Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


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The Rolling Stones sing in “All Down the Line”:
“We’ll be watching out for trouble, yeah
(All down the line)
And we’d better keep the motor running, yeah
(All down the line)”



Financial marketplace trends entangle in diverse fashions, which of course can change, and sometimes dramatically. Convergence and divergence (lead/lag) relationships between them can and do evolve, sometimes significantly. An increasing reversal of a given ongoing prior set of patterns between one or more key interest rate, stock, currency, and commodity marketplaces thus can attract growing attention and accelerate price moves in the new directions.


In general, since around the beginning of calendar 2022, as American and other key global government interest rates continued to rise (enlist the United States Treasury note as a benchmark), the S+P 500 (and other advanced nation and emerging marketplace stock playgrounds) declined. Growing fears regarding substantial and persistent consumer price (and other) inflation by the Federal Reserve and its central banking allies and the linked policy response of raising Federal Funds and similar rates played key roles in the yield climbs and stock price falls. Bear trends for other “search for yield” assets such as corporate bonds and United States dollar-denominated emerging marketplace corporate debt converged with those of the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace stocks. Commodities “in general” (“overall”) of course do not always trade “together” in the same direction around the same time as the S+P 500. Nevertheless, in broad brush terms since around late first quarter 2022, their downward price and time trends converged. A very strong US dollar encouraged the relationships of higher US Treasury yields, descending stock prices, and eroding prices for commodities “in general”.

However, the US 10 year note yield achieved an important high on 10/21/22 at 4.34 percent. Using the Federal Reserve Board’s nominal Broad Dollar Index as a weathervane, the dollar peaked at 128.6 on 9/27/22 and 10/19/22. The S+P 500 established a trough in its bear trend with 10/13/22’s 3492. Based on the S+P GSCI, commodities in general attained an important low on 9/28/22 at 591.8. Note the roughly similar times (and thus the convergence) of these marketplace turns, which thereafter reversed, at least temporarily, the preceding substantial trends.

What key changes in central bank policy and marketplace inflation yardsticks encouraged the recent slump in the UST 10 year yield, the depreciation in the US dollar, and the jump in the S+P 500 and the prices of related hunt for yield (adequate return) battlefields? First, various members of the Federal Reserve leadership hinted that future rate increases would slow in extent (be fifty basis points or less rather than 75bp). See the Financial Times summary of officials leaning that way (11/12-13/22, p2). The Fed probably will tolerate a brief recession to defeat inflation, but it (and of course the general public and politicians) likely would hate a severe one. In today’s international and intertwined economy, further substantial price falls (beneath recent lows) in the stock and corporate debt arenas (and other search for yield interest rate territories), and even greater weakness than has thus far appeared in home prices, plus a “too strong” US dollar, are a recipe for a fairly severe recession. Hence the Fed’s recent rhetorical murmurings aim to stabilize marketplaces (and encourage consumer and business confidence and spending) and avoid a substantial GDP drop.

Second, US consumer price inflation for October 2022 stood at “only” 7.7 percent year-on-year. This rate fell short of expectations for that month and declined from heights exceeding eight percent in the several preceding months. This sparked hopes that American (and maybe even global) inflation would continue to decline even more in the future, and that the Federal Reserve and other central bank guardians would engage in less fierce tightening trends.

Of course the Fed policy hints and US consumer inflation statistics do not stand apart from other variables. Might China ease its restrictive Covid-fighting policy, thus enabling the country’s GDP to expand more rapidly?

The trends for commodities in general (employ an index such as the broad S+P GSCI) and the petroleum complex in particular sometimes have diverged substantially for a while from that of the S+P 500. After all, petroleum, wheat, and base metals have their own supply/demand and inventory situations. The broad S+P GSCI stabilized in early autumn 2022 due to a determined effort by OPEC to rally petroleum prices via production cuts. And over the long run, the S+P 500 and commodities tend to trade together. OPEC+’s ability to successfully defend a Brent/North Sea crude oil price around 83 dollars per barrel (nearest futures continuation) depends substantially on interest rate and stock levels and trends, as well as the extent of US dollar strength.

