GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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FINANCIAL BATTLEGROUNDS: AN AGE OF ANXIETY (CONTINUED) © Leo Haviland November 1, 2023

W.H. Auden’s poem “The Age of Anxiety” asserts: “When the historical process breaks down and armies organize with their embossed debates the ensuing void which they can never consecrate, when necessity is associated with horror and freedom with boredom, then it looks good to the bar business.” (Part One, Prologue). And the character Rosetta states (Part One): “Numbers and nightmares have news value.”

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FINANCIAL AGITATION

Financial marketplaces and other cultural battlegrounds always include and reflect diverse and contending perspectives and actions. They also inescapably involve values and emotions. In culture, values and emotions permeate viewpoints, thought processes, and behavior. 

Within and regarding the competitive interest rate, stock, foreign exchange, and commodity arenas (and other economic fields), marketplace perspectives (outlooks; orientations), arguments, and conclusions are always subjective, matters of opinion. So are the selection and assessment of variables (facts, factors, evidence, information). Although agreement often is widespread, so is disagreement. Views compete. After all, marketplaces have bulls and bears, long and medium and short term traders, various advocates of fundamental and technical methods, and so forth. Opinions regarding history, probability, and causation differ. Hence prices and price relationships fluctuate, sometimes dramatically. In addition, rhetoric aims to persuade audiences (including oneself) that a given goal, view, or action is good (or “reasonable”, “rational”, prudent, wise; or better than alternatives), less good, neutral, or bad. In cultural fields, this uncertainty of viewpoint and the differences in behavior create agitation, though levels of excitement/emotion (relative calmness) differ. Anxiety can vary in intensity for a given individual or an “overall” community over time, or between a person and group at any given time. 

For some marketplace participants, apparent cascades of diverse and often changing information can increase agitation (anxiety). “How does one keep up with it all? Information sure travels fast these days.” Perceptions (faith) that “the world” (or some part of it) has become more complex can boost anxiety (tension). 

Trading risks and uncertainty of outcome generate agitation and anxiety; enthusiasm, greed, fear, and hope abound. Investors and other courageous trading warriors fervently battle to win the valued (good) American Dream cultural goals of wealth and financial security. Making money and achieving wealth (financial security) makes many people happy and feel successful. Making and having sufficient money is a means to the “good life” and a “better life”. Marketplace playgrounds can be exciting and entertaining too! In quests to make money and avoid losing it, many devoted fortune seekers compare their performance with that of others, which enhances ongoing inevitable passions. 

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In general, large armies of securities “investors” and other owners in stock and interest rate realms (especially in stocks) love high and rising prices and hate low and falling ones. After all, those security assets represent big money (trillions of dollars and other currencies). Wall Street’s key role in capital formation and investment (wealth management) encourages it to promote bullish outlooks in securities marketplaces (particularly in stocks). Consequently, a significant price decline (and of course especially a sustained one) in both equity and interest rate arenas is especially agitating (in the sense of being upsetting, a source of unhappiness) to securities owners in America (and around the globe) and their Wall Street, financial media, and political comrades. Substantial wealth destruction due to bloody securities price declines also can damage economic growth, perhaps helping to produce a recession. What if house prices also slump? 

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Rising United States interest rates have helped to propel (lead) the S+P 500 lower. The S+P 500 currently is attempting to hold support at around a ten percent decline from its late July 2023 peak. However, long run American stock marketplace history indicates that large and scary falls occur; the average percentage retreat from the peak to the trough is roughly 33.9 percent. The average duration of the descent from the summit to the bottom runs approximately 14.2 months. Marketplace history of course does not have to repeat itself. However, as a bear marketplace trend for the S+P 500 probably commenced in late July 2023, and as the decline thus far only has been 10.9 percent over three months, its bear campaign has quite a bit more distance and time to travel downhill. 

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Some would argue that the financial (economic), political, and social worlds, both in America and around the globe, are especially agitated (anxious) nowadays. In any case, “the cultural situation” does not appear peaceful in many respects. 

Since “economic”, “political”, and “social” fields are entirely cultural (subjective), they are not objectively (scientifically) different territories. In any case, culture wars across economic, political, and social dimensions in America arguably are diverse and intense at present and likely to remain so for quite some time. All else equal, this suggests that the resulting agitation and anxiety make it challenging for American politicians to adequately resolve their differences and solve important problems (such as those relating to government spending). This is particularly true as the nation’s 2024 election approaches. Cultural wars thereby significantly influence interest rate, stock, and other financial marketplaces. 

