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Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

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Tuesday, September 7th, 2021

AMERICA DIVIDED AND DOLLAR DEPRECIATION © Leo Haviland September 7, 2021

Pogo, created by the cartoonist Walt Kelly, is a possum living in Georgia’s Okefenokee Swamp. About 50 years ago, Pogo proclaimed: “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

For many decades, the United States dollar has led the foreign exchange field as the key currency for global trade as well as financial reserves. Over that time span, the greenback’s predominance to a significant extent encouraged, sustained, and reflected widespread (although not unlimited) American and global faith in the wisdom and goodness of American cultural values and the persuasive and practical ability of the nation to be a (and sometimes the) critical guiding force in international affairs. Although the dollar obviously has had numerous extended periods of appreciation and depreciation since the free market currency dealing regime began in the early 1970s, the dollar’s crucial role in the increasingly intertwined global economic system has seldom been significantly questioned or challenged for over an extended period of time.

Using the Federal Reserve’s real “Broad Dollar Index” (which is a monthly average) as a signpost, the US dollar “in general”, for almost ten years, from its major bottom in July 2011 until April 2020, the overall trend of the dollar in general was bullish. The US dollar “in general” depreciated until “around” January 2021. It rallied for several months thereafter, with August 2021 being the high since then. From a long run historical perspective, August 2021’s real Broad Dollar Index level is rather strong.

However, when interpreted alongside phenomena such as America’s government debt level and trend, ascending United States inflation, and the nation’s ongoing cultural divisions and the recent increase in net dissatisfaction among the US public regarding the country’s direction, a review of various important currency cross rate trends against the dollar suggest that “overall” weakness in the US dollar has resumed (beginning around late August 2021) or will do so in the near future.

Take a related vantage point. Given the Federal Reserve’s determined effort to repress (pin at a very low level) the Federal Funds rate and US Treasury yields despite numerous inflationary signs, a probable outcome (consequence; outlet) for that central bank scheme in the context of these assorted variables is a depreciating dollar.

In this context, if the real Broad Dollar Index (“BDI”) moved toward or underneath its March 2009 international economic disaster peak at 101.5, that probably will help to precipitate a “weak United States dollar equals weak US stocks” scenario.

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An underlying factor promoting a dollar tumble is the gradually declining share of America as a percentage of worldwide GDP. Also, both political parties, not just the current US Administration, and especially in the coronavirus era, likely want the real Broad Dollar Index to stay beneath its April 2020 summit at 113.6. They also probably prefer a renewed fall in the BDI from August 2021’s 107.3 elevation. The great majority of the country’s politicians preach their allegiance to a strong dollar, but they also endorse economic growth.

Several additional phenomena make the dollar particularly vulnerable nowadays. First, although many major nations have increased their government debt burdens in recent years, America’s public debt situation has worsened significantly more than most others since 2019. Moreover, America already faced widening federal budget deficits encouraged by the tax “reform” enacted at end 2017. Plus don’t overlook the ongoing ominous long run debt burden, looming from factors such as an aging population. How easily will America service its debt situation? In addition, the current Administration’s infrastructure proposals, if a significant proportion of them become law, probably will boost America’s debt as a percentage of GDP. Will there be a political fight over raising the nation’s debt ceiling? And America’s corporate and individual indebtedness also is substantial.

Second, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U, all items) as a benchmark, American “inflation” in recent months has exceeded that of other leading nations. The Fed continues to maintain a highly accommodative monetary policy. This beloved guardian has merely murmured about tapering its massive quantitative easing (money printing) scheme, and it remains reluctant to raise policy rates significantly anytime soon. Due to the Fed’s yield repression, nowadays US Treasury yields across the yield curve relative to the current US CPI level offer a negative real return. This negative return situation of course (all else equal) tends to make UST ownership rather unattractive for many marketplace participants.

Whether because of ascending US interest rates, a descending dollar or both, suppose foreigners become smaller buyers, or even net sellers, of US Treasury securities. Such overseas action would not be an endorsement of America.

Another bearish indicator for the US dollar exists: the intensity and breadth of America’s cultural divisions has increased in recent times. Though the Trump era reflected and enhanced these splits, they remain very significant across various fields. America’s ongoing substantial cultural battles in economic, political, and social arenas reflect reduced national unity and tend to undermine domestic confidence. American confidence in the nation’s overall direction has slumped in recent months. As US citizen faith in the country’s situation declines, so probably likewise will (or has) that of foreigners in regard to America. To some extent, faith in America and its institutions is reflected by a willingness to own substantial amounts of dollar-denominated assets.

