GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

Subscribe to Leo Haviland’s BLOG to receive updates and new marketplace essays.

RSS View Leo Haviland's LinkedIn profile View Leo Haviland’s profile





GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE, INFLATION, AND POLITICS © Leo Haviland March 20, 2016

“I went home, with new matter for my thoughts, though with no relief from the old.” Charles Dickens’s novel, “Great Expectations” (Chapter 48)

****

OVERVIEW

A deluge of money printing and ardent yield repression by leading central banks of course are not the only important potential sources of inflation. Assorted marketplace guides proclaim a variety of opinions regarding relevant inflationary factors and their relationships and consequences. And everyone knows that economic, political, and social conditions, programs, and challenges differ, often significantly, between countries.

Central banking mandates and interpretations regarding them are not precisely the same. Central banks do not have an easy job. In his story “A Christmas Carol” (Stave 3), Charles Dickens states: “it is always the person not in the predicament who knows what ought to have been done in it, and would unquestionably have done it too”.

However, all the bankers preach devotion to their mandate. The Federal Reserve Board, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Bank of Canada, and the Swedish central bank for the past several years have shared a faith and proclaimed a gospel that achieving and sustaining about two percent inflation is a “good” goal. Thus many leading global central banks believe “too low” inflation (and of course deflation) is “not good” or is “bad”.

Central banking decisions, actions, and rhetoric around the globe have become increasingly interdependent since the eruption of the international economic disaster of 2007-09. Banking captains nobly stress their willingness to do whatever it takes and whatever they must, frequently pointing to their beloved toolkit of monetary measures. Thus they embarked on highly accommodative monetary policies such as yield repression and gigantic money printing and generously provided forward guidance. Yet despite their long-running and devoted odyssey aimed at achieving and sustaining the praiseworthy target of two percent inflation, the armada of central banks thus far has failed in its inflationary quest. Their great expectations have not generated great results.

****

Since inflation (including too low inflation and deflation) concerns and wordplay are so significant for current marketplace analysis and trends, it pays to select and assess variables indicating whether a sufficient and sustained quantity of inflation is appearing or may soon do so. Observers can differ in their choices and viewpoints.

“Inflation”, however defined and measured, may appear earlier in one nation or region than another. Moreover, just because some or sufficient inflation (or deflation) emerges in one territory, they need not do so elsewhere. In any case, let’s focus on America. Not only does the United States play a crucial role on the world economic and political stage, but so does the Federal Reserve Board. Stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity marketplaces avidly monitor Fed statements, signals, and behavior. Finally, America nowadays apparently is (however slowly) showing signs of being a key leader in international GDP growth.

 

US POLITICS: BLEAK HOUSE

In Dickens’s “Great Expectations”, a character says: “’Ask no questions, and you’ll be told no lies.’” (Chapter 2)

****

Most Americans have high (or at least moderate) confidence in and trust the US Federal Reserve Board. In contrast, many Americans nowadays have rather low expectations regarding US politicians “in general”. They distrust and have rather little confidence in most US political leaders. They question the willingness and ability of such representatives to work together to achieve desirable goals.

Focusing on central banks and their monetary measures aimed at achieving sufficient inflation should not cause observers to overlook political causes, including fiscal ones, of inflation and higher interest rates. And interest rates can rise for reasons other than, or in conjunction with, inflation pressures.

In any case, weak national political leadership and substantial political divisions do not guarantee rising interest rates, but they can encourage that development. They also can help to generate a weaker dollar.

The United States currently is a house divided. Income and asset inequality, immigration debates, views on health care, opinions on the appropriate size and role of government, international trade topics, climate change, and other issues inflame America’s political theater. In election year 2016, as in the prior few years, there has been greater than normal partisan strife.

These ongoing significant US political divisions risk further weakness in the US dollar. Underscore the current conflict between the Republican Congress and the Democratic President. Though the American political process has a long way to go until election season 2016 concludes, partisan warfare likely will persist. The House likely will remain Republican; the President probably will be a Democrat (Hillary Clinton). Control of the Senate is a close call.

The battles within the Republican camp look likely to persist for at least a few more months. Will there be a convention fight? “Trump warns Republican elders of ‘riots’ if they fail to back his candidacy”, headlines the Financial Times (3/17/16, p3). Although Trump has great confidence in his own talents, at present the majority of Americans apparently do not share that confidence. Suppose Donald Trump captures the Republican Presidential nomination. Imagine that he wins the Presidency. Comments from overseas leaders suggest lack of faith in Trump’s abilities and policies. Such foreign attitudes are a bearish factor for the dollar.

An ability to transcend partisan divisions only via big spending (fiscal irresponsibility) does not eliminate substantial underlying political factionalism. The massive addition to future US budget deficits agreed upon by Congress and the President in late December 2015 probably will tend to push up interest rates and is a bearish factor for the dollar. (See the Congressional Budget Office’s “Summary of The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026; 1/25/16. See also the NY Times, 12/17/15, pA29; NY Times, 12/19/15, ppA1, 13). In any event, America has a looming long run debt problem. And don’t debtors tend to like inflation?