Cultural feuds also exist in other leading nations. Moreover, especially in today’s globalized and multipolar world, cultural hostilities can and do cross national boundaries, which in turn can directly affect financial marketplaces, which increase anxiety (agitation) regarding and within them. Picture the rich versus poor divide, democracy versus authoritarianism, capitalism (free markets) against socialism, and religious differences. Those wars of course can be military, as the violent Russia/Ukraine and Hamas/Israel situations demonstrate.

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Financial Battlegrounds- an Age of Anxiety (Continued) (11-1-23)

FINANCIAL AGITATION ©Leo Haviland October 3, 2023

RISING AMERICAN INTEREST RATES, FALLING US STOCKS

Listen to “Agitation”, jazz music from Miles Davis.

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Let’s focus on the American horizon and the exciting US Treasury and S+P 500 marketplaces. 

Since around spring 2020, and particularly since August 2022, and especially in recent months, the UST marketplace has suffered noteworthy capital destruction due to falling prices. A glorious bull move in the  S+P 500 followed 3/23/20’s dismal bottom at 2192. The S+P 500 thereafter exploded upward, more than doubling, to establish a thrilling record high on 1/4/22 at 4819. After an agonizing bear slump to October 2022’s bottom, a significant joyful stock rally ensued. The S+P 500 approached January 2022’s peak, reaching a summit on 7/27/23 at 4607. The S+P 500 probably has commenced a bear trend, though its slump from its July 2023 peak has been moderate thus far. 

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“Long Run Historical Entanglement: US Interest Rate and Stock Trends” (7/6/23) concluded: “Many times over the past century, significantly increasing United States interest rates have preceded a major peak, or at least a noteworthy top, in key stock marketplace benchmarks such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and S+P 500. The yield climb sometimes has occurred over a rather extended time span. The arithmetical (basis point) change has not always been large. Sometimes the yield advance has extended past the time of the stock pinnacle.”

“Given the historic pattern in which UST [US Treasury; focus on the UST 10 year note] yield increases “lead” to peaks in key American stock benchmarks such as the S+P 500, do signs of a noteworthy rising yield trend exist on the interest rate front? Yes.” And “the pattern of rising UST 10 year note yields likely is leading to another peak in the S+P 500. This stock marketplace peak will probably occur relatively soon, probably within the next few weeks or months. However, even if the S+P 500 continues to climb, it probably will not exceed its January 2022 peak by much if at all.” 

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The UST 10 year note yield increased since 3/9/20’s major bottom at .31 percent, accelerating upward from 8/4/21’s 1.13pc to 6/14/22’s 3.50 pc. The S+P 500 peaked during this rising yield trend on 1/4/22 at 4819. The UST 10 year note yield, after sliding down to 8/2/22’s 2.51 percent resumed its yield ascent. It made another important interim yield low with 4/6/23’s 3.25pc. With 8/22/23’s 4.37 percent, the UST 10 year pierced 10/21/22’s 4.34 percent high, achieved around the time of the S+P 500’s crucial trough on 10/13/22 at 3492. The UST 10 year note price kept falling, and the UST yield reached 4.81 percent on 10/3/23. A dramatic UST 10 year yield climb over five percent and toward 6/13/07’s 5.32 percent Goldilocks Era summit would further unnerve many UST (and stock) holders. 

In some circumstances, rising interest rates can indicate or portend adequate (good) real GDP growth, and thus from some perspectives (up to some point), increasing UST yields (falling debt prices) are designated as “good”. And investors in interest rate instruments of course want a decent (and real) return relative to inflation, so rising yields have been a blessing for many of them, at least to some extent. 

However, many institutions and individuals bought low-yielding UST during the Fed’s yield repression era. Their interest income during the past couple of years likely fell beneath inflation heights represented by the consumer price index. Many of these interest rate instrument owners probably have suffered some noteworthy mark-to-market damage to their principal; so have numerous other recent buyers given the rising rate trend of recent months. Nowadays, the average maturity of total outstanding marketable UST debt is about six years. 

From the price perspective, review the CME’s UST 10 year note (nearest futures continuation contract) as a rough guide to the capital consequences of recent trends. (In practice, this contract sometimes prices relative to deliverable grade instruments with a maturity somewhat different from ten years.) The UST 10 year peaked at about 140-22 on 3/9/20. Its recent low is 10/3/23’s 106-20 (as of 300pm EST), an eviscerating 24.2 percent tumble (and beneath 10/21/22’s 108-26). From 8/2/22’s interim price high of 122-02, 10/3/23’s level drops 12.6 percent. Excitement (emotions) will increase if the price heads closer to 104-00 (6/13/07 price bottom 104-04; 6/28/06 low 104-01). 

