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GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.

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Tuesday, December 3rd, 2019

EMERGING MARKETS, COMMODITIES, BITCOIN, AND THE S+P 500: TRAVELS AND SIGNS © Leo Haviland December 3, 2019

The movie “They Shoot Horses, Don’t They?” (Sydney Pollack, director) depicts a Depression Era dance contest marathon with a noteworthy monetary prize for the winning couple left standing. The master of ceremonies declares: “And believe me, these wonderful kids [the “kids” are all adults] deserve your cheers, because each one of them is fighting down pain, exhaustion, weariness, struggling to keep going, battling to win. And isn’t that the American Way?”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Since around first quarter 2018, the price trends in emerging marketplace stocks “in general” and emerging marketplace sovereign debt securities in general have made important highs and lows at roughly the same time. Thus, for example, around year-end 2018, prices (not yields) for sovereign emerging marketplace bonds attained important lows (yields had been rising) alongside troughs in emerging marketplace stocks. United States high-yield corporate bonds have moved in a similar pattern over that time span. Key commodity sectors such as the petroleum complex and base metals likewise have established important highs (lows) around the same time as those in emerging marketplace equities and sovereign debt. The timing of these assorted shifts of course is not always exactly the same, only approximately so.

Unlike emerging marketplace stocks, during calendar 2018 and calendar 2019, America’s S+P 500 has marched to new highs. Despite this price divergence, many key turns in the interim trends for the S+P 500 occurred “around” the same time as those in emerging marketplace stocks, as well as in emerging sovereign marketplace debt (in both dollar-denominated and local currency arenas), US high-yield corporate bonds, and commodities.

As the S+P 500 was sinking lower in late 2018, the Federal Reserve Board lifeguard jumped to the rescue and unveiled its monetary “patience” doctrine. It cut the Federal Funds rate three times during calendar 2019. Central banking allies such as the European Central Bank enhanced or maintained existing easy money schemes. Beginning around end-year 2018, this accommodative monetary policy (encouraged by widespread negative yields in advanced nation government debt domains), inspired waves of “investors” (speculators, traders) to hunt, more avidly than ever, for sufficient (good, reasonable, acceptable) “yields” (“returns”) in other provinces. These districts around the globe included emerging marketplace securities, high-yielding corporate debt, and even commodities.

The exciting cryptocurrency frontier, which includes stars such as Bitcoin, attracts interest from assorted financial pioneers and the economic media (and even central bankers at times). In the opinion of some observers, Bitcoin belongs to some variety of “asset” class. In any case, since “around” first quarter 2018, despite Bitcoin’s wild price adventures, critical turns in its price action have occurred around the same time as in emerging marketplace securities, high-yield US business debt, commodities (petroleum and base metals), and even the S+P 500.

During 2019, the S+P 500 continued its heavenly climb. Nevertheless, at various points during calendar 2019, emerging marketplace securities, US corporate debt, commodities, and Bitcoin established interim highs and began to retreat. For example, note Brent/North Sea crude oil’s 4/25/19 summit at $75.60 (S+P 500 interim top 5/1/19 at 2954). Thus the run-up in these asset prices which commenced around end calendar 2018/early calendar 2019 probably is over.

Significantly, emerging marketplace stock, emerging marketplace sovereign debt securities, high-yield US corporate debt, and petroleum and base metals (still “trading together”) renewed their price declines in September 2019. Take a look at Bitcoin too. Given that global economic (and political) spheres intertwine, this pattern signals a top in the S+P 500 and the probability that the S+P 500 (and other advanced nation stock battlefields) will decline alongside (converge with ongoing bearish price patterns in) emerging marketplace securities and related domains such as commodities.

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The United States dollar, as measured by its broad real effective exchange rate, has remained sufficiently strong to be a factor tending to undermine prices in dollar-denominated emerging marketplace sovereign debt securities as well as dollar-denominated emerging marketplace corporate debt instruments. Rising dollar-denominated yields, especially as the United States dollar generally has remained strong in recent months, tends to push emerging marketplace equity prices lower. Related to this, prices also gradually have fallen since early September 2019 in the US Treasury 10 year note (low yield 1.43 percent on 9/3/19). Also, US corporate earnings have been relatively flat for calendar 2019 year-on-year, suggesting that the joyous tax “reform” enacted at end calendar 2017 is losing power and thus the capability to propel the S+P 500 even higher. Even if America and China agree on a partial trade deal in the near future, will trade conflicts involving them and others disappear?

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Emerging Markets, Commodities, Bitcoin, and the S+P 500- Travels and Signs (12-3-19)

Thursday, November 7th, 2019

TRADE WARS AND CURRENCY TRENDS IN THE TRUMP ERA © Leo Haviland November 7, 2019

“All I ever asked for was an unfair advantage”, said an oil trader to me many years ago.

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The United States dollar, as measured by its broad real effective exchange rate, probably has started a bear trend and will decline a notable amount from its recent high.

