GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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JAPAN: FINANCIAL ARCHERY, SHOOTING ARROWS © Leo Haviland October 5, 2018

The famous military philosopher and analyst Carl von Clausewitz states in “On War” (Book Two, chapter 3; italics in original): “Rather than comparing it [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In late 2012, the Japanese political leadership dramatically unveiled its three “arrows” of easy money, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reform to improve the country’s economic performance. In practice, those Japanese political authorities generally represent major financial (corporate; commercial) interests (“Japan, Inc.”). The Bank of Japan’s policies since late 2012, though nominally independent of political and economic power centers, in practice reflects the goals of Japan’s substantial entrenched economic groups and the political representatives and bureaucrats aligned with them.

Monetary policy of course is not the only factor affecting GDP, inflation, and other intertwined variables. Yet Japan’s ongoing government fiscal deficit, though somewhat helpful for promoting growth and inflation, is not the most noteworthy element in the country’s policy array since end-2012. Moreover, the general government debt burden remains massive and likely will remain so for many years. According to the International Monetary Fund, Japan’s general government gross debt as a percent of GDP was 236.4 percent in 2017 (contrast the G-7 average of 118.6pc that year) and forecast at 236.0pc for 2018 and 234.2pc in 2019, dipping only slightly to 229.6pc by 2023 (“Fiscal Monitor”, April 2018, Table A7; the October 2018 update probably will not change Japan’s government debt as a percent of GDP statistics substantially). And structural reform in Japan, which usually crawls forward slowly, has been unremarkable.

The extremely easy monetary policy arrow embraced by the accommodative Japanese central bank for almost six years is the country’s critical weapon. The central bank chief faithfully and repeatedly proclaims that sustained inflation of two percent is a praiseworthy goal (as essentially do the sermons preached by other leading central banks such as the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank). The Bank of Japan’s ongoing tools to achieve its aims include sustained yield repression and massive quantitative easing (money printing). So far, the Bank of Japan, despite its determination, has not come close to achieving two percent inflation. The consumer price trend in recent months manifests merely minor progress on that front. And although Japan’s quarterly GDP for April-June 2018 may signal enhanced year-on-year economic performance, International Monetary Fund forecasts are not as sunny.

Yet what else has the Bank of Japan (as a representative and reflection of the country’s political and economic generals) really battled to achieve via its remarkably lax monetary strategy? A notion of improved and acceptable economic growth and frequent reference to an iconic two percent “price stability target” do not offer a complete story. Moreover, the enthusiastic declaration of assorted monetary policy plans and tactics does not directly reveal important aspects about the economic (financial; commercial; marketplace) landscape within which the interrelated GDP and inflation goals are targeted and such extraordinary easy money programs are designed and applied.

In practice, what are the intermediate connections (means; methods) to the achievement of the allegedly ultimate ends of satisfactory growth and sufficient inflation? One key approach of the Bank of Japan’s magnificent scheme relates to currency depreciation, the other to stock marketplace appreciation. Japan’s central bank sentinel quietly has aimed to achieve the related objectives of Yen weakness and Japanese stock marketplace strength.

In recent times, Japan deliberately has kept a relatively low profile in foreign exchange, trade, and tariff conflicts. Compare the furious racket nowadays, especially since the advent of the Trump presidency, around the United States and China (and also in regard to the European Union, Mexico/Canada/NAFTA).

Nevertheless, for several years, Japan has waged a trade war (engaged in fierce currency competition) without capturing much international political attention or media coverage. The Bank of Japan (and its political and economic allies) in recent years has fought vigorously to depreciate the Yen (especially on an effective exchange rate basis) and thereby to bolster Japan’s current account surplus. Japan’s overall economic growth relies significantly on its net export situation. The Yen’s substantial retreat and its subsequent stay at a relatively low level and the significant expansion in the country’s current account surplus are glorious triumphs.

Since late 2012, the Bank of Japan also has struggled ferociously to rally the Japanese stock marketplace (boost corporate profits). As of early autumn 2018, this guardian has achieved significant victories in this campaign as well.