The “too strong” US dollar during calendar 2022 encouraged price declines in assorted search for yield asset classes, including emerging marketplace stocks and debt instruments as well as commodities. The recent depreciation of the US dollar thus has interrelated with (confirmed) the price rallies in recent days in the S+P 500 and other marketplaces. Yet the Federal Reserve probably will remain sufficiently vigorous in comparison with other central banks in its fight against inflation, which should tend to keep the dollar strong, even if it stays beneath its recent high.


Investors in (and other owners of) stocks and other search for yield realms and their financial and media friends joyously applauded recent price rallies. However, to what extent will these bullish moves persist?

US consumer price and other key global inflation indicators remain very high relative to current central bank policy rates. Not only does the US CPI-U all items year-on-year percentage increase of 7.7 percent for October 2022 substantially exceed UST 10 year yields over four percent, but so does October 2022’s 6.3 percent year-on-year increase in the CPI-U less food and energy.

Imagine consumer price inflation staying at only 4.5 percent. To give investors a 50 basis point return relative to inflation, the UST should yield five percent. Thus the Fed will continue to push rates higher in its serious battle against inflation, and eventually the rising UST yield pattern probably will reappear, persisting until there are signs of much lower inflation or a notable recession.

Although marketplace history is not marketplace destiny, history reveals that significant climbs in key US interest rate signposts (such as the UST 10 year) tend to precede substantial falls in US stock benchmarks such as the S+P 500. Thus the S+P 500 probably will resume its decline, although it will be difficult for it to breach its October 2022 depth by much in the absence of a sustained global recession. So a return to rising UST rates, all else equal, probably will keep the dollar fairly powerful from the long run historic perspective, even though the dollar will find it challenging to exceed its recent highs by much (if at all) for very long.

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Critical Conditions in Financial Marketplaces (11-13-22)


In “Satisfaction”, The Rolling Stones sing: “I can’t get no satisfaction.”



“Economic” confidence and satisfaction levels and trends interrelate with patterns of and anticipations regarding “economic” performance. These variables entangle with and influence price trends in stocks and other financial marketplaces. Thus consumer (Main Street) confidence and similar measures can confirm, lead (or lag), or be an omen for future movements in GDP, inflation, the S+P 500, interest rates, and so on.

Declines in American economic confidence in recent times confirm deterioration in the nation’s (and global) economic condition. The severity of those confidence slumps probably warns of further ongoing economic challenges in the future. These looming difficulties include not only the perpetuation of relatively high inflation for quite some time, but also slowing and perhaps even falling GDP growth. Since America is a leading economic nation in the intertwined global economy, what happens there substantially influences and reflects economic performance elsewhere.


Regarding and within cultural fields, definitions, propositions, interpretations, arguments, and conclusions are subjective (opinions). So-called “economic” (financial, commercial, business) arenas and analysis regarding them are not objective (scientific). In any case, as they are cultural phenomena, economic realms are not isolated from “political” and “social” ones. They interrelate with them, and sometimes very substantially.

Evidence of substantial (and in recent times, increasing) “overall” (including but not necessarily limited to political or economic) dissatisfaction within America are not unique to that country. However, since overall and political measures of declining confidence within and regarding the United States both include and extend beyond the economic battleground, at present they consequently probably corroborate current and herald upcoming economic troubles (economic weakness; still rather lofty inflation) for the US.


Marketplace history is not marketplace destiny, either entirely or even partly. Relationships between marketplaces and variables can change, sometimes dramatically. Nevertheless, keep in mind that if prices for assorted “search for yield (return)” marketplaces such as stocks (picture the S+P 500) and lower-grade debt can climb “together” (roughly around the same time), they also can retreat together.

