GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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US INFLATION SIGNALS © Leo Haviland June 7, 2015

In their noble war to generate sufficient inflation, insure economic recovery, and slash unemployment, central bankers in America, Europe, and Japan have fought with extraordinary weapons such as monumental money printing and longstanding interest rate yield repression. On the inflation front, they battle furiously to achieve and sustain an inflation target of about two percent. This allegedly good (desirable, reasonable, prudent) goal contrasts not only with bad “excessive” inflation, but also with bad “too low” inflation and evil (or at least really bad) of deflation.

For several months, widely-watched inflationary yardsticks such as the consumer price index indicated too low inflation or inflamed worries regarding deflation. The consequences of the 2007-2009 international economic disaster probably have not disappeared, and the dramatic slump in petroleum prices after mid-2014 has troubled many inflation seekers. In any event, most economic forecasters, including central banking captains, have postponed the achievement of sufficient inflation as measured by such signposts rather far out into the future. Consequently, marketplace warriors, political leaders, and the financial media have focused relatively little on other gauges warning of notable potential for increased inflation in benchmarks such as the consumer price index.
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The worldwide global economy of course is interconnected and complex. Numerous variables intertwine to produce any given inflation level and trend. Inflation acceleration need not appear first or strongest in beloved indicators such as consumer prices or personal consumption expenditures. Although the United States is not a financial island, focus on the American landscape.

“Inflation” is not confined to measures such as the CPI or personal consumption expenditures; “the economy” includes other inflation benchmarks. Various indicators signal there is more inflation “around” in the US than most believe. Underline American wage increases. Note central bank and marketplace murmurings regarding high valuations or so-called asset bubbles; keep in mind the climbs in US equities and home prices from their financial crisis depths. Money supply growth remains robust. The steely determination of the Fed and its central banking allies to achieve their inflation objectives heralds that monetary policy probably will remain quite lax for some time even if the US eventually raises rates. These factors collectively warn that at least in America, deflationary forces “in general” have found strong adversaries. The recent spike in key interest rates such as the 10 year US government note (and the German Bund) in part reflects this inflation.

Despite the recent rate of change in US consumer prices and personal consumption expenditures, probably neither deflation nor dangerously low inflation are on the American horizon. In addition, sustained “too low” inflation in America probably should not be a worry for the near term. Nevertheless, although a sustained jump in PCE and CPI inflation rates much beyond the Fed’s desired two percent target currently appears unlikely, “sufficient” inflation in America may be achieved faster than many predict.
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“Flights to quality”, hunts for suitable yield (return), and other supply/demand considerations, not just low inflation statistics, can rally prices of debt securities. Yet did sustained central bank yield repression create or at least encourage “too low” yields for (a price “bubble” in) key government debt securities such as those of the United States and Germany? In the Eurozone, the terrifying enemy called deflation neared. The European Central Bank fired back with a huge quantitative easing (money printing) plan involving government debt securities. Some European government security interest rate yields went negative.

However, was a US (and German) debt security price bubble recently popped?

The 10 year US government note established an important yield low at 1.64 percent on 1/30/15, above 7/25/12’s major bottom at 1.38pc. Since January 2015’s valley, the US 10 year rate shot up about 50 percent to 6/5/15’s 2.44pc. The 1/2/14 summit at 3.05pc represents important resistance. In any case, what should the yield on US 10 year government notes be if inflation (such as in the PCE) is 1.5 percent or higher?

The 10 year German government note made a key bottom on 4/17/15 close to zero, at .05 percent (not long after the UST 10 year note made a minor low at 1.80pc on 4/3/15). Bund yields thereafter blasted higher, reaching almost one percent on 6/4/15. The Japanese 10 year JGB made a significant trough in 2015 shortly before the UST’s, on 1/20/15 at .20 percent.

US stocks advanced victoriously from their March 2009 major low for many reasons, including strong corporate earnings and share buybacks. Yet money printing and yield repression also assisted the S+P 500’s mighty ascent. So if US stocks recently reached “too high” levels, perhaps rising interest rates (or growing fears of them) will inspire those equities to retreat (burst their bubble).