The United States dollar’s glorious bull charge has lasted for a very long time, over eight years, dating back to July 2011. Marketplace history is not marketplace destiny, but the duration of and the distance travelled in the dollar rally is comparable to other extensive ones of the past few decades.

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Trade Wars and Currency Trends in the Trump Era (11-7-19)

Friday, October 5th, 2018

JAPAN: FINANCIAL ARCHERY, SHOOTING ARROWS © Leo Haviland October 5, 2018

The famous military philosopher and analyst Carl von Clausewitz states in “On War” (Book Two, chapter 3; italics in original): “Rather than comparing it [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In late 2012, the Japanese political leadership dramatically unveiled its three “arrows” of easy money, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reform to improve the country’s economic performance. In practice, those Japanese political authorities generally represent major financial (corporate; commercial) interests (“Japan, Inc.”). The Bank of Japan’s policies since late 2012, though nominally independent of political and economic power centers, in practice reflects the goals of Japan’s substantial entrenched economic groups and the political representatives and bureaucrats aligned with them.

Monetary policy of course is not the only factor affecting GDP, inflation, and other intertwined variables. Yet Japan’s ongoing government fiscal deficit, though somewhat helpful for promoting growth and inflation, is not the most noteworthy element in the country’s policy array since end-2012. Moreover, the general government debt burden remains massive and likely will remain so for many years. According to the International Monetary Fund, Japan’s general government gross debt as a percent of GDP was 236.4 percent in 2017 (contrast the G-7 average of 118.6pc that year) and forecast at 236.0pc for 2018 and 234.2pc in 2019, dipping only slightly to 229.6pc by 2023 (“Fiscal Monitor”, April 2018, Table A7; the October 2018 update probably will not change Japan’s government debt as a percent of GDP statistics substantially). And structural reform in Japan, which usually crawls forward slowly, has been unremarkable.

The extremely easy monetary policy arrow embraced by the accommodative Japanese central bank for almost six years is the country’s critical weapon. The central bank chief faithfully and repeatedly proclaims that sustained inflation of two percent is a praiseworthy goal (as essentially do the sermons preached by other leading central banks such as the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank). The Bank of Japan’s ongoing tools to achieve its aims include sustained yield repression and massive quantitative easing (money printing). So far, the Bank of Japan, despite its determination, has not come close to achieving two percent inflation. The consumer price trend in recent months manifests merely minor progress on that front. And although Japan’s quarterly GDP for April-June 2018 may signal enhanced year-on-year economic performance, International Monetary Fund forecasts are not as sunny.

Yet what else has the Bank of Japan (as a representative and reflection of the country’s political and economic generals) really battled to achieve via its remarkably lax monetary strategy? A notion of improved and acceptable economic growth and frequent reference to an iconic two percent “price stability target” do not offer a complete story. Moreover, the enthusiastic declaration of assorted monetary policy plans and tactics does not directly reveal important aspects about the economic (financial; commercial; marketplace) landscape within which the interrelated GDP and inflation goals are targeted and such extraordinary easy money programs are designed and applied.

In practice, what are the intermediate connections (means; methods) to the achievement of the allegedly ultimate ends of satisfactory growth and sufficient inflation? One key approach of the Bank of Japan’s magnificent scheme relates to currency depreciation, the other to stock marketplace appreciation. Japan’s central bank sentinel quietly has aimed to achieve the related objectives of Yen weakness and Japanese stock marketplace strength.

In recent times, Japan deliberately has kept a relatively low profile in foreign exchange, trade, and tariff conflicts. Compare the furious racket nowadays, especially since the advent of the Trump presidency, around the United States and China (and also in regard to the European Union, Mexico/Canada/NAFTA).

Nevertheless, for several years, Japan has waged a trade war (engaged in fierce currency competition) without capturing much international political attention or media coverage. The Bank of Japan (and its political and economic allies) in recent years has fought vigorously to depreciate the Yen (especially on an effective exchange rate basis) and thereby to bolster Japan’s current account surplus. Japan’s overall economic growth relies significantly on its net export situation. The Yen’s substantial retreat and its subsequent stay at a relatively low level and the significant expansion in the country’s current account surplus are glorious triumphs.

Since late 2012, the Bank of Japan also has struggled ferociously to rally the Japanese stock marketplace (boost corporate profits). As of early autumn 2018, this guardian has achieved significant victories in this campaign as well.

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Japan- Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows (10-5-18)

Monday, August 13th, 2018

CHINA AT A CROSSROADS: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DANGER SIGNS (c) Leo Haviland August 5, 2018

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“Our million hearts beat as one,
Brave the enemy’s fire, March on!” “March of the Volunteers”, China’s national anthem

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Although China’s era of miraculous economic growth has marched into history, the nation nevertheless achieved enviable real GDP increases in recent years. Benchmark predictions by numerous economic wizards regarding China’s economy remain rather sunny, especially in comparison with those for most other countries. In fact, most observers are fairly complacent about China’s current situation and future prospects. Faith in adequate global growth intertwines with belief that China’s expansion will continue to be substantial.

