GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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JAPAN: FINANCIAL ARCHERY, SHOOTING ARROWS © Leo Haviland October 5, 2018

The famous military philosopher and analyst Carl von Clausewitz states in “On War” (Book Two, chapter 3; italics in original): “Rather than comparing it [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In late 2012, the Japanese political leadership dramatically unveiled its three “arrows” of easy money, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reform to improve the country’s economic performance. In practice, those Japanese political authorities generally represent major financial (corporate; commercial) interests (“Japan, Inc.”). The Bank of Japan’s policies since late 2012, though nominally independent of political and economic power centers, in practice reflects the goals of Japan’s substantial entrenched economic groups and the political representatives and bureaucrats aligned with them.

Monetary policy of course is not the only factor affecting GDP, inflation, and other intertwined variables. Yet Japan’s ongoing government fiscal deficit, though somewhat helpful for promoting growth and inflation, is not the most noteworthy element in the country’s policy array since end-2012. Moreover, the general government debt burden remains massive and likely will remain so for many years. According to the International Monetary Fund, Japan’s general government gross debt as a percent of GDP was 236.4 percent in 2017 (contrast the G-7 average of 118.6pc that year) and forecast at 236.0pc for 2018 and 234.2pc in 2019, dipping only slightly to 229.6pc by 2023 (“Fiscal Monitor”, April 2018, Table A7; the October 2018 update probably will not change Japan’s government debt as a percent of GDP statistics substantially). And structural reform in Japan, which usually crawls forward slowly, has been unremarkable.

The extremely easy monetary policy arrow embraced by the accommodative Japanese central bank for almost six years is the country’s critical weapon. The central bank chief faithfully and repeatedly proclaims that sustained inflation of two percent is a praiseworthy goal (as essentially do the sermons preached by other leading central banks such as the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank). The Bank of Japan’s ongoing tools to achieve its aims include sustained yield repression and massive quantitative easing (money printing). So far, the Bank of Japan, despite its determination, has not come close to achieving two percent inflation. The consumer price trend in recent months manifests merely minor progress on that front. And although Japan’s quarterly GDP for April-June 2018 may signal enhanced year-on-year economic performance, International Monetary Fund forecasts are not as sunny.

Yet what else has the Bank of Japan (as a representative and reflection of the country’s political and economic generals) really battled to achieve via its remarkably lax monetary strategy? A notion of improved and acceptable economic growth and frequent reference to an iconic two percent “price stability target” do not offer a complete story. Moreover, the enthusiastic declaration of assorted monetary policy plans and tactics does not directly reveal important aspects about the economic (financial; commercial; marketplace) landscape within which the interrelated GDP and inflation goals are targeted and such extraordinary easy money programs are designed and applied.

In practice, what are the intermediate connections (means; methods) to the achievement of the allegedly ultimate ends of satisfactory growth and sufficient inflation? One key approach of the Bank of Japan’s magnificent scheme relates to currency depreciation, the other to stock marketplace appreciation. Japan’s central bank sentinel quietly has aimed to achieve the related objectives of Yen weakness and Japanese stock marketplace strength.

In recent times, Japan deliberately has kept a relatively low profile in foreign exchange, trade, and tariff conflicts. Compare the furious racket nowadays, especially since the advent of the Trump presidency, around the United States and China (and also in regard to the European Union, Mexico/Canada/NAFTA).

Nevertheless, for several years, Japan has waged a trade war (engaged in fierce currency competition) without capturing much international political attention or media coverage. The Bank of Japan (and its political and economic allies) in recent years has fought vigorously to depreciate the Yen (especially on an effective exchange rate basis) and thereby to bolster Japan’s current account surplus. Japan’s overall economic growth relies significantly on its net export situation. The Yen’s substantial retreat and its subsequent stay at a relatively low level and the significant expansion in the country’s current account surplus are glorious triumphs.

Since late 2012, the Bank of Japan also has struggled ferociously to rally the Japanese stock marketplace (boost corporate profits). As of early autumn 2018, this guardian has achieved significant victories in this campaign as well.

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Japan- Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows (10-5-18)

BUSLOAD OF FAITH: FINANCIAL MARKETPLACES © Leo Haviland, January 15, 2018

In his song “Busload of Faith”, Lou Reed chants: “you need a busload of faith to get by”.

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CONCLUSION

The United States 10 year government note is a widely-watched marketplace benchmark and guide. It ended its major bull move in summer 2016, establishing a yield bottom on 7/6/16 at 1.32 percent. Although the rate for the US Treasury 10 year note has walked peacefully sideways in a fairly narrow path over the past year or so, its yield nevertheless on balance has crept upward from its 9/8/17 interim trough at just over two percent toward its critical barrier around 2.65pc. In the UST’s bear move, the UST yield probably will pierce this 2.65pc target in the near term, with 1/2/14’s 3.05pc elevation the next height in sight.