The CME UST five year note’s price peak (nearest futures continuation) occurred at about 126-08 on 8/7/20 (126-07 on 1/8/21). It nosedived 17.2 percent to 10/3/23’s 104-18 (under 10/21/22’s roughly 105-15). An attack on price support around 103-00 (7/5/06; 103-02 on 6/13/07) will boost anxiety. 

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In America, a substantial amount of household net worth resides in debt securities (not only in US Treasuries) and equity shares (not just the S+P 500 playground). Read the fine print of the Federal Reserve’s Z.1, “Financial Accounts of the United States” (9/8/23; see Tables B.101, B.101.e, and B.101.h). As of end 2Q23, total assets for households and nonprofit organizations combined were about $174.4 trillion (net worth was $154.3 trillion), the great majority of which resided in the household domain. As of end 2Q23, for households and nonprofit organizations combined, debt securities at market value were about $10.9 trillion, or around 6.2 percent of total assets (9.3pc of total financial assets). Equity shares in 2Q23 had a value of about 44.7 trillion dollars, or 25.6 percent of total assets (almost 38.3pc of total financial assets). 

Consumers represent about two-thirds of United States GDP. If they suffer substantial wounds to their net worth, to what extent will they slash their spending? 

Many Wall Street and Main Street stock investment communities preach the wisdom of buying good (or high) quality American stocks for some version of the misty long run. To what extent are such stock bulls married to their positions? 

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For the twenty-two US stock marketplace “bear” trends summarized in “US Stocks Over the Long Run: Bear Marketplace History” (8/4/23), the average percentage decline from the peak to the trough is about 33.9 percent. The average duration of the descent from the summit to the bottom is approximately 14.2 months. 

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Financial Agitation (10-3-23)

MARKETPLACE CROSSROADS © Leo Haviland September 4, 2023

“I have been passing my life in guessing what I might meet with beyond the next hill, or around the next corner.” Wellington, the British military commander who defeated Napoleon in the battle of Waterloo (“Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations”, ed. Robert Heinl, Jr.)

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OVERVIEW

Cultural observers differ in their subjective perspectives, arguments, and conclusions regarding economic phenomena, including the prices of and variables relating to interest rate, stock, foreign exchange, commodity, real estate, and other marketplaces. They consequently develop and express a variety of personal views as to whether a given financial price or price relationship level (or trend), or an economic (commercial; business) or political situation substantially relevant to them, has reached or soon will attain a very important point or stage. Thus figuratively speaking, a marketplace (its level and trend) or an economic (or political scene) is or shortly will be at a crossroads. For example, the S+P 500, inflation, Federal Reserve policy, or the American federal fiscal situation can arrive at a crossroads. 

Looking forward, people ask “what will happen from here?” People devotedly select, review, and weigh information to ascertain (develop personal opinions regarding) probabilities for a range of potential outcomes in the aftermath of this key situation. They differ in their views of “the” past and “the” present. In their forecasting (risk evaluation) process, some sentinels analyze the distance and duration a given price move has traveled or eventually (potentially) may move. In various fashions, prophets assess perceived interrelationships between interest rate, stock, foreign exchange, and other marketplaces. 

Hence competitive financial arenas fill with diverse and enthusiastic bulls and bears (and neutral players) talking and acting in a variety of ways. Arrays of investors and speculators and traders and hedgers and risk managers ardently promote and behave according to competing viewpoints and probability assessments. Typically, each player views its own subjective analysis and outlook as “reasonable”, and probably at least as reasonable (intelligent, rational) as that of others. Consequently, we hear fervent rhetoric and see artful pictures relating not only to probabilities, but also patterns and trends, support and resistance, critical levels and turning points, breakout and breakdown, continuation and reversal, convergence and divergence, and lead and lags. 

Many believe that some cultural situations are more difficult to predict than others. In any case, imagine future hypothetical (potential) events regarding a given marketplace (such as the S+P 500 or the United States Treasury 10 year note) or a particular economic or political battlefield (such as “the” US or global economy; American political wars). For some particular potential outcomes (including a related process creating it), many marketplace warriors will label the result as unlikely or very unlikely or unusual (against the odds; having little chance), or even unreasonable, irrational, extraordinary, incredible, unbelievable, astounding, surprising, crazy, impossible, and so forth. 