****

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this article as a PDF file.
Great Expectations- the Federal Reserve, Inflation, and Politics (3-20-16)

MARKETPLACE FIREWORKS © Leo Haviland July 6, 2015

Statistics and stories constantly bombard marketplaces. In today’s marketplace environment, and especially when an especially enthralling news item bursts into view, many gurus and coaches scream about current or prospective crises, panics, and bubbles (overvaluation).

****

Recent debt-related troubles in Greece and Puerto Rico and the collapse in the Chinese stock battleground are not isolated or entirely unique (special) marketplace events. They are signs and symptoms of widespread and intertwined marketplace phenomena. They are examples of and interconnected with current problems and related (linked) marketplace price movements around the globe.

****

It is a truism that times change, but that does not mean that times necessarily are entirely or substantially different. Some historians may hearken back to the 2007-09 worldwide economic disaster; the United States real estate catastrophe and the demise of Lehman Brothers were not mere flare-ups. They did not stand alone. Debt, leverage, and credit problems were worldwide, even if they varied to some extent from place to place; their consequences erupted around the globe.

The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and China’s central bank have engaged for many years in highly accommodative monetary programs. Despite lax policies such as sustained yield repression and massive quantitative easing (money printing), international debt, leverage, and credit problems did not disappear. They persisted and have reappeared. These central bankers have provided cosmetic fixes, not permanent ones, to such difficulties. Remarkably easy money policies, aided by political deficit spending, have helped to spark and sustain worldwide GDP growth since around early 2009.

Yet that past success does not guarantee future triumphs. Is worldwide growth decelerating? Probably. Note the downward growth revisions in recent months for 2015 for the United States by the International Monetary Fund (Article IV Consultation, released 6/4/15) and the Fed (Economic Projections, 6/17/15). Indications of a Chinese slowdown preceded its recent stock tumble. There have been concerns about the property marketplace, shadow (and other) banking, and increasing debt. “China orders banks to keep lending to insolvent provincial projects” declares the front page of the Financial Times (5/16-17/15, p1). Note the continued bear marketplace trend in base metals in general. Through May 2015, China’s year-on-year electricity output was about flat, up only .2pc (National Bureau of Statistics).

****

Some issues obviously matter more to some traders (and marketplace sectors) than others. But in today’s interconnected global marketplaces, various key stock, interest rate, currency, and commodity playgrounds intertwine in diverse and often-changing fashions. Moreover, these arenas are never separate from the “real” economy. So flashy economic stories about one marketplace or nation can spark or accelerate modest and sometimes even dramatic price travels in numerous venues.

And regardless of which exciting tales currently capture substantial trading and media attention, they usually reflect and interconnect with crucial (and so-called “underlying”) economic (financial, commercial) and political phenomena. These noteworthy variables, issues, trends, and opinions regarding them not only capture the attention of many marketplace players, but also necessarily remain major factors for Wall Street price action and Main Street prosperity.

****

The debt and leverage (credit) problems in the United States and elsewhere which developed prior to yet culminated in the Goldilocks Era arguably remain unsolved, or have appeared in related forms. For example, America in general has a love affair with debt. The overall consumer debt burden has lightened somewhat since the darkest nights of the 2007-09 crisis. However, federal debt has jumped up. Thus America’s overall indebtedness remains quite significant. See the essay, “America’s Debt Culture” (4/6/15).

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this article as a PDF file.
Marketplace Fireworks (7-6-15)

AMERICA’S DEBT CULTURE © Leo Haviland April 6, 2015

America continues to have a love affair with debt. The nation has achieved remarkably little progress in improving its comprehensive (all-inclusive) debt situation since 2009’s very elevated debt relative to nominal GDP percentage. Increasing federal indebtedness has substantially though not entirely outweighed modest improvements in the consumer and state and local government domains. As the national government is a representative (democratic; “We, the People”) one, the country has not significantly mended its troubling overall debt problem.

A review of total American credit marketplace debt portrays the development and entrenchment of a national culture of debt. The long run trend toward greater debt holdings (and tolerance of debt) probably indicates and intertwines with a growing bias toward consumption and spending rather than saving. The increasing borrowing and massive debt accumulation arguably in part also probably reflect an increasingly widespread sense of entitlement to American Dream goals of the “good life” and a “better life”.
****

Total United States credit marketplace debt at end 2014 stood at about $58.7 trillion (Federal Reserve Board, “Financial Accounts of the United States”, Z.1 data; 3/12/15). The total includes US household, financial and non-financial business, and government debt, plus the relatively small foreign/rest of the world category. Compare 2001’s $29.2tr. Thus America’s credit marketplace debt has doubled in roughly a dozen years, and there has been no yearly fall in the sum since 2001.

What does a long run examination of total United States credit marketplace debt as a percent of nominal GDP reveal? Review the post-World War Two landscape. For over five decades, from the early 1950s up through the glorious Goldilocks Era that ended in 2007, and for a couple of years thereafter, total US indebtedness as a percentage of nominal GDP climbed steadily and substantially.