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Japan- Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows (10-5-18)

STOCK MARKETPLACE MANEUVERS: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE © Leo Haviland September 4, 2018

“Danger always strikes when everything seems fine.” From the movie “Seven Samurai” (Akira Kurosawa, director)

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

American stock indices inspire an assortment of competing stories regarding them, including reasons for their past, present, and future levels and trends. Narratives and explanations regarding a broad “national” stock marketplace indicator such as the S+P 500 often involve those of equity weathervanes elsewhere. Discussions of interest rates, currencies, commodities, and other financial indicators may interrelate with stock marketplace analysis. These tales frequently indicate the extent to which given marketplace domains converge and diverge (lead or lag) with each other.

Many descriptions and analyses regarding broad benchmarks such as the S+P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average appear relatively unique to the United States. However, economic regions and marketplaces around the world increasingly have intertwined during the course of globalization in recent decades.

Therefore the directional travels (bull and bear adventures) of America’s “overall” stock marketplace increasingly have tended to parallel (converge with) stocks of other significant advanced countries and regions. In the increasingly intertwined global economy, trends of emerging marketplace stocks “in general” have interrelated with and often (but not always) resembled those of leading advanced nations.

Various advanced nation and emerging marketplace stock indices achieved very important highs “together” early in first quarter 2018. However, in recent months, probably beginning around the end of first quarter 2018, the generally bullish trend of the S+P 500 and other noteworthy US equity marketplace benchmarks have diverged substantially from the bearish trend of emerging marketplace stocks. Climbing US interest rates and a renewed rally in the broad real trade-weighted dollar, plus increasing trade war rhetoric, encouraged the relative and overall feebleness in emerging marketplace stocks.

In addition, the S+P 500 and other US stock indices have diverged somewhat from those of other key advanced nations, though less substantially than relative to emerging stock marketplace realms. Nevertheless, important European and Japanese stock arenas currently remain under their January 2018 highs (and mid-May 2018 ones). The failure of these overseas stock battlegrounds to achieve new highs alongside American ones, when interpreted alongside the decline in emerging marketplace stocks (and in relation to other economic variables), further hints that American stock benchmarks probably are establishing an important price peak around current levels.

In this context, bearish indicators for American equities include the longer run trend of rising US interest rates (note the yield lows of  July 2016 and September 2017), mammoth global debt totals, expanding American federal government budget deficits (aided by tax “reform”), and the rally in the broad real trade-weighted US dollar above a critical height. The Federal Reserve and other key central banks are not displaying signs of further easing; instead, the bias is toward tightening (even if only at a rather glacial pace). Also, United States stock marketplace valuations arguably are high by historical standards. A global trade war (tariff fights), or at least noteworthy skirmishes, is underway.

Populist pressures have not disappeared in America or elsewhere. Economic, political, and other cultural divisions in America are significant. What if the US mid-term elections this autumn return the Democrats to power in the House of Representatives (and perhaps the Senate as well)? Concerns about the quality of US Presidential leadership remain widespread.

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The US tax “reform” legislation enacted in December 2017 has been a critical factor in creating the price divergence since around late first quarter 2018 between American stock price benchmarks and those elsewhere. The US corporate tax cut translated into higher reported earnings for American companies and thereby helped to rally American stocks. Other leading countries around the globe did not enact a similar generous gift for their corporations. Moreover, America’s tax reform likely further encouraged share buybacks by US corporations.

The second quarter 2018 blended earnings growth rate for the S+P 500 was 25.0 percent year-on-year (FactSet, “Earnings Insight”; 8/31/18). Thomson Reuters estimates S+P 500 2Q18 earnings soared 24.8pc (“S&P 500 Earnings Scorecard”; 8/28/18). Thomson Reuters data notes that 1Q18’s earnings likewise skyrocketed, up 26.6pc year-on-year (compare 4Q17’s boost of 14.8pc and 3Q17’s 8.5pc rise).

Both FactSet and Thomson Reuters forecast significant year-on-year earnings increases for the S+P 500 over the next two quarters of 2018. FactSet says analysts are projecting earnings will climb 20.0 percent in 3Q18 and 17.4pc in 4Q18. Thomson Reuters puts year-on-year earnings growth at roughly similar levels, with 3Q18 ballooning 22.3pc and 4Q18 up 20.3pc.

