GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Leo Haviland provides clients with original, provocative, cutting-edge fundamental supply/demand and technical research on major financial marketplaces and trends. He also offers independent consulting and risk management advice.

Haviland’s expertise is macro. He focuses on the intertwining of equity, debt, currency, and commodity arenas, including the political players, regulatory approaches, social factors, and rhetoric that affect them. In a changing and dynamic global economy, Haviland’s mission remains constant – to give timely, value-added marketplace insights and foresights.

Leo Haviland has three decades of experience in the Wall Street trading environment. He has worked for Goldman Sachs, Sempra Energy Trading, and other institutions. In his research and sales career in stock, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity battlefields, he has dealt with numerous and diverse financial institutions and individuals. Haviland is a graduate of the University of Chicago (Phi Beta Kappa) and the Cornell Law School.


 

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AMERICAN HOUSING: A MARKETPLACE WEATHERVANE © Leo Haviland December 4, 2018

“What You Own”, a song from the musical “Rent” (by Jonathan Larson), declares: “You’re living in America at the end of the millennium- you’re living in America, where it’s like the twilight zone.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

American home prices have enjoyed a joyous climb since their dismal lows following the global economic disaster of 2007-09. However, United States home prices “in general” (“overall”) now probably are establishing an important peak. At least a modest reversal of the magnificent long-run bullish United States home price trend probably is near.

What is a high (too high), low (too low), expensive, cheap, average, good, bad, neutral, normal, typical, reasonable, commonsense, appropriate, fair value, overvalued, undervalued, natural, equilibrium, rational, irrational, or bubble level for prices or any other marketplace variable is a matter of opinion. Subjective perspectives differ. In any case, current US home price levels nevertheless appear quite high, particularly in comparison to the lofty heights of the amazing Goldilocks Era. As current American home price levels (even if only in nominal terms) hover around or float significantly above those of the Goldilocks Era, this hints that such prices probably are vulnerable to a noteworthy bearish move. Moreover, measures of global home prices and US commercial real estate also have surpassed their highs from about a decade ago and thus arguably likewise may suffer declines.

Many United States housing indicators in general currently appear fairly strong, particularly in relation to their weakness during or in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. Nevertheless, assorted American housing variables as well as other phenomena related to actual home price levels probably warn of upcoming declines in American home (and arguably other real estate) prices. A couple of US home price surveys have reported price declines for very recent months. US housing affordability has declined. New single-family home sales display signs of weakness, as do new privately-owned housing starts. American government interest rate yields, as well as US mortgage rates, have edged up. The Federal Reserve Board as of now likely will continue to tighten and raise rates for a while longer. Overall household debt, though not yet burdensome (at least for many), now exceeds the pinnacle reached ten years ago in 3Q08. The economic stimulus from America’s December 2017 tax “reform” probably is fading. US consumer confidence dipped in November 2018.

Marketplace history of course does not necessarily repeat itself, either entirely or even partly. Convergence and divergence (lead/lag) relationships between marketplace trends and other variables can shift or transform, sometimes dramatically. Price and time trends for the American stock marketplace and US housing prices do not move precisely together. However, the international 2007-09 crisis experience (which in part strongly linked to US real estate issues) indicates that prices for US stocks and housing probably will peak around the same time, or at least “more or less together” (a lag of several months between the stock high and the home price pinnacle). The S+P 500 probably established a major high in autumn 2018 (9/21/18 at 2941, 10/3/18 at 2940; the broad S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index peaked 10/3/18 at 504). That autumn equity summit in the S+P 500 bordered 1/26/18’s interim top at 2873. Ongoing weakness in US (and international) stock marketplaces will help to undermine American home prices.

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American Housing- a Marketplace Weathervane (12-4-18)

TWISTS, TURNS, AND TURMOIL: US AND OTHER GOVERNMENT NOTE TRENDS © Leo Haviland November 12, 2018

In “The Age of Anxiety”, the poet W.H. Auden remarks: “Gradually for each in turn the darkness begins to dissolve and their vision to take shape.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Since summer 2016, using the 10 year central government note as a benchmark, global interest rate yields for leading nations “in general” gradually have risen. The United States has been the key nation propelling “overall” debt yields upward. Also since summer 2016, marketplace trend twists and turns from the price and time perspective for this assortment of nations usually has been fairly close.