As the world has become more globalized and intertwined, China’s substantial economic expansion not only has boosted China’s international economic (financial, commercial, business) and political presence and power. It also has helped to ensure domestic political stability and protected the central role and authority of the Communist Party. The country’s leadership and other elites obviously desire and battle to protect such impressive accomplishments.

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However, China has a significant debt problem, and one that probably will worsen. Most China watchers nevertheless ignore or downplay this, with analysis and concerns banished to obscure articles, back pages, and fine print. China’s strong economy in the past five years probably derived substantially from a substantial expansion of its overall national debt. Will China’s government (and other areas of the economy) need to borrow more and more and go greater in debt in order to sustain “appropriate” GDP growth? Probably.

Yet the Chinese debt explosion, with totals at or moving toward high levels relative to GDP (particularly in the government and corporate sectors), endangers prospects for continued robust Chinese economic growth. Creditor (lending) confidence probably is not unlimited, especially in regard to segments of China’s corporate, banking, and local government arenas.

Moreover, very elevated debt is not just a Chinese phenomenon, but a worldwide one. The International Monetary Fund’s “Fiscal Monitor” (April 2018; Chapter 1) stated: “Global debt [public and nonfinancial private debt] is at historic highs, reaching the record peak of US$164trillion in 2016, equivalent to 225 percent of global GDP [current levels probably are higher]. The world is now 12 percent of GDP deeper in debt than the previous peak in 2009, with China as a driving force.” See also the Institute of International Finance’s perspective on the expanding global debt as a percentage of world GDP trend (July 2018). Public debt has played an important part in the leap in global indebtedness. China obviously is not an island isolated from other nations. So if international economic conditions weaken, perhaps partly encouraged by prior or prospective interest rate increases, it probably will become somewhat harder for many entities, both public and private, to raise cash.

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China’s glorious economic growth, and the related boom in its exports, has interconnected with increasing openness in international trade. Enthusiastic challenges to the free trade (globalization; multilateral) order and ideology, especially by the current American leadership (President Trump; “Make America Great Again!”), has raised concerns about trade wars and currency conflicts. The American Administration’s noisy criticism of China’s allegedly colossal (and supposedly unfair) trade surplus (at least in relation to the United States) and its willingness to impose tariffs on Chinese products has encouraged a rapid noteworthy depreciation in the Chinese renminbi relative to the US dollar in recent months.

Currency depreciation, not merely the running of large government deficits or tolerating (encouraging) jumps in corporate and household borrowing (and spending), is another strategy aimed at creating or sustaining adequate economic growth. Perhaps China’s currency depreciation relative to the US is to some extent a competitive plan designed to maintain its economic growth rate by ensuring continued substantial entry of its exports into the American marketplace. And the dollar/renminbi cross rate fascinates most marketplace observers in an environment excited by trade and currency war talk.

America of course is an important commercial counterparty for China. But it does not come close to capturing a majority of China’s overseas economic transactions. A review of China’s currency patterns and levels from a broad real effective exchange rate (“EER”) vantage point therefore offers superior enlightenment regarding the overall Chinese currency situation, and thereby its overall economic one.

The high level in China’s EER likely has tended to reduce exports and thus GDP growth to some extent from what they (all else equal) otherwise would have been. This consequently has tended to encourage China’s debt expansion as a means of achieving “sufficient” (official targets for) economic growth. Even allowing for the recent renminbi depreciation versus the US dollar, China’s EER remains rather lofty from the historical perspective. From China’s policy standpoint, its EER probably should depreciate even more than it has since its 2015 pinnacles in order to achieve desired economic growth and to handle its growing debt troubles.

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Not only do China’s debt predicament and the renminbi’s feebleness relative to the US dollar (and the need for the renminbi to slump further on an EER basis) warn of underlying weakness in and the probability of slower growth than generally forecast for the Chinese economy. The sharp fall in calendar 2018 in the Shanghai Composite Index (and other emerging stock marketplaces) and declines in key commodity benchmarks also signal subsiding (slowing) Chinese GDP growth. The gradual rise in US interest rates (ongoing Federal Reserve tightening; underline climbs in the Federal Funds rate and the 10 year US Treasury note), given the links across global marketplaces, also probably is starting to curtail economic growth around the globe. In any case, given China’s major role in the international economy, a slowdown in its output relative to levels anticipated (hoped for) by economic pundits and financial pilgrims likely will injure expansion elsewhere.

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China’s leadership probably is more fearful of inadequate economic growth than it publicly confesses. Why else has the country in the past few years further centralized political leadership and emphasized Communist Party control, embarked in well-publicized anti-corruption drives, and engaged in assorted territorial squabbles with its Asian neighbors? Such political programs suggest that real economic growth not only has slowed down (and perhaps to lower levels than official statistics indicate), but also probably eventually will ebb further than many high priests predict. A sharp deterioration in China’s GDP levels and prospects probably entails heightened internal political risks.

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China at a Crossroads- Economic and Political Danger Signs (8-5-18)