After establishing a major top in December 2016/January 2017 at 103.2, the broad real trade-weighted US dollar (“TWD”; Federal Reserve, H.10; monthly average) slipped 7.8 percent to 95.2 in September 2017, slightly below crucial support around 96.2 to 96.6. Despite a slight bounce for a couple of months following that September depth, the TWD has renewed its bearish assault on 96.2/96.6 and probably will break decisively beneath that floor (and September 2017’s minor low) relatively soon.

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Economic phenomena and fields interrelate in various fashions. Apparent links and relationships between financial (and political) variables and trends (including convergence/divergence and lead/lag ones) of course can change, sometimes dramatically. In any case, although marketplace history is not marketplace destiny, historical analysis still can offer guidance regarding future probabilities.

The current intertwined relationship and trends of rising US Treasury yields alongside the weakening United States dollar likely is of substantial significance for financial marketplaces in general, not just US government interest rates and key currencies.

History signals that climbing US interest rate yields often precede (connect with; lead to) pinnacles in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S+P 500. In the current economic and political landscape, further feebleness in the broad real trade-weighted US dollar probably will warn of (or confirm) important tops in advanced nation and emerging marketplace stock marketplace benchmarks.

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See “Marketplace Vehicles: Going Mobile” (12/13/17), “History on Stage: Marketplace Scenes” (8/9/17), and other essays.

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Busload of Faith- Financial Marketplaces (1-15-18)

THE NEW WORLD?! US ELECTION AFTERMATH © Leo Haviland November 15, 2016

In “The New World”, the band X sings:
“Honest to goodness
The bars weren’t open this morning
They must have been voting for the president of something…
It was better before
Before they voted for what’s-his-name
This was supposed to be the new world”.

“Don’t stop thinking about tomorrow
Don’t stop, it’ll soon be here
It’ll be, better than before
Yesterday’s gone, yesterday’s gone”. Fleetwood Mac, “Don’t Stop”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

What marketplace consequences will ensue from Donald Trump’s surprising “populist” victory? Much obviously depends on how successfully the new President implements his campaign agenda. Some aspects of his plans in principle and practice require clarification. And he might elect to change his current political views and aims. However, at present one should assume this leader generally will seek to accomplish the broad outlines of his recent messages, particularly in the economic arena.

In trade and several other matters, the President retains substantial freedom relative to Congress. However, even though the Republicans control the Senate and House of Representatives, passage of the new President’s proposed legislation is not guaranteed. The Republican Party has significant divisions. Senate Democrats, as they control well over 40 seats, likely can block many executive branch proposals.

Moreover, in a globalized and multipolar world, America’s political and economic fields, even after dramatic change such as that represented by Trump’s triumph, of course do not move independently of other realms. In addition, numerous assorted and entangled variables and trends, not just those closely linked to the 2016 election and American political (economic) scene, influence financial marketplaces in the United States and elsewhere. Besides, benchmark interest rate, currency, stock, and commodity benchmarks themselves intertwine. The economic game, like the political one, moves as it plays.

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With such complexities and caveats in mind, let’s concentrate on three key parts of the American and global financial marketplace pictures, the United States Treasury 10 year note, the broad real trade-weighted US dollar (“TWD”), and the S+P 500. The long run yield trend for the UST probably is up. In the near term, the dollar will challenge and perhaps break modestly above its January 2016 high. However, as time passes and the new President and his friends fight to implement his policies, the trade-weighted dollar probably will embark upon a notable bear trend. Though it is a very difficult call, the S+P 500 probably will not surpass 8/15/16’s record high at 2194 by more than five percent.

To some extent, and although not exclusively, the patterns of rising interest rates and the (eventually) weaker dollar probably will derive from a growing lack of domestic and international confidence in American political and economic leadership and policies. America’s ongoing severe political and other cultural divisions likely will interrelate with this eroding trust. The passing and outcome of America’s Election Day 11/8/16 did not bury the nation’s substantial conflicts. Widespread support for Trump and Sanders showed that American “populist” ideologies, whether within so-called right wing/conservative congregations or left wing/liberal fraternities, likely will not soon surrender their attractiveness or fervor. But the “establishment” (elites) have not fled the battleground or abandoned their doctrines.