Relatively strong American economic growth and tightening Federal Reserve Board policies have played important roles in the worldwide rate increase process. The reduction of central bank yield repression is and will remain a crucial factor underpinning the long run yield increase trend. Even the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan, which have ongoing lax monetary policies, suggest they eventually will become slightly less accommodative.

Significant global credit demand in an environment where overall global debt (government, corporate, household) already is substantial also is an important element tending to boost global yields. The international government debt level as a percentage of GDP nowadays is much greater than at the advent of the 2007-09 global economic disaster. For many countries, including America, there is little likelihood for notable government debt reduction anytime soon.

Expanding United States federal budget deficits resulting from December 2017’s exciting tax “reform” legislation probably have encouraged the ascent in American yields. Given the importance of America in the interconnected global economy, the US national budget deficit and debt level trends as a percentage of GDP not only will continue to generate US Treasury rate climbs over the long run, but also will assist a global upswing in yields. America’s tax reform scheme exacerbated the already massive long run federal budget problem (big deficits alongside entitlement spending, etc.; higher demand for credit). By helping to push American US government interest rates higher, the tax reform magnifies the country’s monumental debt challenge.

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Despite the broadly similar rising yield trend direction and convergence links (connections, associations) across the central (federal) government note marketplaces since summer 2016, the pattern of course is not always perfect. Also, as time passes, divergence within this “overall upward trend” may emerge. For example, whereas the US Treasury 10 year note’s yield high to date since summer 2016 is 10/9/18’s 3.26 percent,  the German Bund (81 percent on 2/8/18) and China’s 10 year central government note (11/22/17’s 4.04pc) attained their highs many months earlier. In addition, rate climbs are not all necessarily the same in distance or speed terms. For countries engaged in substantial yield repression, the advance may be fairly small and slow for quite a while.

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Fearful “flights to quality” occasionally may inspire yield falls in so-called safe haven government debt instruments issued by nations such as America, Germany, and Japan. Central banks likely will become (or remain) highly accommodative if the global recovery appears seriously threatened. The reality of or omens pointing to feebler than expected (desired) GDP growth (in conjunction with other variables) may spark such yield declines, and perhaps also induce renewed accommodative central bank actions (or at least soothing rhetoric from such earnest guardians).

In the current marketplace situation, additional notable erosion in the prices of global stock marketplace benchmarks from their calendar 2018 summits might also inspire relatively significant retreats in debt yields. For example, a decline in the S+P 500 of nearly twenty percent or more from its autumn 2018 peak could connect with government yield declines (and perhaps with the emergence of central bank propaganda or action to rally stock prices).

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The major (long run) trend for US government interest rate yields, and for other nations around the globe, probably remains up. Despite tumultuous twists and turns, the long run upward march in government interest rate yields which commenced around the middle of 2016 likely will remain intact. The UST 10 year note’s 3.26 percent high yield will be exceeded.

However, the declines in global stock marketplaces (especially the S+P 500’s slump since its September 2018/October 2018 peak), especially if interpreted alongside the failure of German and Chinese 10 year government notes to establish yield new yield highs close in time to those in the UST (and other important countries), warn that a temporary halt to (or noteworthy slowdown in) the overall global pattern of rising government rates (including in America) is being established. Some yield declines in government notes may be rather dramatic. However, based upon a perspective of a long run extending for several years from now, such yield descents probably will be temporary.

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Twists, Turns, and Turmoil- US and Other Government Note Trends (11-12-18)

JAPAN: FINANCIAL ARCHERY, SHOOTING ARROWS © Leo Haviland October 5, 2018

The famous military philosopher and analyst Carl von Clausewitz states in “On War” (Book Two, chapter 3; italics in original): “Rather than comparing it [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale.”

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

In late 2012, the Japanese political leadership dramatically unveiled its three “arrows” of easy money, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reform to improve the country’s economic performance. In practice, those Japanese political authorities generally represent major financial (corporate; commercial) interests (“Japan, Inc.”). The Bank of Japan’s policies since late 2012, though nominally independent of political and economic power centers, in practice reflects the goals of Japan’s substantial entrenched economic groups and the political representatives and bureaucrats aligned with them.