An additional feature can intertwine with these variables to undermine the dollar, especially over the long run. In recent years, the strong international belief in the reliability (and leading role) of America as a trading and military partner probably has eroded somewhat. Some of this may reflect the declining US share of worldwide GDP. Former President Trump’s often erratic behavior, bold wordplay, and frequent disregard for the truth assisted this fall in confidence process. Also, ongoing America First (Make America Great Again) movements and an apparently diminished American enthusiasm for multilateralism and globalization probably reduce confidence in other players that America will be “as committed” a partner. For example, trade conflicts, even if they now are less strident than during the Trump presidency, have not evaporated. The dismal American withdrawal process from Afghanistan troubles many overseas observers. In addition, the persistence of America’s fervent and substantial cultural divides to some extent risk injuring foreign faith in the reliability and effectiveness of America on the international scene.

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Declining faith in American assets (and its cultural institutions and its economic and political leadership) can inspire shifts away from such assets. American marketplaces will not be completely avoided given their importance, but players can diversify away from them to some extent. Not only Americans but also foreigners own massive sums of dollar-denominated assets (debt instruments, stock in public and private companies, real estate; dollar deposits). Such portfolio changes (especially given America’s slowly declining importance in the global economy) will tend to make the dollar feeble.

Suppose nations and corporations increasingly elect, whether for commercial or political reasons, to avoid using the dollar as the currency via which they transact business. That will injure the dollar.

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America Divided and Dollar Depreciation (9-7-21)

Tuesday, July 2nd, 2019

US DOLLAR TRAVELS: CROSSTOWN TRAFFIC © Leo Haviland July 2, 2019

“But, darlin’ can’t you see my signals turn from green to red
And with you I can see a traffic jam straight up ahead”. Jimi Hendrix, “Crosstown Traffic”

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CONCLUSION

The broad real trade-weighted United States dollar’s December 2016 (at 103.3)/January 2017 (103.1) peak likely will remain intact (“TWD”; based on goods only; Federal Reserve Board, H.10; monthly average, March 1973=100). The high since then, December 2018’s crest at 102.0, stands slightly beneath this, as does May 2019’s 101.6 (June 2019 was 101.1). December 2018/May 2019’s plateau probably forms a double top in conjunction with December 2016/January 2017’s pinnacle. If the TWD breaks through the December 2016/January 2017 roadblock, it probably will not do so by much. The majestic long-running major bull charge in the dollar which commenced in July 2011 at 80.5 has reached the finish line, or soon will do so.

Unlike the broad real trade-weighted dollar, the broad nominal trade-weighted dollar (goods only) has daily data. The broad nominal US dollar probably also formed twin peaks. It achieved an initial top on 12/28/16 (at 128.9) and 1/3/17 (128.8). The nominal TWD’s recent high, 5/31/19’s 129.6, edges only half of one percent over the 2016/17 high.

The depreciation in the broad real trade-weighted dollar from its 103.3/103.1 elevation probably will be at least five percent, and very possibly ten percent. This retreat likely will last at least for several months.

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The broad real trade-weighted dollar’s level and patterns are relevant for and interrelate with those in key stock, interest rate, commodity, and real estate marketplaces. The extent to which and reasons why foreign exchange levels and trends (whether for the US dollar or any other currency) converge and diverge from (lead/lag) those in stock, interest rate, commodity, and other marketplaces is a matter of subjective perspective. Opinions differ.

For related marketplace analysis, see essays such as: “Petroleum: Rolling and Tumbling” (6/10/19); “Wall Street Talking, Yield Hunting, and Running for Cover” (5/14/19); “Economic Growth Fears: Stock and Interest Rate Adventures” (4/2/19); “American Economic Growth: Cycles, Yield Spreads, and Stocks” (3/4/19); “Facing a Wall: Emerging US Dollar Weakness” (1/15/19); “American Housing: a Marketplace Weathervane” (12/4/18); “Twists, Turns, and Turmoil: US and Other Government Note Trends” (11/12/18); “Japan: Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows” (10/5/18); “Stock Marketplace Maneuvers: Convergence and Divergence” (9/4/18); “China at a Crossroads: Economic and Political Danger Signs” (8/5/18); “Shakin’ All Over: Marketplace Convergence and Divergence” (6/18/18); “History on Stage: Marketplace Scenes” (8/9/17).

ON THE ROAD AGAIN

“We’ll be watching out for trouble, yeah (All down the line)
And we keep the motor running, yeah (All down the line)”, The Rolling Stones, “All Down the Line”

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What interrelated phenomena currently are sparking, or will tend to encourage, near term and long run US dollar weakness?