Nevertheless, cultural history, including that of marketplaces, of course evidences that what many (or even the great majority of) clairvoyants viewed as very unlikely to occur indeed has happened. So in practice, many scouts look out for and consider so-called “tail risks” (subjectively highly unlikely outcomes) to some degree. A trader once said: “In commodities, the impossible happens at least once a year.” Besides, what will be highly unlikely or surprising to one cultural observer may not be so to another. 

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Let’s review several financial marketplaces which appear to be at or near a crossroads. 

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Marketplace Crossroads (9-4-23)

FACING A WALL: EMERGING US DOLLAR WEAKNESS © Leo Haviland January 15, 2019

CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

The broad real trade-weighted United States dollar probably peaked at 103.2 in December 2018 (“TWD”; Federal Reserve Board, H.10; monthly average, March 1973=100). Significantly, that elevation links with the critical TWD pinnacle of December 2016 at 103.4/January 2017 at 103.3, thereby building a formidable double top barrier. This double top ends the glorious long-running major bull move which commenced in July 2011 at 80.5.

Unlike the broad real trade-weighted dollar, the broad nominal trade-weighted dollar has daily data. The broad nominal US dollar probably also formed twin peaks. It achieved an initial summit on 12/28/16 (at 128.9) and 1/3/17 (at 128.8). The nominal TWD’s recent high, 12/14/18 at 129.1, edged less than one percent beyond the 2016/17 summit.

The decline in the broad real trade-weighted dollar from its 103.2/103.4 summit probably will be fairly close to and quite possibly more than ten percent. This retreat likely will last at least for several months. The broad TWD’s wall of resistance at 103.2/103.4 probably will not be broken anytime soon. If it is, the breach likely will not be substantial; dollar depreciation will resume.

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What interrelated phenomena currently are sparking, or will tend to encourage, near term and long run US dollar weakness?

Growing faith that America’s Federal Reserve Board will slow down (at least for a while) its current program of raising the Federal Funds rate represents a key factor in the establishment of December 2018’s TWD ceiling. Both the Fed Chairman and other US central bank guardians recently spoke of the need for “patience” on the rate increase front. For example, note Chairman Powell’s remarks before the Economic Club of Washington, DC (see the NYTimes, 1/11/19, pB3). Read the transcript of his 1/4/19 comments in an Atlanta, GA conference with other past Fed Chairs.

By reducing the likelihood of (at least) near term boosts in the Federal Funds rate, and thereby cutting the probability of notable yield increases for US government debt securities, the Fed makes the US dollar less appealing (less likely to appreciate further) in the perspective of many marketplace players. The Fed’s less aggressive rate-raising scheme (at minimum, a pause in that “normalization” process) mitigates enthusiasm for the US dollar from those aiming to take advantage of interest rate yield differentials (as well as those hoping for appreciation in the value of other dollar-denominated assets such as American stocks or real estate relative to the foreign exchange value of the given home currency). Capital flows into the dollar may slow, or even reverse to some extent.

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Another consideration constructing a noteworthy broad real TWD top is emerging optimism that tariff battles and other aspects of trade wars between America and many of its key trading partners (especially China) will become less fierce. Both the US and China increasingly are nervous regardless the ability of their nations to maintain adequate real GDP increases.

The current United States China 90 day negotiation deadline is 3/1/19. The NYTimes reported signs of Chinese concessions (1/9/18, ppA1, 8). US trade deals with China and other noteworthy nations reduce the incentive for those countries to depreciate their currency relative to the dollar in order to maintain market share for their goods and services within America. Such deals with China may well be vague or not amount to much in actual practice, but even cosmetic progress on the trade war battlefields will tend to weaken the dollar.

Signs of an armistice with China would bolster confidence that US trade feuds with Europe (particularly Germany) will subside. For the near term, the late 2018 deal between the US Administration with Canada and Mexico changing NAFTA treaty arrangements has lessened marketplace agitation regarding trade conflicts in that arena. Whether Congress eventually will enact this deal or a version close to it remains uncertain.

The current US Administration may seek a weaker US dollar relative to current heights in order to stimulate the economy as election season 2020 approaches.

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The substantial and worsening United States debt situation, particularly in the federal sector as a result of the end-December 2017 tax “reform” legislation, nowadays encourages and increasingly will assist long run dollar depreciation. In its bearish implications for the broad real TWD, this ominous US debt variable at present is somewhat independent of near term Federal Reserve Board and other key central bank policy action and rhetoric as well as the outcome of trade negotiations. However, it nevertheless entangles with these phenomena.

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Facing a Wall- Emerging US Dollar Weakness (1-15-19)