However, the rate of earnings increases slows in 2019. FactSet states earnings growth in 1Q19 will be 7.2pc year-on-year, with 2Q19 stretching up 7.5pc versus 2Q18. Thomson Reuters places 1Q19 growth at 8.2pc year-on-year, with that for 2Q19 up 9.3pc.

Perhaps the wonderful US corporate earnings of first half 2018 will be followed by the impressive earnings forecast for the balance of 2018. However, if notable shortfalls in actual earnings relative to such lofty current profit expectations occur, that probably will worry many stock bulls. Going forward, if forecasts for first half 2019 earnings for the S+P 500 are cut relative to current expectations, will that make S+P 500 bulls (“investors” and others) fearful. After all, the currently anticipated (conjectural) calendar 2019 earnings growth already dips significantly from those of calendar 2018’s quarters.

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Stock Marketplace Maneuvers- Convergence and Divergence (9-4-18)

SHAKIN’ ALL OVER: MARKETPLACE CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE © Leo Haviland June 18, 2018

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Financial wizards not only offer competing opinions regarding past, current, and future trends for stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces. Their rhetoric displays diverse viewpoints regarding alleged relationships within and between those categories. For example, within the global stock constellation, various apostles elect to compare the travels of the S+P 500 with those of the Nasdaq Composite or with an emerging marketplace stock benchmark. Alternatively, some visionaries herald their subjective insights and foresights about connections between stocks (such as the S+P 500) and interest rates (such as the United States 10 year government note), perhaps also including the US dollar and the commodities galaxy in their investigations.

Luminaries tell stories offering their cultural perspective regarding apparent convergence and divergence (lead/lag) relationships within and between marketplace domains. Viewpoints regarding convergence and divergence encompass not only price direction (trend), but also the timing (start and end date; duration) of a given move as well as the distance it travelled. In any case, these links (associations; patterns) can alter, sometimes substantially and occasionally permanently. Marketplace history, including that related to convergence and divergence, is not marketplace destiny, whether entirely or even partly.

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History reveals that the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace stocks “in general” (MSCI Emerging Stock Markets Index, from Morgan Stanley; “MXEF”) often have had very important trend changes in the same direction “around” the same time.

After establishing important bottoms together in first quarter 2016, the key American stock indices and those of other important advanced nations and the “overall” emerging stock marketplace traded closely together from the directional and marketplace timing perspective. Though the bull moves since first quarter 2016 in these assorted domains did not all voyage the same distance, all were very substantial. Their rallies since around the time of the November 2016 United States Presidential election were impressive. Both emerging marketplace equities and the S+P 500 established important peaks in first quarter 2018 (MXEF 1279 on 1/29/18; S+P 500 2873 on 1/26/18).

Yet whereas since its first quarter 2018 summit prices for the emerging stock marketplace arena have eroded significantly and currently rest at their calendar 2018 lows, the S+P 500 has retraced much of its dive and now (6/15/18 close 2780; stock price data in this essay is through 6/15/18) stands only slightly over three percent from its 1Q18 top. This divergence, though not massive, is noteworthy. A similar but more extreme divergence between these stock benchmarks existed from spring 2011 (and note particularly since around second half 2014) through about May 2015. The S+P 500 kept going up and achieved new highs over its spring 2011 one, but the MXEF failed to do so.

After spring 2015, convergence developed, with a bear trend in the S+P 500 accompanying the existing downhill one in the emerging marketplace stock group. An important factor assisting this was the decisive climb in the broad real trade-weighted United States dollar (“TWD”) above its critical resistance around 96.6. A similar convergence is likely to occur in the present MXEF and S+P 500 marketplace relationship, with the significant divergence disappearing and both equity realms falling “together”.

US corporate earnings indeed have been quite strong, with share buybacks and mergers and acquisitions robust. Nevertheless, one bearish factor for stocks in the current landscape is the broad real trade-weighted dollar’s recent advance over the 96.2/96.6 barrier (compare 2015); also recall the TWD rally beginning in spring 2008 during the 2007-09 global economic disaster). The ascending US yield trend (which began in July 2016, accelerating in 1Q18) has encouraged the TWD’s modest rally in the past few months. Trade war talk and potential tariffs probably have assisted the TWD’s appreciation. The US is a net importer nation; some exporters (which include many developing nations) may depreciate their currency to maintain market share within the US.