Growing faith that America’s Federal Reserve Board not only will refrain from raising the Federal Funds rate anytime soon, but even may reduce it over the next several months, is a critical factor in the construction of the latest segment (December 2018 to the present) of the TWD’s resistance barrier. The Fed Chairman and other US central bank policemen speak of the need for “patience” on the rate increase front. The Fed eagerly promotes its “symmetric” two percent inflation objective (6/19/19 FOMC decision), which blows a horn that it may permit inflation to exceed (move symmetrically around) their revered two percent destination.

By reducing the likelihood of near term boosts in the Federal Funds rate, and particularly by increasing the odds of lowering this signpost, the Fed gatekeeper thereby cuts the probability of yield increases for US government debt securities. The Fed thus makes the US dollar less appealing (less likely to appreciate further) in the perspective of many marketplace players.

The Fed’s less aggressive rate scheme (at minimum, a pause in its “normalization” process) mitigates enthusiasm for the US dollar from those aiming to take advantage of interest rate yield differentials (as well as those hoping for appreciation in the value of other dollar-denominated assets such as American stocks or real estate relative to the foreign exchange value of the given home currency). This is despite negative yields in German, Japanese, and other government debt securities. Capital flows into the dollar may slow, or even reverse to some extent.

The yield for the US Treasury 10 year note, after topping around 3.25 percent in early October 2018, has backtracked further in recent months. The UST resumed its drop from 4/17/19’s minor top at 2.62pc, nosediving from 5/28/19’s 2.32pc elevation. Since late June 2019, its yield has bounced around 2.00pc.

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The current United States Administration probably wants a weaker US dollar relative to its current elevation in order to stimulate the economy as the 2020 elections approach. President Trump claimed that the European Central Bank, by deliberately pushing down the Euro FX’s value against the dollar, has been unfair, making it easier for the Euro Area to compete against the US (New York Times, 6/19/19, ppA1, 9). Recall his complaints about China’s currency policies as well. The President’s repeated loud sirens that the Federal Reserve made mistakes by raising its policy rates, and instead should be lowering them also messages that the Administration wants the dollar to depreciate.

Another consideration constructing a noteworthy broad real TWD top is mild, even if nervous, optimism that tariff battles and other aspects of trade wars between America and many of its key trading partners (especially China) will become less fierce. Both the United States and China increasingly are fearful regarding the ability of their nations to maintain adequate real GDP increases.

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US Dollar Travels- Crosstown Traffic (7-2-19)

Wednesday, June 7th, 2017

US DOLLAR THEATRICS: DEPRECIATING ACTS © Leo Haviland, June 7, 2017

“Gonna leave this brokedown palace
On my hands and my knees I will roll, roll, roll”. The Grateful Dead, “Brokedown Palace”

CONCLUSION AND OVERVIEW

The gradual depreciation of the broad real trade-weighted United States dollar (“TWD”; Federal Reserve Board, H.10 statistics; monthly average; March 1973=100) that began in December 2016/January 2017 at about 102.8 probably will continue for at least the next several months. Dollar cross rate patterns against assorted individual currencies (such as the Euro FX, Chinese renminbi, and Japanese Yen) are not necessarily the same. In principle and practice, the dollar may rally against one counterpart while getting feebler against another. Nevertheless, the similar weakness in recent months of the dollar’s cross rate versus several key American trading partners manifests the widespread underpinnings of the growing overall dollar breakdown. Gold’s bull climb since December 2016 roughly coincides with and reflects (confirms) the greenback’s erosion.

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Various entangled factors influence foreign exchange levels and patterns, with monetary policy of course being a key variable. Over the past few months and looking forward, underline the US Federal Reserve Board’s willingness to tighten monetary policy by raising the Federal Funds rate; it also hints at the eventual reduction of its bloated balance sheet. Moreover, such Fed action and its forward guidance wordplay contrasts with the ongoing highly accommodative policy of many key central banks (such as the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan). Yet the dollar nevertheless has weakened. In this context, the TWD’s slump over the past few months therefore portends future dollar depreciation. The Fed meets 6/13-14/17, 7/25-26/17, and 9/19-20/17.

Moreover, most believe that US real GDP growth will remain relatively strong. The dollar’s downturn in New Year 2017 is ominous from this perspective as well.

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The 1/20/17 inauguration of President Trump very closely connects in time with the TWD peak. Is this merely a coincidence? Probably not.

Comments during the 2016 election season and its aftermath by Trump and some members of the supporting cast allied with him indicate that he probably wanted some dollar depreciation to help boost US economic growth. Note their criticism of some key European trading partners and China. Isn’t it unfair to the US if the Euro FX or Chinese renminbi are “excessively weak”?

But much more than a willingness by the Trump Administration to permit some dollar bearishness probably explains the dollar’s decline in calendar 2017. After all, the US dollar rallied for several weeks after Trump’s November 2016 victory.