The bottom in overall US credit marketplace debt as a percent of GDP was 1951’s 129.5 percent. It inexorably edged up for about thirty years. It then started to accelerate from 1981’s 164.1pc. In 1985, it reached 200.3pc, with 1998’s 257.4pc, and 2001’s 275.1pc. In 2003, that measure attained 298.2pc. As debt became increasingly popular, it joyously soared during the blissful Goldilocks period to 346.1pc in 2007. As the gloomy American (and global) financial crisis emerged and proceeded, total US credit marketplace debt peaked at 362.0pc in 2009.

Despite pillow talk from many pundits about improving American debt conditions, that gigantic percentage has fallen only modestly since 2009. It slipped to 349.7pc of nominal GDP in 2010, and 340.6pc in 2012. However, it has diminished very little since then, with 2013 at 338.0pc and 2014 at 337.1pc. Significantly, 2014’s percentage remains not far from the heavenly Goldilocks Era 346.1pc height of 2007.

Another statistic further underscores the growth and persistence of America’s debt culture. Not only is the current credit marketplace debt as a percent of GDP level still historically high and close to the Goldilocks plateau. The arithmetic drop of 24.9 percentage points from the five years 2009 to 2014 (362.0pc less 337.1pc) is only about half the 47.9 point increase over the four years from 2003-07 (298.2 versus 346.1).
****

The Federal Reserve’s long-running extraordinary and very easy monetary policy (notably money printing/quantitative easing and interest rate yield repression) seek not only to ignite and sustain economic recovery and buy time for serious action in the federal and other debt realms. The Fed has battled to boost inflation to a supposedly sufficient level, while it has simultaneously repressed debt securities yields. Its artful strategies reflect the central bank’s ardent devotion on behalf of the constituency of debtors (borrowers) relative to the one of savers (creditors).

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this article as a PDF file.
America's Debt Culture (4-6-15)

FORWARD GUIDANCE AND THE US DOLLAR © Leo Haviland September 23, 2013

The broad real trade-weighted United States dollar probably will remain weak. Continuing its major long run bear trend from its March 2009 high, it probably will challenge its record low of July 2011. Why?

Among assorted bearish factors, focus on two which are becoming increasingly significant. First, the Federal Reserve Board in its September 2013 meeting displayed its absence of a genuine forward guidance plan and a lack of an authentic comprehensive exit strategy. Thus marketplace faith in the Fed has declined and will do so further in the aftermath of that September gathering. Keep in mind that feeble (vague) Fed guidance and decreased confidence in the Fed occurs amidst ongoing (and long-running) gigantic money printing and interest rate repression. The central bank is doggedly determined to keep pinning the Federal Funds rate near the floor (and thus below current inflation rates and announced Fed inflation targets) for some time. So how attractive are and will be United States Treasury yields for much over much of the government yield curve? Second, America’s national political players currently display weak fiscal (economic) leadership, especially as the debt ceiling limit beckons.

The Federal Reserve Board’s overall exit strategy for its extraordinary sustained accommodative policy remains far more a sketch than a complete design or coherent practical plan. Prior to its September 2013 assembly, central bank communicators strongly hinted the Fed soon would reduce its massive money printing campaign. Yet the illustrious Federal Reserve Board generals surprised the great majority of observers by not cutting back on quantitative easing. Moreover, these Fed luminaries also underlined their flexible attentiveness to a wide array of intertwining variables which will influence their tapering and other decisions. The ever-watchful Fed thus implicitly demonstrated that its loudly-proclaimed forward guidance wordplay offers Fed watchers at best only modest enlightenment and direction. America’s central bank consequently did more than increase marketplace uncertainty. The Fed wounded its own marketplace credibility. By damaging its credibility, the Fed reduces the widespread belief that it can engineer or at least significantly influence “good” economic outcomes.

Unfortunately, the significant shortfall in forward guidance from the guiding lights at the Federal Reserve currently coincides with a badly fractured American national political scene. Of course politicians and parties disagree and compete vigorously. Yet in the United States in recent years, significant philosophical divisions, diverse and often well-entrenched interests, and quests by political players to capture attention and win elections have combined to create ongoing “overall” feeble national political leadership. Strong political individuals in combination do not necessary make a strong collective group.

Failing to satisfactorily resolve the funding and (especially) the debt ceiling issues (and related deficit spending questions) will call in question America’s political leadership as a whole. All else equal, growing doubts about the quality of that leadership (and related fiscal policies) tend to undermine confidence in the US dollar. Besides these current feuds, America’s national political leaders continue to make no progress in resolving or even significantly mitigating the country’s looming long run fiscal deficit problem. Debt crises do not occur only in emerging or developing nations or in countries on the European “periphery”.

FOLLOW THE LINK BELOW to download this market essay as a PDF file.
Forward Guidance and the US Dollar (9-23-13)