UPCOMING MARKETPLACE ADVENTURES

“Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy night!” advises Margo Channing in the movie “All About Eve” (Joseph Mankiewicz, director)

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The aftermath of Trump’s victory saw the UST 10 year note yield jump sharply, breaking above 3/16/16’s 2.00 percent. Yet recall that UST yields had been climbing higher several months prior to his win; recall 7/6/16’s 1.32 percent bottom. US inflation expectations also have ascended since early summer. The St. Louis Fed’s measure of expected inflation (on average) for the five year period that begins five years from today has risen from 1.41 percent (7/5/16) to over two pc recently (11/10/16’s 2.06pc).

Why should US Treasury 10 year note yields keep rising from current levels around 2.25 percent?

First, America’s debt was rather lofty and likely to trend higher over the next decade (and probably thereafter) even before Trump’s win. See the Congressional Budget Office’s “An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026” (8/23/16; this study did not include Trump’s plans). Second, and very importantly, most experts believe Trump’s (Republican) tax and spending (think of infrastructure projects to help make America great again) proposals, if enacted, will result in even more massive budgets deficits. Gaping budget holes, especially those lasting for several years, represent a demand for cash to fill them. Who will do so, and at what price? For many months (a long time before the November 2016 election), foreign official institutions have been notable and consistent net sellers of UST notes and bonds (next Treasury International System/TIC release is 11/16/16). See the essay “Running for Cover: Foreign Official Holdings of US Treasury Securities” (10/13/16).

Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board, which has for several years repressed the Federal Funds rate (and thus the government yield curve) at artificially low levels, again has hinted it will gradually normalize rates. The next Fed meeting is 12/13-14/16. Admittedly, inflation benchmarks such as the consumer price index and personal consumption expenditures have not marched above the Fed’s beloved two percent target. The Fed nevertheless nowadays likely will be more inclined to push rates higher. Not only is the election past, but also the likelihood of monumental US fiscal stimulus (huge budget deficits) encourages rate hikes. In addition, headline unemployment is around the Fed’s goal. Asset prices such as stocks (S+P 500) and real estate have soared from their international economic disaster depths.

In his political apprenticeship on the campaign trails, Trump criticized Fed rate suppression. Perhaps he should have been more careful regarding the higher policy rates for which he implicitly asked. Since Trump and others criticized the Fed for keeping rates on the ground floor, they hardly can complain (at least for a while) about upward Federal Funds rate moves.

In addition, keep in mind that the Fed for several years engaged in mammoth money printing (quantitative easing). Although the Fed ceased QE, it has not reversed its money printing actions. Thus though some inflation measures (such as the CPI) are low, even before the election 2016 outcome, there arguably was potential for eventual inflation ascents as a consequence of the Fed’s ardent QE monetary stimulus. Assuming the new US political regime enacts hefty individual (and corporate) tax cuts and embarks on its infrastructure schemes, Trump’s festive tax and spending party will intertwine with this earlier Fed money printing extravaganza. Also, the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan continue to print money.

Signs of US wage inflation have appeared. There remains some pressure to boost the minimum wage. Would a big infrastructure plan, if it occurs a time of low headline unemployment, lift labor prices? Also, suppose the US deports a significant number of illegal (undocumented foreign) workers; that will tend to push wages and thus interest rates higher, though gurus can quarrel as to how much.

Suppose inflation marches higher and sustains levels around the Fed’s two percent weathervane. To (finally) give savers (creditors) a decent return relative to inflation, UST rates obviously should be above that goal. Focus on the UST 10 year. A one pc premium (100 basis points) makes the UST 10 year yield 3.00pc, well above current levels. The 6/11/15 top was 2.50pc. Above that stands 1/2/14’s 3.05pc peak. A two pc premium makes the UST 4.00pc. Obviously, no guarantee exists that the inflation level, if it advances, will halt at two percent (or that the Fed immediately will fight vigorously to contain inflation once it touches two pc).

Suppose US government (and many other related) interest rates rise from low levels. Will current debt holders start to run for the exits? Supply from those sellers of “old” debt may supplement the US government’s effort to sell “new” securities to finance tax cuts and spending programs.

Finally, suppose America imposes tariffs to ensure “fair” trade. Viewed alone, this perhaps will tend to increase the price of goods and services sold in the US. Of course other nations may respond. Some may cut prices to retain access to the American marketplace. Or, a genuine trade war could help weaken world (and US) GDP and keep prices and rates low.