“Runs for cover” in recent months increasingly have replaced “searches for yield” in the global securities playground by worried “investors” and other nervous owners. Price declines in American and other stock marketplaces have interrelated with higher yields for (price slumps in) corporate debt securities and emerging marketplace sovereign US dollar-denominated notes and bonds.

The devastating price collapse in Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies surely has dismayed many yield-hunters on Main Street.

Declines in American confidence and satisfaction assist and confirm the price falls in recent months in the S+P 500 and other “search for yield” playgrounds such as corporate and low-grade sovereign debt. Thus confidence destruction has interrelated with capital destruction (loss of money) by “investors” and other owners) in stock and interest rate securities marketplaces. From the historical perspective, slumps in as well as very low levels for some of the confidence (“happiness”; optimism) indicators probably signal further price drops in the S+P 500 and interconnected search for yield marketplaces.


The beloved Federal Reserve and its central banking friends finally recognized that consumer price inflation is not a temporary or transitory phenomenon and have elected to raise policy rates (end, or at least reduce, yield repression) and shrink their bloated balance sheets. Yet inflation probably will not drop significantly for some time. Besides, how much faith exists that the Federal Reserve will (or can) control and even reduce consumer price inflation anytime soon? How much trust should we place in the Fed’s abilities? The Fed helped to create inflation (and not just in consumer prices, but also in assets) via its sustained massive money printing and ongoing yield repression, and the Fed did not quickly perceive the extent and durability of consumer price inflation.

Long run history shows that significantly rising American interest rates for benchmarks such as the US Treasury 10 year note lead to bear marketplaces in the S+P 500.The US stock marketplace has declined significantly since its January 2022 peak. Home price appreciation, a key factor pleasing many consumers, probably will decelerate, and perhaps even cease. The Ukraine/Russia war continues to drag on. Despite recent declines from lofty heights, prices for commodities in general remain elevated from the pre-war perspective. Global government debt is substantial, and fearsome long-run debt problems for America and many other countries beckon. American and international GDP growth has slowed. Stagflation and even recession fears have increased. The coronavirus problem, though less terrifying, has not disappeared.

Therefore many American Main Street confidence indicators probably will decline, or at least remain relatively weak, over at least the next several months.


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We Can't Get No Satisfaction- Cultural Trends and Financial Marketplaces (7-13-22)

GIMME SHELTER (AND FOOD AND FUEL) © Leo Haviland June 5, 2022

In “Gimme Shelter”, The Rolling Stones sing:
“Ooh, a storm is threatening
My very life today
If I don’t get some shelter
Ooh yeah I’m gonna fade away”



Not long after the end of the 2007-09 global economic disaster, American home prices embarked upon a sustained and substantial bull move. Economic growth, population increases, the American Dream’s ideology praising home ownership, widespread faith that a home represents a long run store of value, and tax incentives for home acquisition encouraged that rally. In recent years, the Federal Reserve’s sustained interest rate yield repression and extravagant money printing policies also boosted the consumer’s ability (reduced the cost) and inclination to buy homes. Homes, like stocks and corporate bonds and even many commodities, became part of the “search for yield” universe. The dramatic home price rally has not been confined to America.

The international coronavirus epidemic which emerged around first quarter 2020, made working in the office (or learning at school) appear dangerous. This inspired a ravenous appetite to acquire homes (or more space or quality at home) to escape health risks, encouraging the latest stages of the bullish house trend. Both central bankers and governments acted frantically to restore and ensure economic recovery and growth. Thus housing prices, benefited not only by the beloved Fed’s easy money policies, but also from monumental federal deficit spending.

Moreover, given the acceleration and substantial levels of American and international consumer price inflation over the past year or so, the general public increasingly has seen home ownership as an “inflation hedge”, not just as an indication of American Dream success and “the good life”.


