. See “‘Populism’ and Central Banks” (7/12/16). These guiding lights do not want populist leaders, whether America’s Donald Trump or European (or other) left or right wing firebrands, to achieve power.

The S+P 500 and other global stock marketplace benchmarks have rallied sharply from their 1Q16 depths. The S+P 500 has edged above its 5/20/15 peak at 2135. But a sharp downturn in worldwide equities probably would help populist advocates of “Change” to claim that “the establishment” had inadequate or failing economic (and political and social) policies. So the US establishment and its overseas comrades do not want the S+P 500 and related equity marketplaces to collapse, especially during the countdown up to US Election Day (11/8/16). Keeping US government (and other) yields low and avoiding big moves in the US dollar intertwine with central bank (and other establishment) stock marketplace support and anti-populist strategies.

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Ticking Clocks- US Financial Marketplaces (8-8-16)

FANTASTIC VOYAGES: THE US DOLLAR AND COMMODITY CURRENCIES © Leo Haviland April 3, 2016

In the 1966 movie “Fantastic Voyage”, the character Cora declares: “We’re going to see things no one has ever seen before. Just think about it.” (Richard Fleischer, director)

In “On the Road” (original scroll version), Jack Kerouac writes: “But no matter, the road is life.”

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CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

The substantial rally in the broad real trade-weighted United States dollar (“TWD”) that embarked in mid-2011 played a key part in encouraging (confirming) and accelerating bear movements in emerging marketplace stocks and commodities “in general”. The S+P 500’s majestic rally over its spring 2011 interim high diverged for about four years from the trends in emerging equity realms and commodities. However, the TWD’s 2015 ascent above its March 2009 peak was a crucial event; this dollar climb helped propel the S+P 500 downhill following its 5/20/15 pinnacle at 2135 in conjunction with the emerging stock marketplace and commodity trends.

In January/February2016, these linked price patterns partly reversed. The TWD has depreciated and stocks (emerging marketplaces as well as those of America and other advanced nations) have rallied. Commodities (particularly oil) jumped. The benchmark United States Treasury 10 year note yield ascended from its low. This relatively unified reversal across marketplace sectors paralleled the entwined moves since mid-to-late 2015. Highly accommodative central bank rhetoric and action by the Federal Reserve Board and its allies aimed at achieving their targeted two percent inflation destination will continue for an extended period. For example, note the Fed’s 3/16/16 meeting and its Chairman’s very dovish speech, “The Outlook, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy” (3/29/16). Underline the expansion of the European Central Bank’s easing scheme (most recently 3/10/16) and the lax policies of the Bank of Japan. Consequently, the current marketplace interrelationships (“roughly trading together”) probably will persist for the near term, regardless of whether the pattern of mid-2015 to first quarter 2016 resumes or that since mid-first quarter 2016 continues. Marketplace history of course need not entirely or even substantially repeat itself.

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Concentrating on and comparing exchange rates of “commodity currencies” alongside the broad real trade-weighted dollar trend offers additional notable insight into the assorted interconnected marketplace relationships. Commodity currencies, associated with countries with large amounts of commodity exports, are not confined to developing/emerging nations. Because commodity exports are significant to the economies of advanced countries such as Australia, Canada, and Norway, the currencies of these lands likewise can be labeled as commodity currencies.

The bearish currency paths (effective exchange rate basis) of important emerging and advanced nation commodity exporters up to first quarter 2016 resembled the similar trends among them during the 2007-09 worldwide economic disaster era. However, these commodity currencies depreciated notably more in their recent dive than during the 2007-09 turmoil. In addition, the lows attained by most of them decisively pierced the floors achieved about seven years previously. Moreover, the TWD rallied more sharply in its bull move to its January 2016 elevation than it did during the past crisis.

The feebleness in recent times for the commodity currency group, as it involved both advanced and emerging marketplace domains (as it did in 2007-09), reflected an ongoing global (not merely emerging marketplace) crisis. Substantial debt and leverage troubles still confront today’s intertwined worldwide economy. The bear trip of many commodity currencies into early first quarter 2016, especially as it occurred alongside big bear moves in emerging marketplace stocks (and in the S+P 500 and other advanced stock battlefields) and despite long-running extremely lax monetary policies, underlines the fragility of the relatively feeble global GDP recovery.

Thus noteworthy rallies in these commodity (exporter) currencies from their recent depths will tend to confirm (inspire) climbs in commodities in general and emerging (and advanced) nation stock marketplaces. Renewed deterioration of the effective exchange rates of the commodity currency fraternity “in general” likely will coincide with renewed firming of the US dollar. Such depreciation in the commodity currency camp probably will signal worsening of the current dangerous global economic situation and warn that another round of declines in global stock marketplaces looms on the horizon.

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Therefore key central bank captains, concerned about slowing real GDP and terrified by “too low” inflation (deflation) risks, have fought to stop the TWD from appreciating beyond its January 2016 top and struggled to encourage rallies in the S+P 500 and related stock marketplaces. Yield repression (very low and even negative interest rates) promotes eager hunts for yields (return) elsewhere. Indeed, rallies in the S+P 500 (and real estate) may help inflation expectations (and inflation signposts monitored by central banks such as consumer prices) to motor upward. Given their desperate quest to achieve inflation goals, central banks probably approve of at least modest increases in commodity prices in general.