Monetary policy of course is not the only factor affecting GDP, inflation, and other intertwined variables. Yet Japan’s ongoing government fiscal deficit, though somewhat helpful for promoting growth and inflation, is not the most noteworthy element in the country’s policy array since end-2012. Moreover, the general government debt burden remains massive and likely will remain so for many years. According to the International Monetary Fund, Japan’s general government gross debt as a percent of GDP was 236.4 percent in 2017 (contrast the G-7 average of 118.6pc that year) and forecast at 236.0pc for 2018 and 234.2pc in 2019, dipping only slightly to 229.6pc by 2023 (“Fiscal Monitor”, April 2018, Table A7; the October 2018 update probably will not change Japan’s government debt as a percent of GDP statistics substantially). And structural reform in Japan, which usually crawls forward slowly, has been unremarkable.

The extremely easy monetary policy arrow embraced by the accommodative Japanese central bank for almost six years is the country’s critical weapon. The central bank chief faithfully and repeatedly proclaims that sustained inflation of two percent is a praiseworthy goal (as essentially do the sermons preached by other leading central banks such as the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank). The Bank of Japan’s ongoing tools to achieve its aims include sustained yield repression and massive quantitative easing (money printing). So far, the Bank of Japan, despite its determination, has not come close to achieving two percent inflation. The consumer price trend in recent months manifests merely minor progress on that front. And although Japan’s quarterly GDP for April-June 2018 may signal enhanced year-on-year economic performance, International Monetary Fund forecasts are not as sunny.

Yet what else has the Bank of Japan (as a representative and reflection of the country’s political and economic generals) really battled to achieve via its remarkably lax monetary strategy? A notion of improved and acceptable economic growth and frequent reference to an iconic two percent “price stability target” do not offer a complete story. Moreover, the enthusiastic declaration of assorted monetary policy plans and tactics does not directly reveal important aspects about the economic (financial; commercial; marketplace) landscape within which the interrelated GDP and inflation goals are targeted and such extraordinary easy money programs are designed and applied.

In practice, what are the intermediate connections (means; methods) to the achievement of the allegedly ultimate ends of satisfactory growth and sufficient inflation? One key approach of the Bank of Japan’s magnificent scheme relates to currency depreciation, the other to stock marketplace appreciation. Japan’s central bank sentinel quietly has aimed to achieve the related objectives of Yen weakness and Japanese stock marketplace strength.

In recent times, Japan deliberately has kept a relatively low profile in foreign exchange, trade, and tariff conflicts. Compare the furious racket nowadays, especially since the advent of the Trump presidency, around the United States and China (and also in regard to the European Union, Mexico/Canada/NAFTA).

Nevertheless, for several years, Japan has waged a trade war (engaged in fierce currency competition) without capturing much international political attention or media coverage. The Bank of Japan (and its political and economic allies) in recent years has fought vigorously to depreciate the Yen (especially on an effective exchange rate basis) and thereby to bolster Japan’s current account surplus. Japan’s overall economic growth relies significantly on its net export situation. The Yen’s substantial retreat and its subsequent stay at a relatively low level and the significant expansion in the country’s current account surplus are glorious triumphs.

Since late 2012, the Bank of Japan also has struggled ferociously to rally the Japanese stock marketplace (boost corporate profits). As of early autumn 2018, this guardian has achieved significant victories in this campaign as well.

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Japan- Financial Archery, Shooting Arrows (10-5-18)

STOCK MARKETPLACE MANEUVERS: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE © Leo Haviland September 4, 2018

“Danger always strikes when everything seems fine.” From the movie “Seven Samurai” (Akira Kurosawa, director)

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OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

American stock indices inspire an assortment of competing stories regarding them, including reasons for their past, present, and future levels and trends. Narratives and explanations regarding a broad “national” stock marketplace indicator such as the S+P 500 often involve those of equity weathervanes elsewhere. Discussions of interest rates, currencies, commodities, and other financial indicators may interrelate with stock marketplace analysis. These tales frequently indicate the extent to which given marketplace domains converge and diverge (lead or lag) with each other.

Many descriptions and analyses regarding broad benchmarks such as the S+P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average appear relatively unique to the United States. However, economic regions and marketplaces around the world increasingly have intertwined during the course of globalization in recent decades.

