

The Band sings in "The Shape I'm In":
"Out of nine lives, I spent seven
Now, how in the world do you get to Heaven?
Oh, you don't know the shape I'm in".

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Everyone knows that the coronavirus pandemic and political (medical) responses to it have wreaked widespread and deep economic destruction around the globe. The coronavirus, however, was not the only bearish phenomenon preceding and influencing the disastrous economic situation. The ultimate extent of the damage and the timing and extent of the international and American recovery remain conjectural.

America and its consumers obviously are not the only economic engines for the international economy. However, given substantial global economic interconnections, American economic conditions, trends, and policies significantly influence those elsewhere. US consumer spending represents about 68.0 percent of American GDP, a very sizable share (Federal Reserve Board; Z.1, "Financial Accounts of the United States", Table F.2; 3/12/20). Consequently, regarding the prospects for United States economic growth, and thus output in other realms, much depends on the situation and attitudes of the American consumer.

American consumer spending and other "Main Street" variables intertwine with those around the globe, as well as with "business" (both big and small) and other economic, political, and social phenomena. For example, Federal Reserve and other central bank actions, government spending levels and trends, United States (and other) stock marketplace levels, American government and other interest rates, the dollar and other currencies, commodities, real estate, and assorted other economic, political, and social variables influence American consumer spending in a variety of fashions. These relationships and phenomena encouraging them can and do change, sometimes slowly, sometimes rapidly. Convergence and divergence (lead/lag) patterns between economic indicators as well as marketplaces likewise can shift or transform.

Wall Street (and its financial media friends), politicians, and Main Street pray that the monumental monetary interventions by central banks such as the Federal Reserve and its allies (massive money printing and so forth) and dramatic fiscal deficit spending boosts not only will rescue the international economy from its current monumental troubles (reduce the magnitude of a recession), but also will restore acceptable economic growth relatively quickly, perhaps even before the end of the third quarter of 2020. Prior success in dealing with the dreadful worldwide economic disaster of 2007-09 encourages widespread faith that these (and perhaps further) efforts and a warlike "whatever it takes" monetary and governmental policy attitude ultimately will succeed.

Many economic high priests such as the International Monetary Fund predict a relatively strong and quick global recovery. In its World Economic Outlook (Table 1.1; April 2020), the IMF forecast a gloomy three percent drop in world output in 2020. However, global real GDP ascends sharply in 2021 by 5.8 percent. GDP retreats in advanced economies by -6.1pc year-on-year in

2020, but climbs 4.5pc in 2021. According to the IMF, US GDP collapses -5.9pc in 2020 but jumps 4.7pc in 2021. Emerging/developing marketplaces allegedly will suffer only a one percent fall in calendar 2020, with GDP growing a rapid 6.6pc in 2021 (compare 2019's modest 3.7pc expansion). China supposedly will manage to grow 9.2 percent in 2021 (1.2pc in 2020), although its GDP fell -6.8pc year-on-year in 1Q20.

US corporate earnings depend on many phenomena, and of course not all corporations depend (directly) on consumer purchasing (whether by Americans or others) to the same extent. Yet US corporate earnings estimates from Wall Street pulpits, like the IMF's vision, generally display optimism for calendar 2021 despite the sharp year-on-year falls expected for calendar 2020.

However, a survey of several key US variables closely linked to the situation of the American consumer nevertheless suggest that the injury to the American consumer "in general" and thus the country's overall economy has been and will continue to be severe. A very substantial portion of the general public is in rough shape. Numerous other consumers are fearful regarding their future. Between the terrifying unemployment situation (and at least the near term outlook for it) and a relatively high arithmetical household debt level prior to the coronavirus devastation, most American consumers probably will be cautious spenders for quite some time. Even if the coronavirus pandemic significantly subsides relatively soon, how rapidly will the shattered consumer sector race to resume its prior buying habits and thus boost GDP substantially? Moreover, the planned reopening of America's economy probably will be gradual. And how quickly will firms, whether large or small, rehire a large number of laid-off workers? In addition, widespread worries about the ongoing and future coronavirus waves likely will persist, and people await the development of a proven vaccine and adequate testing.

Thus America's economic recovery probably will be slow rather than fast (or even fairly quick on a sustained basis). Optimism heralded by the IMF and many other leading institutions, enthusiastic gospels from US "investment" gurus regarding magnificent corporate earnings in calendar 2021, and similar propaganda likely will be disappointed.