Over the next several months, the intersection of the current major trend of increasing American and other interest rates alongside a gradually weakening United States (and worldwide) economy probably will significantly reduce the rate of American home price increases. Fears that a notable slowdown (or stagflation), and maybe even a recession, have developed. Even the ivory-towered Federal Reserve finally espied widespread and sustained inflation. So central bankers nowadays are engaging in monetary tightening. Further rounds of mammoth government deficit spending currently are unlikely. Public debt in the US and elsewhere rose immensely due to the huge government expenditures related to the coronavirus pandemic and the related quest to create and sustain economic recovery. As the US November 2022 election approaches, that country is unlikely to agree anytime soon on another similar deficit spending spree to spark economic growth. Some signs of moderation in housing statistics hint that home price increases probably will slow and that prices will level off. Thus the peak in American home prices will lag that in the S+P 500.

In regard to the present robust bull price pattern for US homes, there is a greater probability than most audiences believe that US home price increases will slow substantially. Nominal house prices eventually may even fall some. It surely is unpopular (and arguably heretical) nowadays to suggest that American and other national house prices eventually may decline. Yet history, including the passage from the Goldilocks Era to the global economic crisis period, demonstrates that home values, like other asset prices, can fall significantly.

“Runs for cover” increasingly are replacing “searches for yield” in the global securities playground by “investors” and other owners. Price declines in American and other stock marketplaces have interrelated with higher yields for (price slumps in) corporate debt securities and emerging marketplace US dollar-denominated sovereign notes and bonds.

Further declines in US consumer confidence probably will take place. Sustained lofty consumer price inflation (encouraged not only by core CPI components such as shelter, but also by high levels in food and fuel prices) distress consumers. At some point, generalized inflation accompanied by higher US Treasury and mortgage yields can slash home buying enthusiasm, especially if home-owning affordability tumbles. Although history shows that price and time relationships for the S+P 500 and US home prices are not precise, and though equities and houses have different supply/demand situations, stocks and home prices roughly “trade together” over the misty long run. In addition, substantial declines (and increases) in American consumer confidence intertwine with (confirm) major trends in the S+P 500. Consumer confidence has been slipping for several months; the S+P 500 probably established a major peak in early January 2022, and its decline of around twenty percent fits the conventional definition of a bear market.

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Gimme Shelter (and Food and Fuel) (6-5-22)


“But, darlin’ can’t you see my signals turn from green to red
And with you I can see a traffic jam straight up ahead”. Jimi Hendrix, “Crosstown Traffic”



The broad real trade-weighted United States dollar’s December 2016 (at 103.3)/January 2017 (103.1) peak likely will remain intact (“TWD”; based on goods only; Federal Reserve Board, H.10; monthly average, March 1973=100). The high since then, December 2018’s crest at 102.0, stands slightly beneath this, as does May 2019’s 101.6 (June 2019 was 101.1). December 2018/May 2019’s plateau probably forms a double top in conjunction with December 2016/January 2017’s pinnacle. If the TWD breaks through the December 2016/January 2017 roadblock, it probably will not do so by much. The majestic long-running major bull charge in the dollar which commenced in July 2011 at 80.5 has reached the finish line, or soon will do so. 

Unlike the broad real trade-weighted dollar, the broad nominal trade-weighted dollar (goods only) has daily data. The broad nominal US dollar probably also formed twin peaks. It achieved an initial top on 12/28/16 (at 128.9) and 1/3/17 (128.8). The nominal TWD’s recent high, 5/31/19’s 129.6, edges only half of one percent over the 2016/17 high. 

The depreciation in the broad real trade-weighted dollar from its 103.3/103.1 elevation probably will be at least five percent, and very possibly ten percent. This retreat likely will last at least for several months. 


