GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

 

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DÉJÀ VU (ENCORE): US MARKETPLACE HISTORY © Leo Haviland October 4, 2015

CONCLUSION 

Via its rhetoric and September 2015 managerial decision to delay a Fed Funds rate increase, the Federal Reserve has battled to halt the S+P 500’s decline relative to its May 2015 peak at around ten percent. Hints by the European Central Bank and Japanese policymakers regarding their potential willingness to embark on additional quantitative easing interrelate with this Fed quest. However, the International Monetary Fund head warns: “global growth will likely be weaker this year than last, with only a modest acceleration expected in 2016”; “we see global growth that is disappointing and uneven” (“Managing the Transition to a Healthier Global Economy”; 9/30/15). The World Trade Organization cut its 2015 forecast of global trade expansion from 3.3 percent to 2.8pc, lowering that for 2016 to 3.9pc from 4.0pc (9/30/15). The WTO says risks to this prediction are on the downside.

 

Worldwide economic growth probably will be feebler than the IMF expects. In today’s intertwined international economy, this overall economic weakness, which is not confined to emerging/developing nations, will help to undermine American GDP growth. The S+P 500 will remain volatile, but it probably will continue to decline, eventually breaking beneath its August 2015 low. The broad real trade-weighted United States dollar will stay relatively strong.

 

Marketplace history for US stocks and other financial domains obviously need not repeat itself, either in whole or in part. A slump in the S+P 500 of roughly twenty percent or more from its spring 2015 pinnacle nevertheless probably would inspire memories of 2007-09. After all, not only is the dollar strong, but also emerging marketplace stocks and commodities “in general” have collapsed over the past few years, and notably since second half 2014.

 

The strong US dollar, the substantial tumble in emerging stock marketplaces, and the crash in commodities in general reflect (confirm; encourage) global economic weakness (slowing growth). Overall debt levels as a percentage of nominal GDP in America (and many other places) remain elevated despite the economic recovery since 2009. The United States has made no progress in reducing its long run federal fiscal deficit problem. These trends are ominous bearish indicators for the S+P 500. What other variables currently or potentially confirm the probability of economic weakness in the US (and elsewhere)? Let’s focus on the US economic and political scene.

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The broad real trade-weighted US dollar (“TWD”) established a major bottom at 80.5 in July 2011 (Federal Reserve, H.10; monthly average). By September 2015, it had run up to 97.9. Not only does September 2015 exceed March 2009’s 96.9 high, attained at the depths of the worldwide economic disaster (and alongside the S+P 500’s March 2009 major low at 667). The TWD’s 21.6 percent appreciation in its current bull move exceeds the 15.1pc TWD advance during from April 2008 to March 2009. Keep in mind that although the S+P 500’s major high in October 2007 at 1576 preceded April 2008’s TWD trough, its 5/19/08 final top at 1440 roughly coincided with that April 2008 TWD low.

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Review Moody’s Baa index of corporate bonds (this signpost includes all industries, not just the industrial sector; average maturity 30 years, minimum maturity 20 years; Federal Reserve, H.15). Despite the Fed’s continued unwillingness to raise the Federal Funds rate, such yield repression in recent months has not prevented the modest yet rather steady rise in medium-grade US corporate debt yields. In addition, the yield spread between that corporate debt index and the 30 year US Treasury bond has widened. Although these rate moves have not shifted as dramatically as they did during the worldwide financial crisis, they likewise warn of (confirm) US (and global) economic weakness.

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Deja Vu (Encore)- US Marketplace History (10-4-15)

TALKING THE TALK: MARKETPLACE PARALLELS © Leo Haviland October 19, 2014

Marketplace history of course does not necessarily repeat itself, either in whole or in part. However, sometimes it does. In any case, it should not be forgotten. Storytellers reveal (construct, create) parallels (and differences) between the marketplace past and present, not only to explain ancient times and the current situation, but also to predict future phenomena.

Coincidentally, the S+P 500’s recent high at 2019 on 9/19/14 occurred almost exactly on the sixth anniversary of Lehman Brothers’ 9/15/08 bankruptcy filing. Around the time of that autumn 2008 event, the fearsome worldwide economic crisis that emerged in mid-2007 accelerated.

Yet not so coincidentally, many recent intertwined dramatic marketplace moves in interest rate, stock, currency, and commodity arenas bear significant resemblance to those of the 2007-09 theater. Why? Problems now echo those of the prior period. Some troubles represented by that supposedly distant past have not been sufficiently fixed. In addition, some excesses of that long ago time, even if in somewhat different ways, have reappeared.

In regard to the current vista, underline several trend interrelations between key playgrounds. Focus on the time dimension in this context. Note not only the US Treasury 10 year note’s yield decline since its 1/2/14 top at 3.05pc (and the narrowing of the 10 year less two year UST spread), but also the UST’s yield slump from 9/19/14’s 2.65pc and its break under key support around 2.40 percent. The S+P 500 fell nearly ten percent following 9/19/14’s 2019 plateau. In addition, the recent peak in emerging marketplace stocks (“MXEF”; MSCI Emerging Stock Markets Index, from Morgan Stanley) on 9/4/14 at 1104 occurred close in time to both the S+P 500’s recent high as well as the rally in the broad real trade-weighted US dollar. Moreover, recall the sharp retreat in the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index since 6/23/14’s 673 interim top, particularly its recent decisive break under important support at 595/612.

The current and future marketplace theater probably will not duplicate the scope of the 2007-09 global economic disaster. Nevertheless, despite the passage of several years, significant deficit spending by America and other key nations, and widespread extraordinary central bank easy money policies (conjure up the Federal Reserve’s yield repression and money printing schemes), we have not entirely escaped the horrific days of the 2007-09 era.

The major bull move from the S+P 500’s 10/10/02 bottom at around 769 to 2007’s lofty 10/11/07 major high at 1576 lasted five years. The October 2002 bottom times two is 1538, or within about three percent the October 2007 peak. Since the S+P 500 achieved its major bottom on 3/6/09 at 667, its bull move has run about five and a half years, even longer than 2002-07’s advance. Whereas S+P 500 prices doubled over the 2002-07 span, 9/19/14’s height at 2019 triples March 2009’s major bottom (doubles 7/1/10’s 1011 trough; and jumps about 50 percent over 11/16/12’s 1343 low).

Given that the S+P 500’s major bull move since March 2009 was even longer-lasting and stratospheric than the preceding one, observers should be watchful for a very noteworthy S+P 500 decline, extending (or greater than) the one that so far since 9/19/14 has reached around ten percent. With parallels between the 2007-09 world and the current environment in mind (given the recent moves in the UST 10 year, emerging marketplace stocks, the broad real trade-weighted dollar, and the broad GSCI), the S+P 500’s 9/19/14 height probably represents an important top. If that top is broken, it probably will not be exceeded by much.

Incidentally, for those seeking further timing parallels in the S+P 500, the 9/19/14 date is not far from the October 2002 and 2007 calendar tops and bottoms (10/10/02; 10/11/07), but also 10/4/11’s important low at 1075.

Looking forward, since history need not repeat itself, the Fed’s eloquence and actions may not always achieve the goals the Fed diligently seeks. Continued or even increased easing, whether by the Fed or other important central banks, do not inevitably produce rallies in the S+P 500 (or a continued economic recovery).

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Talking the Talk- Marketplace Parallels (10-19-14) (1)
Charts- Ten Yr UST, S+P 500, GSCI, Corp Bond (10-19-14, for essay Talking the Talk- Marketplace Parallels)