GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

 

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THE OIL BATTLEFIELD: EVOLUTION, RELATIONSHIPS, AND PRICES © Leo Haviland, April 10, 2017

In “Street Fighting Man”, The Rolling Stones sing:
“Everywhere I hear the sound of marching, charging feet, boy
‘Cause summer’s here and the time is right for fighting in the street, boy”.

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

The continued determination of leading OPEC members (such as Saudi Arabia) and some key non-OPEC oil producing nations (such as Russia) to subdue their crude oil output will underpin petroleum prices. The Saudis and their allies will not readily sacrifice their long-sought production restraint agreement achieved with several important non-OPEC exporters in late 2016. Assuming supply discipline by key producers and moderate global economic growth, supply/demand estimates indicate that OECD (advanced nations such as the United States) industry inventories by the end of calendar 2018 will have declined to around “normal” levels in days coverage terms.

Even gigantic producers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia (for political as well as economic reasons) need to generate at least moderate income. Given its planned sale of shares in Aramco via an initial public offering, does Saudi Arabia want a renewed collapse in petroleum prices to $40 Brent/North Sea or less? Given its need for revenues, global political ambitions, and signs of domestic unrest, does Russia want petroleum prices to plummet sharply?

Other political worries help to bolster oil prices. Some (as usual) relate to the Middle East. North Korea’s nuclear program captures headlines. What if Venezuelan political turmoil results in a supply interruption?

However, current OECD petroleum industry inventories remain far above average. Even by end calendar 2017, they probably will be several days above normal. And end calendar 2018 obviously is a long time from now. Compliance with the OPEC/non-OPEC output guidelines by several individual countries has not been universal. And going forward, production discipline should not be taken for granted. Will Iraq and Iran moderate their production? What if Nigerian or Libyan production increases? Also, the net noncommercial position in the petroleum complex, which played a very important part in the explosive oil bull move in oil that began in first quarter 2016, is still quite high and vulnerable to liquidation.

History reveals that petroleum price levels and trends intertwine with currency, interest rate, stock and other commodity marketplaces (particularly base and precious metals) in a variety of ways. The current interrelationship between petroleum and these other arenas probably warns that it will be difficult for petroleum prices to sustain advances much above their first quarter 2017 highs.

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Using NYMEX crude oil (nearest futures continuation) as a benchmark, petroleum prices for the next several months likely will stay in a broad range. Major support exists at around $38.00/$42.00. Significant resistance exists between $52.00/$55.25.

However, assuming ordinary international economic growth, what if OPEC/non-OPEC production discipline continues for the next year and a half (or marketplace faith increases that such restraint will persist)? In this scenario, if (and this “if” is a very important if) no sustained significant weakness in global stock marketplaces (and intertwining/confirming patterns in the US dollar, interest rates, and metals) develops, then NYMEX crude oil prices probably will attack the $60.75/$65.00 range.

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this article as a PDF file.
The Oil Battlefield- Evolution, Relationships, and Prices (4-10-17)

COMMODITIES AND US STOCKS: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE © Leo Haviland January 28, 2013

Since mid-2008, commodities “in general” and United States stocks “as a whole” have moved roughly in the same direction at around the same time. In this convergence process (relationship), noteworthy bull (bear) moves in US equities find parallels in those in the commodity arena. Thus significant marketplace rallies (declines) have tended to occur around the same time.

However, this perspective is not the only vantage point by which to assess the often close relationship between US equities and the commodities complex. There also is another, longer run view by which one can examine the relationship between them. Since spring 2011, commodities have ventured down (or sideways to down). However, key American stock benchmarks such as the S+P 500 have attained new highs, first in April 2012, then September 2012, and again in January 2013. Thus despite the convergence at assorted timely turning points since spring/ summer 2008, and even though the two territories continue to trade together to some extent, arguably there has been noteworthy divergence in their overall relationships (their trends) since May 2011.

Now recall several of 2007-08’s details. US equities peaked in October 2007, almost nine months before the commodity one in early summer 2008. Only after the final stock marketplace

summit in May 2008 did equities and commodities trade in close tandem. The current longer run relationship thus perhaps likewise reveals divergence, but with the commodity peak to date appearing well before any major S+P 500 one.

In contrast to 2007-08, what if the major peak in commodities is well before that in stocks (and the lag is likewise so great as to suggest divergence)? Suppose- and this admittedly is a key suppose- eventually commodities and US stocks will trade together over the long run. After all, so-called marketplace relationships can change dramatically, whether from the convergence/ divergence (lead/lag) perspective or otherwise. What does continued divergence, the failure of commodities to near or exceed its spring 2011 heights, suggest?

The 2007-08 relationship warns that the current continued failure of commodities to confirm the equity rally eventually will reveal a notable decline in stocks. Since the duration between the spring 2011 commodities top and today’s new highs in the S+P 500 is almost 20 months, whereas that between October 2007’s stock pinnacle and the broad GSCI’s summit in July 2008 was about nine months, the failure of the broad GSCI to achieve new heights should warn equity bulls that a decline may be fairly near in time.

S+P-500-Chart-(1-28-13,-for-essay-on-Commodities-and-US-Stocks)

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this market essay as a PDF file.
Commodities and US Stocks- Convergence and Divergence (1-28-13)
S+P 500 Chart (1-28-13, for essay on Commodities and US Stocks)