America’s notable political, economic, racial, religious, age, gender, and other divisions and related quarrels preceded Trump’s political showmanship and electoral triumph. But such conflicts arguably have worsened since Trump took office.

Examine the ongoing intensity of the carnival of media coverage relating to such divisions, even after the contentious national election. Look at ferocious debates over Obamacare, fiscal priorities, immigration policy, and climate change. In Washington’s political circus, note the significant disagreements in Congress on assorted key issues. The Republicans control the Presidency, House, and Senate, but they squabble. How likely will there be significant tax “reform” or substantial new infrastructure spending? The degree and scope of Russian involvement in American politics, including relationships with some people within or linked to the Trump Administration, capture headlines.

America’s highly partisan budget battles likely will continue, and its existing long run debt problems will not magically evaporate. Moreover, marketplace wizards generally agree that the enactment of the President’s budget plan (sketch) will widen the deficit dramatically relative to current trends. Of course other nations have big debt problems. Look at Japan’s mammoth government debt, and see China corporate debt (and property, local government, and shadow banking issues). Yet America’s increased indebtedness, particularly if Trump’s vision becomes law, is “newer news” than what has been going on within Japanese and Chinese debt festivals.

In addition, US consumer indebtedness is not small, and it has been creeping higher in absolute terms. The New York Fed reported that total US indebtedness as of end first quarter 2017 was about $12.7 trillion. This placed overall household debt $50 billion above its prior peak of third quarter 2008, and 14.1 percent higher than the trough attained in 2Q13.

And very significantly, many people at home and abroad believe President Trump’s leadership has been and likely will remain erratic. Compare his language and behavior with that of his predecessors.

Given the nation’s significant political (and other interrelated cultural) conflicts and doubts regarding the quality and predictability of Presidential- and Congressional- leadership and action, and “all else equal”, this makes the United States dollar (dollar-denominated assets) somewhat less attractive to hold. Widespread falling (low) public confidence in many US politicians, political processes, and political institutions eventually can generate falling confidence (and thus declines) in the dollar.

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Thus, in recent months, the victory of an apparently populist leader in America contrasts with the maintenance of power by the establishment in most key American trading partners. And the American President’s rhetoric and actions (at least to some extent) not only are divisive, but also seem rather erratic and confused to many

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US Dollar Theatrics- Depreciating Acts (6-7-17)

Monday, December 1st, 2014

The Euro FX and Japanese Yen for several months have been weakening together, both against the US dollar and on an effective exchange rate basis. This currency relationship and bear trend will continue. Despite the Eurozone’s and Japan’s brave quests to create sufficient inflation (escape deflation), their success probably will be limited; inflation and longer term government interest rates probably will not sustain significant increases. However, even if substantial currency depreciation and massive money printing manage to achieve an inflation goal (and higher interest rates), they likely will not generate sustained economic growth.

Given that both the Eurozone and Japan suffer from low growth and deflationary challenges and fears, is weakness in the Euro FX connected with (encouraging that of) the Japanese Yen? Is the Yen’s swoon helping to depreciate the Euro FX? Are Japan and the Eurozone (and other nations) engaged in competitive devaluations (currency wars) to bolster growth?

One sign of the obstacles facing the Eurozone and Japan in their quest to boost inflation (and generate higher interest rates) is the recent behavior of the UST 10 year government note. American GDP recently has been robust, rising at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in 2Q14 and 3.9pc in 3Q14. However, the UST 10 year yield around 2.20pc remains well beneath its 1/2/14 top at 3.05pc. Admittedly the UST yield bounced up from the 1.86pc low of 10/15/14. But even since that mid-October 2014 depth, yields traveled up to only around 2.40pc, never piercing the important resistance around that level. The failure of UST yields to rally may signal future mediocre US (and worldwide) economic growth since yields generally advance during recovery (or hope of one).

Take the broad Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) as a benchmark for commodities “in general”. It collapsed, of course aided by price dives in the petroleum complex, from 6/23/14’s interim high around 673 to under 520 recently. If sustained, this bloody price retreat will cut many statistical measures of inflation (and perhaps reduce inflation expectations). Thus it may encourage European and Japanese (and other) policy makers to embark on especially accommodative monetary policies. For example, the ECB may decide it has more need (justification) to quickly engage in massive QE, perhaps even by sovereign debt buying.

However, this GSCI weakness also may indicate underlying and ongoing risks to global economic growth as well as the difficulty of generating sufficient inflation in general. Moreover, sustained declines in petroleum prices may create crises in some producing nations that in turn spill over into other nations. For example, think of Russia (the ruble has moved over 50 versus the dollar), Nigeria, and Venezuela.