AMERICAN CONSUMERS: THE SHAPE WE'RE IN

Listen to Blind Willie McTell (1898-1959)'s "Broke Down Engine Blues":

"Feel like a broke down engine, mama

Ain't got no drivin' wheel

You all been down and lonely

You know just how Willie McTell feels".

According to the Federal Reserve, at the end of fourth quarter 2019, the net worth of United States households and nonprofit organizations stood at \$118.4 trillion, a mammoth total. This almost doubled the \$60.3tr total of 1Q09, around the end of the 2007-09 global financial crisis (Z.1; "Financial Accounts of the United States", Table B.101.h; nominal prices). Of the \$118.4tr, households held the great majority, about \$111.8tr. Thus at the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, the overall US consumer balance sheet was strong.

However, given America's significant wealth inequality, a relatively small percentage of households controlled a substantial proportion of the total \$111.8 trillion grand total net worth. Based on wealth percentile, the top ten percent owned 70.2 percent. The bottom 50 percent

controlled merely 1.5pc (less than two percent). For the distribution by income percentile, the top twenty percent at end 4Q19 controlled 73.0 percent, the middle forty percent (40-80pc) owned 21.0pc; the bottom 40 percent held a meager 5.9pc. See the Federal Reserve's "Distribution of Household Wealth in the U.S. since 1989" (3/20/20). Also, US median annual household income in 2018 was about \$63,200, a modest level (US Census Bureau, "Income and Poverty in the United States: 2018", 2018 dollars; 9/10/19). Thus as calendar 2020 started, a great many US consumers probably were (and are) not significantly insulated from the 2020 economic debacle.

In the Z.1's assets category, at end 4Q2019, corporate equities and mutual fund shares were at a lofty \$28.7tr. The recent slump in the S+P 500 and other equity benchmarks cut these values.

At end 4Q2019, household real estate was \$29.3 trillion. This value likely has slumped. With many potential buyers quarantined, demand surely is off. The National Association of Homebuilders/Wells Fargo "National Housing Market Index" (4/15/20) collapsed from 72 in March 2020 (76 in December 2019) to 30 in April 2020. One of its three components, the index for present single family home sales, dropped from 79 to 36. Anticipated single family sales for the next six months plummeted from 75 to 36. Traffic of prospective buyers plunged from 56 to 13. Americans are unlikely to rush to purchase a new home given current and prospective economic weakness.

Also, many homeowners are under threat of foreclosure, and regiments of renters face eviction threats (see the NYTimes, 3/19/20, ppB1, 5). How likely will these people hurry to increase their personal consumption expenditures? And landlords need income too.

Given the shocking magnitude of the recent and prospective 2Q2020 GDP slump, how likely is it that American consumers will rapidly change their purchasing behavior? US gross domestic product tumbled at an annual rate of 4.8 percent in 1Q20 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 4/29/20). Within GDP, personal consumption expenditures cratered at an annual rate of -7.6 percent. Keep in mind that March 2020 was when state governments proclaimed "stay at home" orders, so March 2020 by itself likely was even worse. The Congressional Budget Office (4/24/20) predicts that real GDP will "decline by about 12 percent during the second quarter [of 2020] relative to the preceding quarter, equivalent to a decline at an annual rate of 40 percent for that quarter."

The CBO believes in economic recovery, though! It asserts real economic growth will average about 17.0 percent at an annual rate in the second half of calendar 2020 (annual rate of 23.5pc in 3Q20 and 10.5pc in 4Q20).

Thus 2020 US GDP will drop -5.6 percent on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth quarter basis. This soothsayer states that America's real GDP will grow 2.8 percent in 2021 on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth quarter basis. However, the CBO's real GDP estimate for 1Q20's decline of -3.5pc was less than 1Q20's actual slump of 4.8 percent. Maybe the CBO is overestimating the potential for recovery in second half 2020 and thereafter.

"I'm goin' down the road feelin' bad
I don't want to be treated this-a-way." Bill Monroe, the Grateful Dead, and other musicians have performed versions of the traditional song, "Goin' Down the Road Feelin' Bad".