Another bearish sign for both advanced nation and emerging marketplace stocks is the persistent climb in US Treasury yields. Rising global yields alongside a strengthening dollar is especially painful to emerging marketplace countries and thus their stock marketplaces. Many developing nations, including their corporations, have dollar-denominated debt. And underscore in this context another point: for America over the past century, sustained rising yields generally have led to American stock marketplace declines. Given the Federal Reserve Board’s ongoing tightening policy (and its normalizing balance sheet, as well as probable willingness to allow some overshooting of its two percent inflation target), growing substantial US federal deficits (aided by tax “reform” legislation enacted in December 2017), substantial US household credit demand, a low unemployment rate, and other factors, US government yields probably will tend to keep rising over the long run. The growing mountain of US public debt, including as a percentage of GDP, also tends to push up interest rates.

A confirming sign for equity feebleness in both the S+P 500 and the MXEF likely will be weakness in commodities prices. Commodities often have peaked (bottomed) around the same time as a crucial top (bottom) in important advanced nation or emerging marketplace stocks. However, there have sometimes been lags. Recall that in during the worldwide financial crisis following the glorious Goldilocks Era, commodities “in general” peaked after the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace stocks. The broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (“GSCI”) has declined since 5/22/18’s 498 high.

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Shakin' All Over- Marketplace Convergence and Divergence (6-18-18)

GLOBAL STOCK MARKETPLACES: WINTER OF DISCONTENT © Leo Haviland March 5, 2018

“I’m goin’ down the road feelin’ bad
I don’t want to be treated this-a-way.” Bill Monroe, the Grateful Dead, and other musicians have performed versions of the traditional song, “Goin’ Down the Road Feelin’ Bad”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

American stock indices “in general” inspire an assortment of stories regarding them, including reasons for their past, present, and future levels and trends. Many of these descriptions and analyses regarding broad benchmarks such as the S+P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average appear relatively unique to the United States. However, economic regions and financial marketplaces around the world have increasingly intertwined during the course of globalization in recent decades, and especially during the past several years.

Therefore the directional travels (bull and bear adventures) of America’s stock marketplace increasingly have tended to parallel those of other significant advanced countries and regions. In recent years, the trends of emerging marketplace stocks “in general” increasingly have interconnected with those of leading advanced nations. Consequently, narratives and explanations regarding a broad “national” stock marketplace indicator such as the S+P 500 often involve those of equity barometers elsewhere (as well as interest rate, currency, and commodity movements).

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History underscores that across the fields of these various stock marketplace signposts, the timing of key price turns and the duration and extent (percentage distance travelled) of very important trend moves are not always exactly the same or extremely close. But they often are.

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After establishing important bottoms together in first quarter 2016 (and during the preceding price decline), the key American stock indices and those of other important advanced nations and the “overall” emerging stock marketplace have traded closely together from the directional and marketplace timing perspective. Though the bull moves since first quarter 2016 in these assorted domains did not all cover the same distance, all were very substantial. Their rallies since around the time of the November 2016 United States Presidential election were impressive. Investors and other stock owners, Wall Street, and the financial media cheered the majestic ascent. Heated advice to “buy the dip” became widespread as the S+P 500 climbed and as price declines tended to become less substantial in percentage terms.

However, the glorious bull move in American and other related stock marketplace halted in first quarter 2018. A mournful “correction”, a decline of roughly ten percent, ensued. The disturbing decline in the S+P 500 and other significant global stock marketplace indices probably will continue. However, if the S+P 500 and other equity benchmarks manage to surpass their January 2018 highs, they probably will not do so by much.

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For further economic and political analysis, see “There Will Be Blood: Financial Battlefields” (2/9/18), “Busload of Faith: Financial Marketplaces” (1/15/18), “Marketplace Vehicles: Going Mobile” (12/13/17), “History on Stage: Marketplace Scenes” (8/9/17), and other essays.

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Global Stock Marketplaces- Winter of Discontent (3-5-18)