Therefore the directional travels (bull and bear adventures) of America’s “overall” stock marketplace increasingly have tended to parallel (converge with) stocks of other significant advanced countries and regions. In the increasingly intertwined global economy, trends of emerging marketplace stocks “in general” have interrelated with and often (but not always) resembled those of leading advanced nations.

Various advanced nation and emerging marketplace stock indices achieved very important highs “together” early in first quarter 2018. However, in recent months, probably beginning around the end of first quarter 2018, the generally bullish trend of the S+P 500 and other noteworthy US equity marketplace benchmarks have diverged substantially from the bearish trend of emerging marketplace stocks. Climbing US interest rates and a renewed rally in the broad real trade-weighted dollar, plus increasing trade war rhetoric, encouraged the relative and overall feebleness in emerging marketplace stocks.

In addition, the S+P 500 and other US stock indices have diverged somewhat from those of other key advanced nations, though less substantially than relative to emerging stock marketplace realms. Nevertheless, important European and Japanese stock arenas currently remain under their January 2018 highs (and mid-May 2018 ones). The failure of these overseas stock battlegrounds to achieve new highs alongside American ones, when interpreted alongside the decline in emerging marketplace stocks (and in relation to other economic variables), further hints that American stock benchmarks probably are establishing an important price peak around current levels.

In this context, bearish indicators for American equities include the longer run trend of rising US interest rates (note the yield lows of  July 2016 and September 2017), mammoth global debt totals, expanding American federal government budget deficits (aided by tax “reform”), and the rally in the broad real trade-weighted US dollar above a critical height. The Federal Reserve and other key central banks are not displaying signs of further easing; instead, the bias is toward tightening (even if only at a rather glacial pace). Also, United States stock marketplace valuations arguably are high by historical standards. A global trade war (tariff fights), or at least noteworthy skirmishes, is underway.

Populist pressures have not disappeared in America or elsewhere. Economic, political, and other cultural divisions in America are significant. What if the US mid-term elections this autumn return the Democrats to power in the House of Representatives (and perhaps the Senate as well)? Concerns about the quality of US Presidential leadership remain widespread.

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The US tax “reform” legislation enacted in December 2017 has been a critical factor in creating the price divergence since around late first quarter 2018 between American stock price benchmarks and those elsewhere. The US corporate tax cut translated into higher reported earnings for American companies and thereby helped to rally American stocks. Other leading countries around the globe did not enact a similar generous gift for their corporations. Moreover, America’s tax reform likely further encouraged share buybacks by US corporations.

The second quarter 2018 blended earnings growth rate for the S+P 500 was 25.0 percent year-on-year (FactSet, “Earnings Insight”; 8/31/18). Thomson Reuters estimates S+P 500 2Q18 earnings soared 24.8pc (“S&P 500 Earnings Scorecard”; 8/28/18). Thomson Reuters data notes that 1Q18’s earnings likewise skyrocketed, up 26.6pc year-on-year (compare 4Q17’s boost of 14.8pc and 3Q17’s 8.5pc rise).

Both FactSet and Thomson Reuters forecast significant year-on-year earnings increases for the S+P 500 over the next two quarters of 2018. FactSet says analysts are projecting earnings will climb 20.0 percent in 3Q18 and 17.4pc in 4Q18. Thomson Reuters puts year-on-year earnings growth at roughly similar levels, with 3Q18 ballooning 22.3pc and 4Q18 up 20.3pc.

However, the rate of earnings increases slows in 2019. FactSet states earnings growth in 1Q19 will be 7.2pc year-on-year, with 2Q19 stretching up 7.5pc versus 2Q18. Thomson Reuters places 1Q19 growth at 8.2pc year-on-year, with that for 2Q19 up 9.3pc.

Perhaps the wonderful US corporate earnings of first half 2018 will be followed by the impressive earnings forecast for the balance of 2018. However, if notable shortfalls in actual earnings relative to such lofty current profit expectations occur, that probably will worry many stock bulls. Going forward, if forecasts for first half 2019 earnings for the S+P 500 are cut relative to current expectations, will that make S+P 500 bulls (“investors” and others) fearful. After all, the currently anticipated (conjectural) calendar 2019 earnings growth already dips significantly from those of calendar 2018’s quarters.

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Stock Marketplace Maneuvers- Convergence and Divergence (9-4-18)