Regardless of whether or not American government note yields recently were (or are still) “too low”, the recent sharp increase in UST 10 year note rates may reflect not just a “technical correction” or a growing belief that the Federal Funds rate (and thus yields in US government securities) will rise in the relatively near future. That noteworthy UST yield leap probably also warns that US inflation “in general” has grown or will do so soon.

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US Inflation Signals (6-7-15)

FEDERAL RESERVE EXIT STRATEGIES © Leo Haviland February 21, 2013

Federal Reserve Board generals have underlined that they indeed possess an exit strategy for their ongoing extraordinary easing program. Such confident rhetoric regarding an escape plan indeed helps to boost the morale of many economic and political observers of marketplace battlefields. Didn’t its entrance strategy work? The Fed Funds rate has stayed near the ground floor since late 2008, United States Treasury yields have collapsed relative to their 2007 heights, and US equities (use the S+P 500 as a signpost) have soared from their March 2009 abyss.

Yet marketplace combatants should be wary of the Fed’s exit strategy design as well as its tactical implementation. It is not a detailed and finished blueprint. In actual practice, the exit strategy involves significant risk, and it probably will not be put into practice nearly as timely or smoothly as propaganda from the Fed leadership hints. How rapid, coherent, and helpful were the Fed’s policy viewpoints and actions in the early stages of the worldwide economic crisis? As the Fed’s marketplace entrance strategy and maneuvers were very remarkable and evolved over time, why should its exit plan and its application be any more “orderly”?

Yet why should the Fed’s exit strategy be without some significant pain to UST and stock owners? There’s at least a significant risk of notable wounds. After all, the rally in debt and equity prices assisted by the Fed’s massive marketplace easing generally enriched and thus pleased owners of American stocks and UST (and many other debt instruments). Besides, we know the noble Fed is not the only significant policy maker and fighter on the US (and international) economic battlefield. Thus its practical control over marketplace outcomes has significant limits.

To what extent is the Fed Chairman accurate? Is the Fed Chairman trying to minimize the role of the Fed in financing (money printing for) the deficit and to understate potential overall exit strategy issues?

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Federal Reserve Exit Strategies (2-21-13)

SHOW ME THE MONEY! © Leo Haviland, September 19, 2011

In various forms and fashions, accounting greatly matters in cultural domains. Economic realms employ professional accountants and other measurers and judges of accuracy (and compliance, responsibility, and virtue), but money meadows are not the only field involving accountability. In financial playgrounds- as in politics, war, romance, and elsewhere- it’s important to carefully evaluate the truth, quality, and implications of accounts and other storytelling.

Despite the ongoing excitement of the European sovereign debt crisis, European banks are not the only ones facing significant challenges. Thus some gloomy bystanders perhaps want to avoid renewed scans of America’s banks in the context of real estate and derivatives.

Sometimes the titanic numbers of billions and trillions mask the crucial importance of what’s going on in the provinces of smaller quantities. US real median household income in 2010 was about $49,400, a 2.3pc slide from 2009. Since 2007, real income has tumbled 6.4pc. It is 7.1pc under the median household income peak in 1999, back to the 1996 level of $49.1m.

According to the US Treasury’s recent TIC statistics (9/16/11), major foreign holders (official and others) of Treasury securities (these include bills, notes, and bonds) held about $4.48 trillion of them in July 2011. This is down slightly from June 2011’s $4.50tr and May’s $4.51tr. They held $4.45tr in January 2011. In sum, they’ve essentially not been net buyers for several months. Even relative to July 2010, they’ve been mediocre net buyers. Foreigners held $4.13tr in July 2010; July 2011 thus represents a meager add-on of only about $353 billion to the year-ago month.

Though money supply data are only one variable relevant to inflation, they have started to hint that the future inflationary picture will be less pretty than ardent Fed professors proclaim. Even in a sluggish or recessionary economy, and even if some deflationary forces at home or overseas are strong, that does not prove that inflation will not increase. And inflation perhaps will float considerably higher than many predict.

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Show Me the Money! (9-19-11)