GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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AMERICAN INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES: PAINTING PICTURES © Leo Haviland May 4, 2021

“We hope you will enjoy the show”, sing The Beatles in “Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band

CONCLUSION

“Inflation” (deflation; stable prices) can appear in various diverse economic arenas. The United States consumer price index measure of course covers somewhat different ground from producer price yardsticks, and both of these weathervanes differ from asset price realms such as the S+P 500 and homes. However, these assorted inflation domains and phenomena influencing them in various ways are not entirely separate.

Despite its enthusiastic claims of surveying assorted inflation indicators and marketplaces, the beloved Federal Reserve Board focuses primarily on consumer-level inflation, as measured by indices such as personal consumption expenditure prices.

The US obviously is not an independent island in the interconnected global economy, though it plays a critical part. However, American “inflation” in the general sense of the term (and even if one excludes the asset price territory of the S+P 500 and homes) is more widespread and less well-anchored than the Fed and armies of its devoted followers (especially the investment fraternity and the financial advisors and media who assist it) believe. The ongoing long run trend for rising US Treasury yields (see the UST 10 year note rate) evidences this trend of sustained and increasing US inflation. Inflation will force the Fed to weaken its longstanding tenacious yield repression program.

Demand for credit relative to its supply of course affects US Treasury and other interest rate levels and trends. America’s federal debt situation of enormous budget deficits (massive spending) probably will continue to propel both inflation and UST yields higher.

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American Inflation and Interest Rates- Painting Pictures (5-4-21)

CRITICAL CONDITIONS AND ECONOMIC TURNING POINTS © Leo Haviland February 5, 2020

“Just Dropped In (To See What Condition My Condition Was In)”, a Mickey Newbury song performed by Kenny Rogers

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CONCLUSION

With the passage of time following 2007-09’s global economic disaster, memories regarding the accompanying bloody bear trend in America’s stock marketplace benchmarks such as the S+P 500 gradually yet significantly faded. As the S+P 500 ascended, and especially as it advanced to and sustained record highs, widespread sermons declared that we should “buy the dip”. This aligned with the venerable proverb regarding the reasonableness of buying and holding United States stocks for the “long run”. What constitutes a “dip” or the “long run” is debatable, a matter of subjective perspective (opinion). How substantial a drop from some key elevation justifies buying? Is it one percent, five percent, ten percent, or twenty percent or greater? Is the long run one year, five years, or ten or more?
Of course since the S+P 500’s major bottom on 3/6/09 at 667, a few bloody stock price slides in that signpost (and “related” global equity yardsticks) terrified stock “investors” and their allies, including central banks such as the Federal Reserve, American politicians, and the financial media. Yet as the S+P 500 achieved a record height quite recently with 1/22/20’s 3338 (2/5/20’s level matched this), such advice definitely looked excellent to many stock owners and observers! Besides, as they have numerous times over the past eleven years, won’t beloved central bank physicians such as the Federal Reserve Board (under the guise of fulfilling their mandate), European Central Bank, the Bank of England, China’s central bank, and the Bank of Japan rescue stocks and generate rallies in them? Not only soothing rhetoric, but also yield repression and quantitative easing (money printing) remain antidotes for stock price drops, right? And politicians might assist via new tax cuts, boosts in infrastructure spending, or similar schemes. Thus the majority of US stock marketplace players have focused more on the rewards of owning than the dangers of doing so. Substantial complacency reigns regarding the potential for noteworthy American and other stock marketplace price declines.

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The recent emergence within China of a deadly coronavirus and its spread elsewhere around the globe helped to push US and other equities downhill. Whether this medical problem will injure the S+P 500 and other global stocks significantly (and for a sustained period of time) remains uncertain. Government actions to prevent the spread of the virus will tend to hamper economic growth. Fearful consumers and nervous corporations may slow their spending. The wider the reach and the longer the persistence of the ailment, the greater the economic damage. And economic (financial) weapons such as money printing and yield repression available to the Fed and its friends obviously do not halt epidemics or cure diseases (or fears of them).Though the S+P 500 descended to 3215 on 1/31/20, the index recovered, touching 3338 again on 2/5/20.

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Critical Conditions and Economic Turning Points (2-5-20)

RUNNING FOR COVER: MARKETPLACE EXITS (c) Leo Haviland August 9, 2019

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

The frantic price rally in several key marketplace benchmarks commencing around end year 2018 probably reflected a fervent hunt for “yield” (“return”) by “investors” and other asset purchasers. In addition to buying the S+P 500, yield seekers searched for sufficient return in domains such as other advanced nation stocks, emerging marketplace stocks, lower-grade United States corporate debt, emerging marketplace sovereign debt securities denominated in US dollars, and the petroleum complex. Easy money policies and pronouncements by the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, and their comrades greatly encouraged these eager yield searches.

That ferocious yield hunt has diminished and the associated price rally for these signposts in general probably is finished. The terrifying slip in the S+P 500 from 7/26/19’s 3028 summit, in conjunction with the renewed tumble in emerging marketplace equities and the retreat in petroleum prices, signals a reversal of the avid enthusiasm of the hunt for yield in these arenas. The recent plummeting interest rate in the US 10 year government note underlines this. Although the US Treasury note’s yield decline commenced in autumn 2018 at around 3.25 percent, and although chroniclers can attribute further erosion during early 2019 to central bank easy money talk and schemes, its recent dive beneath two percent likely represents a “flight to quality” stage for UST yields.