US personal income retreated about -2.0 percent lower in March 2020 relative to February 2020 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 4/30/20; see Table 1). American retail sales crashed 8.7 percent in March 2020 versus February 2020, and fell 6.2pc versus March 2019 (Census Bureau, 4/15/20). Probably personal consumption spending and income fell more in April 2020 as layoffs accelerated.

Relevant as a sign of current and future consumer spending attitudes and behavior, underscore that personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income leaped to 13.1pc in March 2020 from February's 8.0pc (BEA, 4/30/20).

Declining American consumer confidence also confirms (warns of) weakening American consumer spending and a relatively feeble recovery. According to the Conference Board, consumer confidence peaked in October 2018 at 137.9 (135.8 in July 2019). However, February 2020's 132.6 height hovered close to that plateau. However, confidence sharply diminished to 118.8 in March 2020 and crashed to 86.9 in April 2020 (cut-off date for the preliminary April results was 4/17/20). Though well above February 2009's 25.3 bottom at the depth of the 2007-09 worldwide economic crisis, April 2020's altitude slipped decisively beneath the pinnacle attained shortly prior to the 2007-09 global financial crisis, July 2007's 111.9.

Given the proximity of small businesses to Main Street, the noteworthy recent sharp decline in small business optimism is an ominous sign for future consumer spending patterns. The National Federation of Independent Business "Small Business Optimism Index" nosedived from 104.5 in February 2020 to 96.4 in March 2020, the largest monthly fall in the survey's history. The March 2020 level neighbors the 94.9 take-off point in October 2016, shortly before President Trump's November 2020 election victory.

Viewpoints regarding American unemployment levels for April 2020 and thereafter are diverse. And there are various definitions of "employment". However, everyone agree that unemployment spiked in recent weeks. Around what height probably was headline unemployment probably as of the week ending 5/2/20?

The US civilian unemployment rate for a given month is based on a survey reference week around mid-month. Thus March 2020's headline unemployment rate of 4.4 percent from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (released 4/3/20) derived from the March 8-14, 2020 survey. So the likely American unemployment rate at end-April 2020 (or 5/2/20) likely will differ from the official (Bureau of Labor Statistics) mid-April figure (5/8/20 next release).

Let's employ initial weekly claims for unemployment insurance ("jobless claims") as a guideline by which to estimate the current unemployment rate. Those claims totaled about 30.3 million for the six week period from 3/21/20 (as the national lockdown took hold) to 4/25/20 (Labor Department, 4/30/20), an extraordinary acceleration. Jobless claims were only 282 thousand for the 3/14/20 week (around the time of the BLS survey), exploding to 3.3 million the following week.

According to the BLS's "Employment Situation" release (4/3/20, Table A-1), the March civilian labor force (seasonally adjusted) was about 162.9 million. Suppose that number is unchanged as of end (not mid)-April 2020 (5/2/20; "now"). The employed number of the civilian labor force for March 2020 was about 155.8 million (Table A-1). As a method for estimating the current unemployment number, first subtract the 30.3 million of initial jobless claims from the employed

number, which leaves 125.5 million. Thus the US unemployment rate as of 4/25/20 stood at around 23.0 percent, an amazing height (125.5mm/162.9mm equals 77.0 percent employed). In contrast to the towering claims for unemployment insurance, employment gains elsewhere in the economy probably were comparatively very small.

The Labor Department has not released jobless claims for the week after 4/25/20 (ending 5/2/20). However, they probably did not collapse to zero given that 4/25/20's were 3.8mm. Also, anecdotal data indicates that not everyone who wanted to file claims in preceding weeks has succeeded in doing so, in part due to the inability of states to quickly handle the tidal wave of claims. As a conjecture, suppose another two million claims will be filed for the week ending 5/2/20. That makes the "current" unemployment rate 24.2 percent (123.5mm/162.9mm is 75.8pc).

This disastrous unemployment level rivals that of the Depression.

In 1933, during the dark times of the Depression, US civilian unemployment reached an estimated annual average of 24.9 percent. Compare 1929's 3.2 percent. Though unemployment declined after 1933, it remained high for years thereafter. In 1937, it averaged 14.3pc. (See Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1929-39: Estimating Methods", Table 1).

Moreover, undocumented immigrants generally are not eligible for unemployment insurance. So the current (as of 5/2/20) unemployed percentage of the nation's civilian labor force surely is greater than the 24.2 percent estimate.

