GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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MARKETPLACE TRENDS AND ENTANGLEMENTS © Leo Haviland April 4, 2022

Bob Dylan says in “The Times They Are A-Changin’”:
“There’s a battle outside and it is ragin’
It’ll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin’”

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CONCLUSION

Marketplace history of course is not marketplace destiny, whether for one financial realm or the relationships between assorted domains. Although traditions and the analytical time horizon and the scope of allegedly relevant variables remain critical, the cultural past in its major fields such as economics and politics need not repeat itself, either completely or even partly. Yet sometimes current and potential economic and other cultural situations apparently manifest sufficient important similarities to “the past” so that many observers can perceive patterns helping to explain “the present” and to forecast future probabilities. Thus from the standpoint of many subjective perspectives, marketplace history (like other history) often does recur to a substantial extent. Such alleged historical similarity, as it is not objective (scientific), also consequently permits a great variety of competitive storytelling about it.

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The 2022 landscape for the United States dollar, the US Treasury 10 year note, commodities “in general”, and the S+P 500 resembles that of around early 2020. The United States dollar currently hints that it may have established an important peak or that it will soon do so. The real Broad Dollar Index’s height (see the Federal Reserve Board, H.10) borders its March/April 2020 highs. Arguably commodities in general began a notable decline in early 2022. Using the broad S&P GSCI as a benchmark, the spot/physical/cash (as well as the nearest futures continuation) commodities complex (including the key petroleum arena) peaked in early January 2020 alongside a strengthening US dollar. A pattern of increasing US Treasury yields (take the 10 year note as the signpost) preceded the early 2020 stock pinnacles (S+P 500 on 2/19/20; emerging marketplaces in general on 1/13/20) as well as the commodities one. Marketplace chronicles unveil a significant yield increase in the UST 10 year note (and other important debt security benchmarks) prior to (and following) the S+P 500’s very significant high (perhaps a major top) 1/4/22 at 4819. As in 2020, the 2022 highs in stocks and commodities entangled with both rising yields and a strong dollar.

In summary, although their future levels and trends admittedly are cloudy and uncertain, what are probable trends for these marketplaces? The United States real Broad Dollar Index probably has attained its pinnacle or will do so in the near future. Commodities in general (spot; nearest futures basis) probably made a major high in early March 2022 and will continue to retreat. Although it is a difficult call, the S+P 500 likely peaked in January 2022, and it probably will venture beneath late February 2022’s 4115 low. Over the long run, given the American (and global) inflation and debt situation, the yield for the US Treasury 10 year note will ascend above its recent high around 2.55 percent, although occasional “flights to quality” and thus interim yield declines may emerge.

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Arguments in marketplaces and elsewhere in cultural life that “this time is different” are inescapable and often persuasive. Of course the coronavirus pandemic played a major role in the first quarter 2020 collapse in global stocks and commodities. However, the rising interest rates and strong dollar variables still played an important part in those 2020 marketplace declines. And the American and international inflation and debt troubles of 2022 (“nowadays”) far exceed those existing around January 2020. The Russian invasion of Ukraine obviously makes aspects of the recent commodities situation different from 2020; global petroleum prices, for example, though “high” prior to the Russia/Ukraine conflict, probably would not have skyrocketed in its absence. And in regard to historic and potential future marketplace relationships and related risk assessments, we should not forget 2007-09, the ending of the Goldilocks Era and its dismal aftermath, the global economic disaster. The S+P 500’s summit (October 2007) diverged for several months from the peak in commodities in general (July 2008), although the trends of those two financial sectors thereafter converged. Also, as US and other stocks began their terrifying descent in spring 2008 until March 2009, the dollar rallied.

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Marketplace Trends and Entanglements (4-4-22)

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LINES (c) Leo Haviland October 22, 2012

Highlight two International Monetary Fund comments in its recently unveiled “Fiscal Monitor” (October 2012). “With downside risks in the global economy mounting, policymakers must once again tread the narrow path that will permit them to continue strengthening the public finances while avoiding an excessive withdrawal of fiscal support for a still-fragile economic recovery.” (page ix). And: “In most advanced economies, the near-term fiscal stance has to walk the fine line between continued adjustment and supporting the economy.” (p6).

This IMF rhetoric, which many other luminaries embrace, of “tread the narrow path” and “walk the fine line” offers hope for the global economy and for the United States in particular. Maybe subtle financial and political sorcerers somehow can escape the dilemma of an economic downturn (too slow growth or recession) and the consequences of additional (irresponsible) substantial deficit spending! Have faith that wise guardians can discover a middle way to evade further suffering!

In the amazing Goldilocks Era, didn’t substantial and growing worldwide debt and leverage joyously promise and provide nearly limitless opportunity for almost everyone (“us”) to prosper with very little (or at least manageable) risk? In the aftermath of the wonderful Goldilocks epoch, should we believe that the implications of significant leverage and mountainous debt accumulation can be magically pain-free, at least over some misty medium term or long run vista?

Despite such entrancing sermons of narrow paths and fine lines from many respected central banking and political guides, economic and political pilgrims should ask if such a path or line exists in practice. It probably doesn’t. Is there really a way for the United States to avoid the looming fiscal cliff and other long run deficit challenges without significant hardship? Probably not.

Most observers are not focusing closely on the potential composition of the Senate. They should. The Senate election result probably will have notable consequences for legislative action (or inaction) in many domains. For example, think of the troubling fiscal cliff and the terrifying long run deficit problems.

Clairvoyants on balance believe the Democrats probably will maintain control of the Senate. Even if the Republicans gain an edge in the Senate, it would be very surprising for them to capture anything close to 60 seats. According to Senate rules, to end debate (halt filibusters) on a legislative proposal (bill), 60 of the 100 Senators must agree to do so (invoke cloture). The sixty votes do not have to all be from the same party. Nevertheless, the failure of a Senate majority party to control 60 or more Senate seats means that its opponents generally can block the majority party’s legislative efforts.

So suppose the House is Republican, and the Senate is Democratic (or even imagine a modest Republican majority). Given such Congressional division, it will be a major challenge for the parties to readily resolve issues over which they disagree dramatically, such as on how to repair the federal deficit disaster. In that situation, the party membership of the winner of the duel for the Presidency matters much less. After all, for the past several years, the Republican House and the Democratic Senate stubbornly have faced each other. With these battle lines, there has been at best little progress on reducing the deficit. Why should having a Republican President instead of a Democratic one change this partisan deadlock in any notable fashion?

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Economic and Political Lines (10-22-12)
Chart- Commodities- Broad GSCI (10-22-12)