GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.
Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.
Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.
Subscribe to Leo Haviland’s BLOG to receive updates and new marketplace essays.
Since the current economic crisis emerged in 2007, a rough pattern has been that major movements and levels in US Treasury ten year note yields have preceded or coincided with those in the S+P 500. Thus, “in general”, plummeting UST yields have been paralleled by diving stock prices. And rising interest rates are connected to rallies in stocks. So in today’s world, gurus and guides often underline that higher and higher UST rates fit an economic recovery (health) scenario. In contrast, collapsing rates indicate looming (or actual) disaster; hence the popularity of flight to quality and safe haven commentary in regard to UST. Such relationships between the UST 10 year note and stocks (and variables allegedly bound to them) of course help forecasters to assess probabilities for and predict important debt and equity trend changes. Looking forward, this ongoing pattern may well persist.
Yet at some point, and arguably within the next several months, the present relationship between the US ten year and the S+P 500 may change. Thus rising UST yields eventually may coincide with sinking stocks. What key trading levels for the 10 year should one keep an eye out for? Such trigger point ranges will vary over time. So anyway, what guidelines for nowadays? If the US 10 year note yield floats decisively above the 2.50 percent level, and if stocks rally very little as that yield barrier is breached, that would hint the current (2007-2011) UST/S+P 500 relationship is altering.
As the global economic crisis flows on and on, many of its intertwined actions and participants (and thus marketplace relationships) may remain relatively unchanging. But they are not stagnant. Today’s marketplace voyagers should wonder if the crisis has drifted closer and closer to a new round of difficulties. Look at European yields, and place Germany on the sidelines. Focus instead on Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy. These countries show that severe economic problems (and downturns) are not always or inevitably associated with falling (or low) government interest rates.
FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this market essay as a PDF file.
Marketplaces and Policies – Making Connections (11-29-11)
The onset and acceleration of vicious bear trends in base metals “in general” such as copper in 2007 and 2008 preceded or coincided with meltdowns in other stock and many other commodity marketplaces. In late 2008, the London Metal Exchange’s base metal index’s bottom dawned only about three months before the major low in the S+P 500. What about 2011? Base metals reached their 2011 summits, as during the early stage of the global economic disaster, around the time of those in the S+P 500.
Erosion in base metal prices, especially as it now coincides with tumbles in stock arenas and in many other commodity playgrounds and some strength in the battered US dollar, confirms and points to further worldwide economic weakness. These intertwined marketplace trends underline that America’s policy actions (and related ones by many other nations) such as gigantic deficit spending, massive money printing, and sustained rock-bottom government interest rates have not sufficiently solved the severe debt and leverage problems that emerged into view in 2007 and 2008.
Although a repeat of the massive price declines of 2008 are unlikely, the current bear trends of 2011 in base metals probably will continue, as will those in equities and many other commodities.
The linkage of the base metal complex to stock marketplace and US dollar moves and interest rate policies and trends underscores the benefits of paying close attention to base metals. There has been a close bond in recent years between trends in the S+P 500, commodities “in general”, and the United States dollar. For example, in 2007, the LMEX major high on 5/4/07 at 4557 preceded the S+P 500 plateau on 10/11/07 at 1576. Eventually the crucial 2008 final tops in various marketplaces arrived. Note the timing coincidence in the final highs in the LMEX (3/5 and 7/2/08), the low in the broad real trade-weighted dollar (April 2008), the final top in the S+P 500 (5/19/08, midway between the LMEX 2008 tops), and the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (7/3/08). Compare the 2011 timing coincidence in tops in these various marketplace domains. For example, the LMEX high on 2/14/11 at 4478 is very close in time to the initial S+P 500 top on 2/18/11 at 1344; compare 4/18/11’s 4469 LMEX high with the S+P 500 peak on 5/2/11 at 1371.
FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this market essay as a PDF file.
Metals and Meltdowns (9-26-11)
Petroleum prices will remain in a sideways to down trend. At least in the OECD, industry inventory in days coverage terms is currently higher than average. Due to renewed economic weakness and still relatively lofty oil prices, petroleum demand for the balance of 2011 and calendar 2012 probably will be less than many believe. Thus days coverage in the petroleum world probably will remain adequate for some time.
Petroleum remains partially hostage to variables of and trends and levels in key equity, currency, and interest rate (and other commodity) battlefields. Equity declines seem to be intertwining with those in the petroleum complex. Consumer balance sheets and incomes in the United States and many other nations remain under pressure. Substantial fiscal deficits (US, several European nations, perhaps Japan) undermine stock marketplace strength. A weak US dollar has convinced many that equities as well as petroleum prices should inevitably keep climbing, or at least stay high. However, a very (especially) weak US dollar situation- which seems to be emerging these days- may coincide with both feeble stocks and falling petroleum prices.
Petroleum bulls underline that if the economic recovery retains strength, supplies could get fairly tight unless OPEC raises its production quite a bit. Admittedly, as the Libyan situation shows, there’s always a chance that some event will significantly interrupt supplies. Some petroleum players therefore prefer to keep a handful of extra inventory around “just-in-case”. Alternative investment by noncommercial players has not evaporated. Some observers have faith that if the American economy weakens substantially, the Fed will engage in a third wave of quantitative easing (money printing) which would rally petroleum prices in nominal terms.
FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this market essay as a PDF file.
Oil and Troubled Economic Waters (8-8-11)
The current act of the Federal Reserve’s money printing festival ends this month. Thus a big buyer of US Treasury securities substantially disappears. Suppose Senate, House, and White House performers do not enact a significant deficit cutting package. Assume no amazing economic growth magically eliminates much of the near term or long run shortfall. Will American individuals and institutions leap at the chance to boost their acquisitions of these low yielding bills, notes, and bonds? Absent “flight to quality” fears, probably not. The same is true of overseas players.
Judging from recent foreign buying patterns of US Treasury securities, it then will be difficult to attract sufficient foreign ownership to fill America’s fiscal hole. In the absence of another round of quantitative easing, or unless the US (and worldwide) economy weakens substantially, US government interest rates will face pressure to rise.
Associated with its quantitative easing and interest rate policies, the central bank sentinels have unleashed rhetoric concerning their talent in managing the process, particularly the unwinding. When if ever, and how fast, will it disgorge its vast supply of securities? Thus Fed quantitative easing has a counterpart in qualitative easing. Fed oratory indeed strives to inspire confidence in the Fed’s monitoring skill, its determination to keep inflation expectations well-anchored, its trusty and ready-at-hand toolkit, and its ability to smoothly implement appropriate exit strategies.
FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this market essay as a PDF file.
After QE2- Easy Does It? (The Money Jungle, Part Three)
View Leo Haviland’s profile