Keep in mind that this estimate of current employment does not include persons who have had their hours (or wages) reduced but who are ineligible for unemployment insurance.

Also, from February 2020 to March 2020, the civilian labor force fell about 1.6 million (BLS, Table A-1). Dropping out of the labor force reduces the denominator for calculating unemployment (164.5mm in February 2020). However, from another perspective, many of those recently exiting indeed (for practical purposes, if not in the official statistics) have become unemployed.

The current unemployment level probably greatly surpasses other crests for the country such as November 1982's 10.8 percent and October 2009's 10.0pc.

Of course some industries such as "restaurants and bars", "travel and transportation", "personal services" and "entertainment" have greater exposure to coronavirus shutdowns than others. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Monthly Labor Review"; April 2020).

In any event, current sky-high unemployment levels probably suggest that consumers "in general" will not rush to increase their spending over the next several months, and perhaps for much of calendar 2021 as well. Many people probably will remain out of work for quite some time. And many with jobs will fear losing them (or having lower wages). Besides, how many employers will rehire large numbers of unemployed persons quickly given the uncertainties regarding the strength and duration of the US (and global) economic recovery, the strong potential for some ongoing social distancing regulation, and fears regarding a resurgence of the coronavirus several months from now? Thus, even if there is a recovery bounce from some boost from consumer spending, the related expansion probably will not reclaim lost real GDP ground substantially for quite some time (compare 4Q19 and up until February 2020) soon.

In the current downturn, perhaps the unemployment summit will precede renewed expansion. But that does not necessitate substantial subsequent growth. The Depression Era of course differs in numerous respects from today, with a highly accommodative central bank monetary policy nowadays a critical distinction. And there is massive deficit spending in the current environment. Unemployment sometimes peaks after an economic recovery is underway, but that does not necessarily mean that the expansion will be fast or substantial.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates regarding US unemployment do not reach Depression peaks, but they are very high from the historic perspective. The CBO believes the unemployment rate will average around 14.0 percent during 2Q20, reaching 16.0pc in 3Q20. It predicts 11.7pc unemployment for 4Q20, with 2021's averaging 10.1pc. With unemployment at 16.0pc in 3Q20 and 11.7pc in 4Q20, and 10.1pc for 2021 (9.5pc by end year 2021), will US consumer spending and GDP growth for second half 2020 and thereafter be as robust as the CBO clairvoyant estimates? Probably not, even though quantitative easing (money printing), yield repression, and deficit spending offer hope.

Before the coronavirus pandemic began creating havoc, American household debt total as a percentage of GDP was less burdensome than during the global economic debacle of 2007-09 and its immediate aftermath (given overall boosts to consumer net worth since 2008-09). According to the Federal Reserve's "Financial Stability Report" (May 2019; p17), the household debt to GDP ratio declined. According to the Financial Stability Oversight Council's "2018 Annual Report" as well (updated 6/20/19; Figure 4.4.1, p28), household debt as a percent of disposable personal income fell in recent years.

Yet consumers "in general" with a given dollar amount of debt can become stretched as their circumstances change. The substantial household arithmetic debt amount was a danger signal pointing to potential pressure on and damage to the consumer front, particularly if the economy weakened and stock and home prices declined significantly. See "US Dollar Travels: Crosstown Traffic" (7/2/19).

American household debt swelled in arithmetical terms over the past few years. According to the New York Federal Reserve Bank (February 2020), aggregate US household debt at the end of 4Q19 tallied \$14.2 trillion dollars, vaulting further above the zenith achieved during the global economic crash (3Q08) by about \$1.5 trillion. Although mortgages represent the major sector of US household debt (68.0 percent), student loan, credit card, and auto loan obligations also are significant. Given the US economic downturn beginning in 1Q20 (and the spike in unemployment), this sizable debt obligation probably will hamper consumer spending and slow the economic recovery.

Keep an eye on charge-off and delinquency rates on loans and leases at commercial banks (Federal Reserve). These currently are relatively low, but probably will rise if the current economic weakness persists.

Remember that corporate debt is substantial in America, China, and many other places.