Therefore, dutiful marketplace pilgrims who raced to identify and achieve “good” (acceptable, reasonable) returns (by purchasing asset classes such as stocks and commodities) at the end of calendar 2018 and for several months thereafter in these sectors probably have started running for cover (begun to liquidate their long positions). Many other investors/owners in these marketplaces probably are running for the exits too.

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America and the rest of the world are in the waning period of the epic economic expansion that followed the dreadful economic disaster of 2007-09. Even if a recession does not occur in the United States (or in advanced nations in general), a noteworthy slowdown in global real GDP growth (including China and other emerging realms) likely is underway. Ongoing or further rounds of central bank easing probably will have limited effectiveness in maintaining adequate economic growth.

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Marketplace history of course does not necessarily repeat itself, either entirely or even partly. Apparent marketplace convergence and divergence (lead/lag) relationships can and do change, sometimes dramatically. Nevertheless, especially since around autumn 2018, the relationship between the S+P 500, emerging stock marketplaces, the United States 10 year government note, petroleum, and the broad real-trade weighted US dollar in key respects increasingly has resembled that of the mid-2014 (and especially mid-2015) to first quarter 2016 time horizon. (One can trace the 2014/2015 trend relationship antecedents back to around spring 2011.)

In the prior era, noteworthy price divergence existed between the S+P 500 and emerging stock marketplaces. However, beginning sometime around late 2014, convergence (less divergence) began to develop between these realms. By spring 2015 (May 2015 high in the S+P 500; late April 2015 emerging stocks top), prices in these equity playgrounds had converged. Prices for both cratered thereafter until first quarter 2016.

Though yields for the United States Treasury 10 year note began to fall in early 2011, the accelerating drop from the yield highs of July 2014 and (especially) June 2015 was a critical factor in relation to stocks and other financial marketplaces. The initial key low yield for the UST occurred in first quarter 2016 (alongside stocks). The decline in commodities in general started in spring 2011, and raced downhill after June 2014’s interim top (and especially) after May 2015 (note the convergence with emerging marketplace stocks and eventually with the S+P 500). Commodities, like stocks, bottomed in first quarter 2016.

The gradually strengthening broad real trade-weighted US dollar intertwined with these various trends. After making a major bottom in July 2011, it gradually appreciated. The dollar’s climb after September 2014 was significant; its fourth quarter 2015 rally above March 2009’s financial crisis peak substantially influenced other financial battlegrounds (note the convergence between and sharp bear moves in the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace stocks), achieving a key high in first quarter 2016.

In both that past era as well as recently, UST 10 year yields dropped substantially. In those two periods, emerging marketplace stocks and commodities crumbled (and alongside each other).

Especially around late 2015, the bull move in the broad real trade-weighted dollar (“TWD”) became remarkably strong. Underline its violent charge above first quarter 2009’s financial crisis top. In the “current” marketplace (which includes many preceding months), the TWD likewise has been very robust. Though the TWD did not push through the economic disaster top recently, it has remained above it for many months. The key parallel between the two periods thus is a strong dollar, and one above the financial crisis high.

Underscore the significant divergence between the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace stocks in both epochs. After its spring 2011 interim top, the S+P 500 continued to attain new highs, peaking in spring 2015. In contrast, emerging marketplace stocks in general were in a sideways to down trend beginning in spring 2011 (though they eventually achieved price convergence with the S+P 500 by spring 2015).

What about the current stock landscape? The divergence between the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace equities probably began before autumn 2018. Emerging marketplace stocks started their bear descent in first quarter 2018. Although the S+P 500 made an important interim high in first quarter 2018, it attained new highs (though not much above the 1Q18 top in percentage terms) up through end July 2019. Therefore divergence between the S+P 500 began around late 1Q18 and continued into summer 2019.

Why the substantial divergence between the S+P 500 and emerging/developing nation equities beginning in early 2018? The passage of America’s tax “reform” legislation in late 2017 was a critical difference. American corporations have reaped major benefits (higher earnings/profits) from this, thus helping to propel the S+P 500 upward. Emerging stock marketplaces (and those of other advanced nations) did not receive such benevolent new legislation.

The S+P 500’s decline since its late July 2019 high probably is the start of price convergence between it and emerging marketplace stocks. Given the similarities of (parallels between) interrelated price movements involving emerging marketplace stocks, commodities (petroleum), the UST 10 year note yield, and the broad real trade-weighted dollar during both eras, convergence between the S+P 500 and emerging marketplace stocks is probable. Thus the S+P 500 probably is in, or soon will begin, a bear trend. Therefore the S+P 500 retreat will confirm the slowing down of the global economy. Keep in mind the spring 2015 association (linkage between) the S+P 500 and MXEF highs and the aftermath in those and other marketplaces.

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Running for Cover- Marketplace Exits (8-9-19)