The broad real trade-weighted dollar’s level and patterns are relevant for and interrelate with those in key stock, interest rate, commodity, and real estate marketplaces. The extent to which and reasons why foreign exchange levels and trends (whether for the US dollar or any other currency) converge and diverge from (lead/lag) those in stock, interest rate, commodity, and other marketplaces is a matter of subjective perspective. Opinions differ. 

For related marketplace analysis, see essays such as: “Petroleum: Rolling and Tumbling” (6/10/19); “Wall Street Talking, Yield Hunting, and Running for Cover” (5/14/19); “Economic Growth Fears: Stock and Interest Rate Adventures” (4/2/19); “American Economic Growth: Cycles, Yield Spreads, and Stocks” (3/4/19); “Facing a Wall: Emerging US Dollar Weakness” (1/15/19); “American Housing: a Marketplace Weathervane” (12/4/18); “Twists, Turns, and Turmoil: US and Other Government Note Trends” (11/12/18); “Japan: Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows” (10/5/18); “Stock Marketplace Maneuvers: Convergence and Divergence” (9/4/18); “China at a Crossroads: Economic and Political Danger Signs” (8/5/18); “Shakin’ All Over: Marketplace Convergence and Divergence” (6/18/18); “History on Stage: Marketplace Scenes” (8/9/17). 


“We’ll be watching out for trouble, yeah (All down the line)
And we keep the motor running, yeah (All down the line)”, The Rolling Stones, “All Down the Line” 


What interrelated phenomena currently are sparking, or will tend to encourage, near term and long run US dollar weakness? 

Growing faith that America’s Federal Reserve Board not only will refrain from raising the Federal Funds rate anytime soon, but even may reduce it over the next several months, is a critical factor in the construction of the latest segment (December 2018 to the present) of the TWD’s resistance barrier. The Fed Chairman and other US central bank policemen speak of the need for “patience” on the rate increase front. The Fed eagerly promotes its “symmetric” two percent inflation objective (6/19/19 FOMC decision), which blows a horn that it may permit inflation to exceed (move symmetrically around) their revered two percent destination. 

By reducing the likelihood of near term boosts in the Federal Funds rate, and particularly by increasing the odds of lowering this signpost, the Fed gatekeeper thereby cuts the probability of yield increases for US government debt securities. The Fed thus makes the US dollar less appealing (less likely to appreciate further) in the perspective of many marketplace players. 

The Fed’s less aggressive rate scheme (at minimum, a pause in its “normalization” process) mitigates enthusiasm for the US dollar from those aiming to take advantage of interest rate yield differentials (as well as those hoping for appreciation in the value of other dollar-denominated assets such as American stocks or real estate relative to the foreign exchange value of the given home currency). This is despite negative yields in German, Japanese, and other government debt securities. Capital flows into the dollar may slow, or even reverse to some extent. 

The yield for the US Treasury 10 year note, after topping around 3.25 percent in early October 2018, has backtracked further in recent months. The UST resumed its drop from 4/17/19’s minor top at 2.62pc, nosediving from 5/28/19’s 2.32pc elevation. Since late June 2019, its yield has bounced around 2.00pc. 


The current United States Administration probably wants a weaker US dollar relative to its current elevation in order to stimulate the economy as the 2020 elections approach. President Trump claimed that the European Central Bank, by deliberately pushing down the Euro FX’s value against the dollar, has been unfair, making it easier for the Euro Area to compete against the US (New York Times, 6/19/19, ppA1, 9). Recall his complaints about China’s currency policies as well. The President’s repeated loud sirens that the Federal Reserve made mistakes by raising its policy rates, and instead should be lowering them also messages that the Administration wants the dollar to depreciate. 

Another consideration constructing a noteworthy broad real TWD top is mild, even if nervous, optimism that tariff battles and other aspects of trade wars between America and many of its key trading partners (especially China) will become less fierce. Both the United States and China increasingly are fearful regarding the ability of their nations to maintain adequate real GDP increases.

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US Dollar Travels- Crosstown Traffic (7-2-19)