GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.
Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.
Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.
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The decline in the Euro FX does more than reflect Europe’s sovereign debt and banking crisis. Europe does not stand or act alone. Euro currency weakness underlines the continuing epic worldwide economic disaster that emerged in 2007. The sustained slump in the Euro FX since spring 2011 warns that the worldwide economic recovery that began around early 2009 is slowing. Some headway has been made in containing Eurozone (and other European) problems, but that progress has been insufficient and it probably will remain so for at least several more months. The Euro FX will depreciate further from current levels.
First, despite the major sovereign debt and banking problems, the Eurozone’s political and economic leadership has the political desire and (ultimately) sufficient economic power to preserve the Eurozone. This means keeping even members such as Greece within it. The problems of the so-called peripheral nations in key respects have become those of the entire fraternity. The Eurozone may rely on outside economic help from the International Monetary Fund or other countries to help pay for the repairs. However, the region as a whole will, “if push comes to shove”, resolve the thorny difficulties itself. And even if Greece did exit the Eurozone, remaining Eurozone members probably would band together to keep the Eurozone intact.
For some time, the so-called fixes may involve pushing the problem (dangers) off to a more distant future. The buying-time strategies (hoping that economic recovery eventually will enable a genuine escape) of course will have some costs. For example, picture inflation risks, slower growth, and some suffering by creditors.
The substantial role of the Euro FX in official reserves underlines the importance of the Eurozone and its Euro FX in the world economic order. Most of the world surely does not want the Euro FX to disappear entirely, or to suffer a massive depreciation (as opposed to a further small or even a modest depreciation). Thus at some point (“if really necessary”), the world outside of Europe would ultimately bail out Europe.
Consequently the declines in the Euro FX over the past several months confirm worldwide economic sluggishness (and slumps in stock marketplaces and commodities). So further falls in the Euro FX may reflect- or help lead to- even more declines in equity and commodity playgrounds. That additional Euro FX debasement may even reflect or accelerate an economic downturn (not just stagnation) in some regions, and not just European territories. Thus Euro FX currency depreciation alone will not solve the Eurozone’s (or overall European) problems.
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Eurozone- Breaking Up Is Hard To Do (1-3-12)
What does travel through the diverse forests of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the so- called “BRIC” nations) reveal?
Though the BRICs are key sources of world growth, they also reflect global growth patterns. BRIC territories do not possess sufficient independent firepower to propel the overall world economy significantly and permanently forward. In recent months, BRIC stocks have declined substantially. This BRIC equity weakness warns of current and further upcoming economic slowdowns not only in those countries, but sluggishness and even downturns elsewhere.
BRIC currency trends relative to the US dollar interrelate with this story told by equity playgrounds. Recent weakness in these BRIC foreign exchange cross rates reflect and confirm the fragility in BRIC stock benchmarks.
The key point is that Chinese currency appreciation, which had been slow yet persistent, now seems to be taking a breather. In the context of China’s substantial bear trend in equities, and given China’s status as a major exporter nation with massive foreign exchange reserves (a large bankroll to solve minor problems), what does this currency “non-appreciation”/modest depreciation against the US dollar suggest?
It indicates difficulties facing China finally have become quite significant- and more substantial than most China watchers recognize. In other words, China’s economic challenges (such as inflation, rising wages, weak property prices, substantial local government debt) may have grown to become a “fairly big problem”, even if Chinese authorities have not confessed to this. However, China did cut its reserve requirement ratio recently. So even if China’s stock marketplace is not an ideal benchmark for assessing “the overall Chinese economy”, at some point its stock price level and trend, when interpreted alongside other variables, can identify (coincide with) noteworthy Chinese economic problems.
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The House of BRICs – How Solid (12-13-11)
The onset and acceleration of vicious bear trends in base metals “in general” such as copper in 2007 and 2008 preceded or coincided with meltdowns in other stock and many other commodity marketplaces. In late 2008, the London Metal Exchange’s base metal index’s bottom dawned only about three months before the major low in the S+P 500. What about 2011? Base metals reached their 2011 summits, as during the early stage of the global economic disaster, around the time of those in the S+P 500.
Erosion in base metal prices, especially as it now coincides with tumbles in stock arenas and in many other commodity playgrounds and some strength in the battered US dollar, confirms and points to further worldwide economic weakness. These intertwined marketplace trends underline that America’s policy actions (and related ones by many other nations) such as gigantic deficit spending, massive money printing, and sustained rock-bottom government interest rates have not sufficiently solved the severe debt and leverage problems that emerged into view in 2007 and 2008.
Although a repeat of the massive price declines of 2008 are unlikely, the current bear trends of 2011 in base metals probably will continue, as will those in equities and many other commodities.
The linkage of the base metal complex to stock marketplace and US dollar moves and interest rate policies and trends underscores the benefits of paying close attention to base metals. There has been a close bond in recent years between trends in the S+P 500, commodities “in general”, and the United States dollar. For example, in 2007, the LMEX major high on 5/4/07 at 4557 preceded the S+P 500 plateau on 10/11/07 at 1576. Eventually the crucial 2008 final tops in various marketplaces arrived. Note the timing coincidence in the final highs in the LMEX (3/5 and 7/2/08), the low in the broad real trade-weighted dollar (April 2008), the final top in the S+P 500 (5/19/08, midway between the LMEX 2008 tops), and the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (7/3/08). Compare the 2011 timing coincidence in tops in these various marketplace domains. For example, the LMEX high on 2/14/11 at 4478 is very close in time to the initial S+P 500 top on 2/18/11 at 1344; compare 4/18/11’s 4469 LMEX high with the S+P 500 peak on 5/2/11 at 1371.
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Metals and Meltdowns (9-26-11)
In recent years, there’s been a close linkage between trends in the S+P 500, commodities “in general”, and the United States dollar. Recent weakness in commodity currencies versus the US dollar coincides with and thus warns of continued declines in commodity benchmarks such as the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and key stock indices such as the S+P 500. The worldwide economic crisis that erupted in 2007 has not been substantially solved.
The price and time trends of the commodity currencies from the US dollar cross rate perspective intertwine closely with key moves in stock and commodity benchmarks. Viewing them as a group, the five currencies soared higher against the US dollar from late 2008/early 2009 for over two years, until spring 2011/July 2011. Commodities in general and the S+P 500 made key bottoms in winter 2009 around the time of those in commodity currencies. The S+P 500 and the broad S+P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) then advanced dramatically for over two years.
In 2011, double tops in the commodity currencies (late April/early May; late July) link closely with the equity and commodity summits. The drops from late July 2011 are noteworthy because the S+P 500 subsequently fell decisively under the summer 2008 1265/1313 range (the financial crisis accelerated from around that 2008 time) and beneath the 4/26/10 top at 1220.
Many observers have faith that a substantial QE3 action will rally the S+P 500 (and commodities). Won’t history repeat itself? However, maybe history will refuse to do so, and stocks will climb very little before resuming their decline. Money printing is not a genuine repair policy for real economic problems. Despite the fearful Fed’s determination to maintain an extremely low Federal Funds rate, a renewed money printing enterprise also eventually may inspire interest rate jumps in US debt playgrounds.
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Commodity Currencies and Economic Cracks (9-12-11)
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