Not all petroleum demand comes via the consumer sector, but the person-on-the-street plays an important role in total consumption. What does the US Energy Information Administration say

about total US petroleum consumption? According to its “Short-Term Energy Outlook” (4/7/20; Table 4a), demand dives a bloody 13.4 percent from 1Q2020 (19.7 million barrels per day) to 2Q20 (about 17.1mmbd). However, it allegedly will rebound to 19.7mmbd in 3Q20 and 20.0mmbd in 4Q20, with 2021 averaging 20.4mmbd. Like the International Monetary Fund and the Congressional Budget Office, the EIA’s perspective reflects belief in a rather speedy American return to “normalcy” following the coronavirus-linked economic decline.

US CORPORATE EARNINGS

The famed blues player Blind Lemon Jefferson (1893-1929) sings in “One Dime Blues”:
“I’m broke, ain’t got a dime
Everybody gets his hard luck sometime”.

On the American corporate earnings front, many marketplace analysts likewise predict a fairly rapid recovery following sharp falls, particularly for calendar 2021. Yet the American and international economy likely is, or soon will be, in recession. Given the stratospheric unemployment numbers, high consumer debt levels, and likely ongoing consumer spending reductions (or only modest eventual spending increases), how realistic is this cheerful opinion regarding earnings gains? Will the US and global economy, even with the assistance from central bankers (money printing and yield repression, plus other accommodative policies) and colossal fiscal deficit spending, really improve so decisively that it will propel corporate earnings sharply higher in 2021?

United States corporate earnings “as a whole” are not only dependent on consumers, whether American or overseas ones. Yet earnings for some industry (including service) sectors of course are closely linked to retail consumption. Keep in mind the substantial share of American consumers in total US GDP.

Widely-watched American stock indices such as the S+P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average are benchmarks which to some extent probably reflect the overall health of and potential for the American economy. Thus in the current situation, levels and trends for these American equity marketplaces attract and sustain international fascination.

Before the economic wreckage following the emergence of the coronavirus disaster, US earnings for the S+P 500 were essentially unchanged. For full calendar year 2019, according to FactSet (“Earnings Insight”, 4/3/20), they rose merely .1 percent year-on-year. Refinitiv states that corporate earnings edged up 1.9pc in 2019 relative to 2018 (“S&P 500 Earnings Scorecard”, 3/27/20).

FactSet predicts a -13.7 percent year-on-year corporate earnings decline for first quarter 2020 for the S+P 500 (5/1/20). If this fall occurs, it will be the greatest year-on-year earnings descent since 3Q09’s -15.7pc. For S+P 500 2Q20 earnings, it expects an even more murderous retreat, -36.7 percent year-on-year. The 3Q20 earnings also sink a huge amount relative to the year-ago period, -20.1pc versus 3Q19. The 4Q20 income also will subside notably, -9.4pc versus 4Q19. For full calendar year 2020, FactSet states that analysts project a devastating earnings decline of -17.8pc.

Refinitiv’s review of the S+P 500 calendar 2020 earnings outlook likewise is gloomy (5/4/20). First quarter 2020 earnings deteriorate -12.5 percent versus those of 1Q19. Second quarter 2020

earnings are eviscerated, crashing -39.1pc year-on-year. The 3Q20 earnings wither -22.1pc relative to 3Q19. Those of 4Q20 slump as well, declining -10.9pc against 4Q19. For full calendar year 2020, earnings collapse a bloody -20.9pc year on year.

These terrible 2020 American corporate earnings, given the important role of the US consumer for the nation's GDP (and demand for corporate products), signals that the US consumer (Main Street) is currently in bad shape and likely will remain so at least for many more months.

According to FactSet (5/1/20), optimism returns for full year 2021, as year-on-year S+P 500 earnings blast 25.1 percent higher. Refinitiv matches this joyous opinion, with 2021 earnings soaring 28.7 percent higher versus 2020's.

Suppose calendar 2019 US corporate earnings are given index of 100. Despite the 2020 GDP and corporate earnings downturns, FactSet statistics remarkably project that 2021's nominal corporate earnings will surpass 2019's. If corporate earnings erode -17.8 in calendar 2020 versus 2019's, they stand at 82.2. Suppose calendar 2021 earnings climb 25.1 percent year-on-year. Then 2021's earnings will reach about 102.8 (82.2 times 1.251). For Refinitiv's estimates as well, apparently 2021 earnings will exceed those of 2019. From 2019's plateau, earnings fall to 79.1 (by -20.9 percent) in 2020. If they boom 28.7pc in calendar 2021, 79.1 times 1.287 equals 101.8. To what extent does this significant recovery for calendar 2021 earnings versus those of 2020 suggest wishful thinking by investment analysts? In practice, (in addition to the gradual reopening of various sectors of the economy), to what extent will quantitative easing (money printing) and other central bank campaigns alongside bloated deficit spending succeed in boosting earnings?