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Fantastic Voyages- the US Dollar and Commodity Currencies (4-3-16)

GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE, INFLATION, AND POLITICS © Leo Haviland March 20, 2016

“I went home, with new matter for my thoughts, though with no relief from the old.” Charles Dickens’s novel, “Great Expectations” (Chapter 48)

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OVERVIEW

A deluge of money printing and ardent yield repression by leading central banks of course are not the only important potential sources of inflation. Assorted marketplace guides proclaim a variety of opinions regarding relevant inflationary factors and their relationships and consequences. And everyone knows that economic, political, and social conditions, programs, and challenges differ, often significantly, between countries.

Central banking mandates and interpretations regarding them are not precisely the same. Central banks do not have an easy job. In his story “A Christmas Carol” (Stave 3), Charles Dickens states: “it is always the person not in the predicament who knows what ought to have been done in it, and would unquestionably have done it too”.

However, all the bankers preach devotion to their mandate. The Federal Reserve Board, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Bank of Canada, and the Swedish central bank for the past several years have shared a faith and proclaimed a gospel that achieving and sustaining about two percent inflation is a “good” goal. Thus many leading global central banks believe “too low” inflation (and of course deflation) is “not good” or is “bad”.

Central banking decisions, actions, and rhetoric around the globe have become increasingly interdependent since the eruption of the international economic disaster of 2007-09. Banking captains nobly stress their willingness to do whatever it takes and whatever they must, frequently pointing to their beloved toolkit of monetary measures. Thus they embarked on highly accommodative monetary policies such as yield repression and gigantic money printing and generously provided forward guidance. Yet despite their long-running and devoted odyssey aimed at achieving and sustaining the praiseworthy target of two percent inflation, the armada of central banks thus far has failed in its inflationary quest. Their great expectations have not generated great results.

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Since inflation (including too low inflation and deflation) concerns and wordplay are so significant for current marketplace analysis and trends, it pays to select and assess variables indicating whether a sufficient and sustained quantity of inflation is appearing or may soon do so. Observers can differ in their choices and viewpoints.

“Inflation”, however defined and measured, may appear earlier in one nation or region than another. Moreover, just because some or sufficient inflation (or deflation) emerges in one territory, they need not do so elsewhere. In any case, let’s focus on America. Not only does the United States play a crucial role on the world economic and political stage, but so does the Federal Reserve Board. Stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces avidly monitor Fed statements, signals, and behavior. Finally, America nowadays apparently is (however slowly) showing signs of being a key leader in international GDP growth.

 

US POLITICS: BLEAK HOUSE

In Dickens’s “Great Expectations”, a character says: “’Ask no questions, and you’ll be told no lies.’” (Chapter 2)

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Most Americans have high (or at least moderate) confidence in and trust the US Federal Reserve Board. In contrast, many Americans nowadays have rather low expectations regarding US politicians “in general”. They distrust and have rather little confidence in most US political leaders. They question the willingness and ability of such representatives to work together to achieve desirable goals.

Focusing on central banks and their monetary measures aimed at achieving sufficient inflation should not cause observers to overlook political causes, including fiscal ones, of inflation and higher interest rates. And interest rates can rise for reasons other than, or in conjunction with, inflation pressures.

In any case, weak national political leadership and substantial political divisions do not guarantee rising interest rates, but they can encourage that development. They also can help to generate a weaker dollar.

The United States currently is a house divided. Income and asset inequality, immigration debates, views on health care, opinions on the appropriate size and role of government, international trade topics, climate change, and other issues inflame America’s political theater. In election year 2016, as in the prior few years, there has been greater than normal partisan strife.

These ongoing significant US political divisions risk further weakness in the US dollar. Underscore the current conflict between the Republican Congress and the Democratic President. Though the American political process has a long way to go until election season 2016 concludes, partisan warfare likely will persist. The House likely will remain Republican; the President probably will be a Democrat (Hillary Clinton). Control of the Senate is a close call.

The battles within the Republican camp look likely to persist for at least a few more months. Will there be a convention fight? “Trump warns Republican elders of ‘riots’ if they fail to back his candidacy”, headlines the Financial Times (3/17/16, p3). Although Trump has great confidence in his own talents, at present the majority of Americans apparently do not share that confidence. Suppose Donald Trump captures the Republican Presidential nomination. Imagine that he wins the Presidency. Comments from overseas leaders suggest lack of faith in Trump’s abilities and policies. Such foreign attitudes are a bearish factor for the dollar.

An ability to transcend partisan divisions only via big spending (fiscal irresponsibility) does not eliminate substantial underlying political factionalism. The massive addition to future US budget deficits agreed upon by Congress and the President in late December 2015 probably will tend to push up interest rates and is a bearish factor for the dollar. (See the Congressional Budget Office’s “Summary of The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026; 1/25/16. See also the NY Times, 12/17/15, pA29; NY Times, 12/19/15, ppA1, 13). In any event, America has a looming long run debt problem. And don’t debtors tend to like inflation?

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Great Expectations- the Federal Reserve, Inflation, and Politics (3-20-16)