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The New World- US Election Aftermath (11-15-16)

PLAYING IN THE BAND: OPEC AND OIL PRICES © Leo Haviland October 25, 2016

Not long after July 2008’s major peak in crude oil prices, the European Central Bank President, Jean-Claude Trichet, declared that “predictions of the future prices of commodities are probably the most difficult exercise you can imagine.” (“Introductory Remarks with Q&A”, 8/7/08)

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CONCLUSION

OPEC, finally fearful of sustained low petroleum prices and renewed price slumps, troubled by elevated oil production and lofty inventories, formally met 9/28/16 in Algiers. The ministers established a crude oil production target range of 32.5 to 33.0 million barrels per day, beneath estimated September 2016 production of around 33.5mmbd. This agreement reflects a Saudi Arabian policy shift. That nation and its allies apparently will no longer countenance (risk) benchmark Brent/North Sea crude oil prices under around $35 to $40 per barrel for an extended period. OPEC ministers have engaged in dialogue with non-OPEC oil producers regarding output schemes. OPEC gathers 11/30/16 in Vienna. Output apparently will not be cut prior to the November meeting (Financial Times, 9/30/16, p20).

OPEC’s rhetoric and general policy approach likely will help support Brent/North Sea at prices around a $35-$40 range. However, for the near term, OPEC’s actions thus far in the context of the global supply/demand picture probably make it challenging for petroleum prices to sustain elevations more than a few dollars above their mid-October 2016 levels (on a nearest futures continuation basis, Brent/North Sea crude oil around $54, NYMEX around $52). Why? First, OPEC has not adopted specific country-based output reductions. Moreover, given ongoing quarrels within the organization, whether it will do so in November 2016 or even implement them in practice is uncertain.

In addition, actual OPEC crude production of 32.5/33.0mmbd probably will begin cutting oil stockpiles only by sometime around mid-2017.

Ongoing serious dialogue with crucial non-OPEC producers such as Russia represents a victory for OPEC. Suppose production cuts by notable non-OPEC nations combined with genuine OPEC discipline; that probably would help to rally prices above recent highs. The Saudi Arabian oil minister claimed that many nations will join OPEC in cutting production (Bloomberg, 10/19/16). However, he did not name names. If non-OPEC countries support OPEC measures, it is not nearly as clear as the Saudi minister claims that non-OPEC lands will slash output. A production freeze by Russia (and perhaps Mexico and other emerging marketplaces) is more likely, but even that is not certain. Russia’s President suggests his country is “ready to join the joint measures [freeze or production cut] to cap production” (Financial Times, 10/11/16, p20). Recall the 2/16/16 output freeze conversation between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Venezuela, and Russia did not result in a production cut.

THE PETROLEUM RALLY: IS AN INTERMISSION APPROACHING?

Key resistance for NYMEX crude oil (nearest futures continuation) is the $51 to $52 band. The recent high was 10/19/16’s $51.93. This inched over 6/9/16’s $51.67 and represents nearly a 100 percent rally from February 2016’s $26.05 bottom. Brent/North Sea’s (nearest futures) high was 10/10/16 at $53.73 (6/9/16 top $52.86). Although petroleum and American natural gas do not always travel in similar fashion (“move together”), this crude oil timing parallels 10/13/16’s NYMEX natural gas top around 3.37. Although NYMEX crude oil prices have not fallen far from 10/19/16’s elevation, a five percent drop gives about $49.35, a ten pc one around $6.75.

Remember that OPEC, despite its enthusiastic September 2016 wordplay, and despite its making progress in dialogue with some non-OPEC members, does not have a well-defined (specific) production agreement (with specific quotas) yet. Its current crude oil output remains high.

A weaker US dollar arguably assists petroleum price rallies. But although the broad real US TWD (monthly average, Federal Reserve, H.10) is moderately weaker than its January 2016 pinnacle, the TWD remains strong. At 97.9 in September 2016, it stands above March 2009’s 96.8 major top (S+P 500 major low in March 2009).

The new record high in the S+P 500, 8/15/16’s 2194, surpasses 5/20/15’s noteworthy pinnacle at 2135, but not decisively (only by 2.8pc). The MXEF (emerging stock marketplaces) remains beneath its 4/27/15 top at 1069 (as well as previous highs in its downtrend: 1212 on 4/27/11 and 1104 on 9/4/14).

There are some signs of rising government interest rates, at least in the United States. The UST 10 year note is around 1.75 percent, up from 7/6/16’s 1.32pc. See “Running for Cover: Foreign Official Holdings of US Treasury Securities” (10/13/16). Although the Fed probably will not raise the Federal Funds rate in its 11/1-2/16 meeting (prior to the 11/8/16 US election), it may elect to do so in its 12/13-14/16 gathering.

Global economic growth remains relatively sluggish. Significant sovereign or corporate debt problems exist in many important countries.

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Sometimes significant patterns and heights in net noncommercial petroleum positions can be in rhythm with important oil price trends. The current net noncommercial long position in petroleum is extremely substantial and probably is vulnerable to liquidation. A widespread run for the exits by such noncommercial longs likely would undermine petroleum prices.

 

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Playing in the Band- OPEC and Oil Prices (10-25-16)