Quantitative easing and low policy rates (Federal Funds), other central bank schemes, and gigantic deficit spending campaigns add marketplace liquidity. They also support consumers and industries (and state and local governments) and spur economic growth to some extent (at least for a while). These factors, assisted by pleasant memories of the S+P 500's glorious rally following the easy money and deficit spending regimes which sparked and sustained economic recovery from 2007-09's worldwide economic disaster, have helped to rally US equity prices. Moreover, Wall Street and its economic and political allies love to promote bull market trends in American stocks.

However, the sharp rally in the S+P 500 benchmark since late March 2020, and the recent relatively high resulting stock prices, do not necessarily "forecast" (or mandate) that real consumer (and other) spending and real GDP will recover quickly or significantly (especially on a sustained basis), or that they eventually will be high. Failure to sustain adequate consumer spending and GDP growth will tend to undermine corporate earnings (slow their recovery) and thus (all else equal) will tend to weaken stock prices. And even if United States stock prices remain fairly strong, Main Street (real world) consumers as a whole probably will not enjoy "good times" (a significant sustained economic recovery) soon.

There are various stock marketplace valuation measures and diverse viewpoints on them and equity marketplace trends. And although a stock marketplace price earnings ratio can widen (or narrow), observers can interpret this in various ways. According to FactSet, the forward 12 month P/E ratio for the S+P 500 is 20.3 (5/1/20). This P/E is decisively over the five year average of 16.7 and exceeds the ten year average of 15.0. April 2002 was the last time forward 12 month P/E ratio was above 20.0. Thus in the absence of a sustained strong US (and global) recovery, current

S+P 500 prices (despite their fall from their February 2020 pinnacle) probably are “high”. However, are some stock marketplace investors looking almost entirely past 2020’s earnings, instead focusing on hypothetical substantial gains in calendar 2021 (and even 2022)?

US STOCKS AND RECOVERY

The S+P 500’s fearful collapse from 3394 on 2/19/20 to 3/23/20’s 2192 was 35.4 percent and lasted just over a month.

“Crawling from the Wreckage: US Stocks” investigated previous major bear trends for the US stock marketplace over the past 125 years. It covered eleven major bear market adventures and four interim bear moves (1990, 1998, 2011, and 2018). The study revealed that the duration of the S+P 500’s decline since 2/19/20 was briefer than every single one of them. Among the major bear trends, only the 1986-87 crash is comparable in brevity. Phenomena inducing a major bear trend typically do not disappear (get counteracted and overcome by bullish considerations) in a short time span. Although US stock history does not show a single major bear trend which ended in one month, will this time be different?

Players must not be dogmatic regarding marketplace probabilities based upon this historical review. The awe-inspiring central bank and fiscal aid nevertheless provide major support for US stock prices. Given that factor, perhaps this time will be different, and the stock bear trend which erupted in February 2020 thus will last merely one month.

Following its March low, the S+P 500 ferociously rallied to 2955 on 4/29/20, a 34.8 percent gain in about five weeks. A thirty-three percent climb from 3/23/20’s 2192 trough equals 2922; this is close to 1/26/18’s 2873, the autumn 2018 interim tops at 2941 (9/21/18)/2940 (10/3/18), and 5/1/19’s 2954. A leap of fifty percent from 3/23/20 equals 3288, fairly close to 2/19/20’s summit. American stock marketplace history displays significant price rallies within major bear trends. Recall those during the horrific 1929 crash and the mournful 2007-09 descent.

“Crawling from the Wreckage” asked: “Is it possible that the flood of money provided by the Federal Reserve and its allies will benefit Wall Street and help support the S+P 500 (after all, nominal interest rate yields are low), while doing comparatively little for Main Street?”

For additional marketplace analysis, see other essays such as “Crawling from the Wreckage: US Stocks” (4/13/20); “Global Economic Troubles and Marketplace Turns: Being There” (3/2/20); “Critical Conditions and Economic Turning Points” (2/5/20); “Ringing in the New Year: US and Other Government Note Trends” (1/6/20).

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